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Abstract 
Much has been said, debated and written on Article 356, 
of the Constitution of India, No part of the Constitution has 
attracted so much controversy as the provision dealing with 
the proclamation of the Presidential Rule in the states on the 
basis of Governor's report or even without it. Mere 
satisfaction on the part of President that a situation exists in a 
state, which calls for the Proclamation, is sufficient. What was 
surprising was that this "Satisfaction" is non-justifiable. The 
Administrative Reforms Commission, Sarkaria Commission 
and a host of Governors conferences have, time and again, 
recommended for the minimum use of Article 356 and that it 
should be the last remedy to be resorted only if other 
alternatives to form the Government fail. These 
recommendations failed to create any dent on the powers that 
be and Proclamation of Presidential Rule has become a 
common practice over since 1951. The Rajmannar Committee 
appointed by the Government of Tamil Nadu 1971 went to the 
extent of recommending its deletion from the Constitution, for 
its misuse umpteen times for political gains. 
It is in this bare ground that the present study seeks to 
attempt the whole issue in proper perspective. The thesis tries 
to analyse the Constituent Assembly Debates and the 
background, in which the provision was included in the 
Constitution, to dismiss a duly elected government. The study 
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also draws a distinction between the Nehru and Post-Nehru 
era. During the Nehru era, the judiciary simply refused to 
intervene in matters pertaining to Proclamation of Presidential 
Rule as it was considered to be the sole prerogative of the 
Union Government and the Governor, which is beyond the 
purview of the law of courts. The Kerala High Court refused 
to admit a petition challenging Presidential Rule on this 
ground. But since then, much water has flowed. There is a 
change in the attitude of the judiciary towards Presidential 
Rule in the State of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal 
Pradesh in the wake of demolition of Babri Masjid. What is 
more surprising is that even the President has asserted his 
powers by returning the Proclamation for reconsideration in 
the recent case of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, as a result of 
which Presidential Rule could not be Proclaimed in these 
States. 
The study also undertakes an analysis of the change on 
the part of judiciary. The task of Judiciary is further 
complicated by the frequent rivalries among political parties 
as it has often been called upon to resolve the crisis. For 
instance when the Janata party came into power at the Union, 
it dismissed nine governments and proclaimed Presidential 
Rule without reason or rhyme making a mockery of the federal 
and parliamentary systems. The study also focuses on the role 
of Governors in the light of Constitutional provisions and their 
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actual role, which they have been playing since the first 
General Election. 
The study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter 
deals with the adoption of Article 356. It seeks to explore the 
deliberations in the Constituent Assembly on the pros and 
cons of the adoption of Article 356. It also seeks to analyze 
the Federal and Parliamentary compulsions coming in the way 
of such enactments. The Constitution specifically includes 
"Emergency Provisions" (Article 352-360) which place the 
Union Government in an extraordinary position vis a vis the 
states. These provision, specifically devised by the founding 
fathers of the Constitution, seeks to protect the unity, 
integrity, security and sovereignty of our country from the 
possible dangers of war or external aggression, armed 
rebellion (internal disturbances), break down of constitutional 
machinery in a state or states or financial instability. The 
present thesis is, however, confined to Article 356. 
Many federal Constitutions contain provisions to tackle 
the emergency situations posing threat to Constitution, law 
and order and national sovereignty. Carl J. Frederich was of 
the view "every modern Constitution has recognised the 
problem of temporary emergencies and sought to provide for a 
temporary concentration of power to be used in overcoming 
such emergencies. The American and Australian Constitutions 
have emergency provisions in their respective Constitutions! 
The Weimer Constitutions had similar provisions, which have 
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a striking similarity to tliose of Article 356 of the 
Constitutions of India. In USA and Australia, federal 
intervention for reasons of domestic violence in States could 
be possible only on the request of federating units, where as 
the Wiemer Constitutions did not impose any such condition. 
The origin of Article 356 can be traced to section 93 of 
the Government of India Act, 1935. Under this Act, there are 
two sections (section 93 and section 45) to deal with the 
breakdown of Constitutional machinery at the provincial and 
federal levels respectively. While the Government of India 
Act, 1935, empowered both the Governor General (at the 
federal level) and the Governor (at the provincial level) to 
deal with the failure of the Constitutional machinery, 
interestingly the Present Constitution does not say anything 
about the failure of Constitutional machinery at the Union 
level. Further, Article 356 empowers only the President of 
India to issue Proclamation of emergency. The concept of 
Unitary State was rejected by the Union Constitutions 
Committee of the Constituent Assembly as well as by the 
Union Powers Committee in their reports respectively. The 
conclusion is emphatic that the soundest framework for our 
Constitution is a federation with a strong Centre as to such an 
extent that the word federation was deliberately opted out of 
the Constitution and in lieu provided for a Union of States to 
deal with post partition scenario. It conceived a strong Union, 
which, nonetheless, left a fairly wide range of subjects to the 
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provinces in which they would have the utmost freedom to 
order things as they like. During the discussions in the 
Constituent Assembly, it was pointed out by a number of 
members that the provisions of Article 356 are very sweeping 
and autocratic. Arming the Centre with special powers against 
the units is rare phenomenon in India, which is not to be found 
to this extent in other constitutions. The fears and 
apprehensions raised in the Constituent Assembly and in the 
counter-arguments by Ambedkar and company have been 
discussed in the first chapter. 
The second chapter is an attempt to highlight the use 
misuse and abuse of Article 356. The founding father of the 
Constitution discussed threadbare the provision for the 
dismissal of an elected government at the state level on 
grounds of constitutional machinery but under a broad 
consensus that it would be a measure to be seldom resorted to, 
if at all. But the way the provision was engineered to come a 
breakdown has totally defied the object of the Constituent 
Assembly in incorporating the said provision in the 
Constitution. An attempt wad to made to highlight the cases 
where the party at the Centre has misused this power for 
political and electoral gains. All political parties stand guilty 
of using Article 356 to its advantage. No other provision 
received such grievous and repeated outraging of 
constitutional modesty as Article 356 at the hands of political 
parties without any exception whatsoever. Its indiscriminate 
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use has posed a baffling problem for the federal polity. The 
need to strike a balance between State autonomy and 
imperatives of national unity and integrity, and the political 
dynamics of governance never received the consideration, it 
deserved, resulting in Union-State tension. The frequent of 
Article 356 further worsened the situation. A common 
criticism against its use has been that, more often than not, it 
has been interpreted and applied differently in similar 
situations to suit the political interests of the political party at 
the Union. It has been alleged, and even seen in many cases, 
that opposition parties or groups had seldom been given 
chance to form alternative governments. Legislative 
Assemblies were dissolved or kept in a state of suspended 
animation. President's Rule is used for partisan purposes like 
buying times to realign party strengths of sorting out intra-
party differences or for resolving leadership crisis. Parties or 
coalitions other use it then the party in power at the Union, on 
plea of corruption, political instability, maladministration, 
deteriorating state of law and order, etc. even though they 
commanded the confidence of their respective Assembly. 
Misuse of Article 356 is now an established fact. The reasons 
are not to far to seek. The Over all constitutional domination 
of the Union in the federal distribution of power is perhaps 
one reason. 
Absence of Constitutional remedies to counter or limit 
unnecessary and irrelevant interference of the Union in the 
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State's area of activity is another. Failure of the coalition 
Government at the State level to provide a stable and efficient 
system of administration has also invited the wrath of Article 
356. The urge to dominate in state matters by the Centre has 
also kept the issue alive. Besides there is a feeling that 
political complexion of governments at the Union and states 
should be the same for the smooth functioning of federation. 
This seems to be highly undemocratic and illegitimate 
principle of governing a society marked by pronounced socio, 
cultural, political and economic diversity. For example, even 
the Janta government (1977-79) did not hesitate to misuse 
Article 356, when it suited its designs. So is the case the 
present government. The will to sustained and maintain the 
federal traditions are found wanting in almost all political 
parties. 
The study has reveled that use of Article 356 was guided 
more by political considerations. It is not uncommon to 
dismiss state ministries even though they enjoy support in the 
Assembly. This happened in PEPSU (1953) Kerala (1959), 
Haryana (1967), U.P. (1970), Tamil Nadu (1976) and nine 
states in (1977) and the same number in (1980). Secondly the 
focus of Article 356 was directed to prevent a non-congress 
party or a combination of parties to form the Government by 
all means, fair or fall. This happened in PEPSU (1953) Kerala 
(1965) Rajasthan (1967) and West Bengal (1971). Third non-
Congress parties were denied the opportunity to form the 
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ministries when tlie Congress Government or a coalition witii 
the congress as a dominant partner, resigned from office in 
anticipation of the defeat on the floor of House. This was done 
in Pondichery (1966), Bihar and West Bengal (1971), Orissa 
(1973) and Nagaland (1988). This provision was also 
employed to Prevent non-Congress parties to form an 
alternative Ministry after the defeat of Congress Government 
on the floor of the House. This happened in Andhra Pradesh 
1954 and Manipur (1969). Fourth, it was also found that 
Article 356 was used to pressurise the Congress Chief 
Ministers having majority in a State Assembly to resign for 
resolving factional and intra-party conflicts. This happened 
for in Punjab (1951), Manipur (1973, 75), Gujarat (1974) and 
Orissa, (1975). In all these case, the interest of the party at the 
Center were protected. It is rather surprising that no attempt 
were made to form alternative governments on the defeat or 
resignation of the government. The role of the Assembly to 
test the strength of the party was appropriated by the UnioOn 
Government. 
The third chapter deals exclusively with the Nehru era. 
Nehru, the undisputed leader of the congress and the nation, 
who had a record of opposing all that is undemocratic, 
unlawful, dictatorial, also did not refrain from invoking 
Article 356 for reasons other than those mentioned in the 
Constitution. As a matter of fact, there was no need for him to 
resort to these extra-ordinary measures, when he or his party 
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even did not think of a defeat not only at the Centre but also 
in the majority of the states. The trend to proclaim presidential 
Rule was set by the congress, for the posterity to follow. The 
congress, which vehemently opposed the Government of India 
Act, 1935, was too happy to adopted the same strategy once it 
replaced the British as the ruler of the sub continent. And it 
passed on the tradition to the Janta Party in 1977, got it back 
in 1980, 1984 and 1991 to pursue the policy which had by non 
acquired the imprimatur of a routine Constitutional 
instruments in the hands of whoever was in power. The present 
NDA Government did not lag behind. The tradition continues. 
The proper working of the office of the Governor in India is of 
crucial importance not only for the proper functioning of the 
federation but also for the success of democratic system of 
Government in the country. The provisions, which established 
the office of the Governor for each state and defined the 
manner of his appointment and his functions and duties, were 
debated threadbare in the Constituent Assembly. Despite 
controversies, he still occupies a pivotal position in the Indian 
federal setup. The Governors are constitutional heads of the 
states yet they cannot ignore the Union Government. They 
have a dual responsibility to carter to the requirements of both 
the Union and the units. The study attempts to focus on the 
role of governors in the light of the provisions of the 
Constitution as well as from the point of view of real politik. 
The Governor was expected to be a non-party man 
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maintaining distance from party politics and guiding the 
destiny of the state as an elderly statesman. This is, however, 
a tall order. Under the present fragile political scenario, it is 
difficult to expect, that the Governor would act an objective 
manner, especially when the Union Government appoints him. 
The office of the Governor deteriorated into a sinecure for 
ruling party rejects, in destructive mediocre and superannuated 
bureaucrats meriting rewards for service rendered, thereby 
rendering the office to an extension to of the Union 
Government in states. Several governors were embroiled in 
controversies in recent times when the party in power provided 
them considerable room for maneuver. 
The fifth chapter is an attempt to analyse the change in 
the attitude of judiciary vis a vis Article 356. From Kerala to 
Bommai, the judiciary underwent radical changes as far as the 
interpretation of the Constitution is concerned. In the 
dissolution of Kerala Assembly, the High Court simply refused 
to admit the petition challenging Presidential Rule, but years 
later in the Dissolution Case the apex court made an extremely 
significant contribution to the issue off Proclamation of 
Presidential Rule in a state the thesis has made a modest 
attempt to explain this phenomenon. It made it clear that 
Court 's can no longer remain passive spectators to political 
manipulations and arbitrary dismissal of states governments. 
The question of judicial review once again dominated in the 
scene, after the historic case of Golaknath. It culminated in 
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the landmark judgement in Bommai where the Supreme Court 
not only widened the scope of judicial review, but also 
declared that if the Proclamation is malafide, the dissolved 
Assembly must be reinstalled. The Supreme Court came out 
with a more liberal judgement, which dawned a new era of 
judicial activism. 
Finally, the conclusion highlights the problem in totality 
and suggests ways and means to end the impasse often created 
by the indiscriminate use of Article 356. India adopted the 
West Minister model but at the same time provided in the 
Constitution, implicitly, the American concept of judicial 
review. Although no real power was given to the President yet 
he is not a mere figurehead. This was proved true and again 
recently President K.R. Naraynan successfully thwarted the 
attempts of the Prime Minister and the Home Minister at 
Proclamation of Presidential Rule by dismissing the Rabri 
Devi Government in Bihar. 
It was suggested that before the State Government is 
dismissed and Presidential Rule imposed, the Governor should 
consult the State Government and obtain its comments. Again 
before issue of Proclamation, the President should convey the 
reasons for the action contemplated and take into 
consideration the opinion of the State Government before 
taking a final recourse to Article 356. It is necessary for the 
Governors and the President in fulfilment of their duties, cast 
upon the Union Executive under Article 355, to try other 
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avenues including consultation with the State Council of 
Ministers, where necessary, to prevent a situation of 
breakdown of the constitutional machinery in the State, before 
making use of Article 356. A warning to the errant state before 
the proclamation will also go a long way in improving the 
situation. However, in grave situations, these exercises may 
not be possible for the Governor to undertake. Governors must 
behave in a dignified manner in consonance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. They are not subordinate or 
subservient to the Government of India. The office of the 
Governor is a constitutional one, not a mere pleasure 
appointment and there is absolutely no justification on the part 
of Governors to behave in a partisan manner. However, to 
remove this lacunae certain safeguards can be evolved to 
ensure their independence both by Constitutional Amendments 
or otherwise. Another safeguard would be to incorporate a 
provision of impeachment of Governors by State Assembly in 
the Constitution by suitably amending it. This will hangs like 
Damocles' Sword over the head of Governors, and make them 
behave in a responsive and responsible manner. 
So far as the deletion of Article 356 is concerned, it is 
submitted that it is a bulwark of the Constitution. If Article 
356 is deleted. Article 365 would lose relevance and use of 
Article 355 in the absence of Article 356 might bring a drastic 
change in Union-state Relations, which may prove worse from 
the point of view of both the states, and the Union. In 
Abstract xiii 
considering tlie issues raised regarding tiie Article 356, it is 
found that tiie remedy to prevent its misuse lies in the domain 
of creating safeguards and constitutional conventions 
governing its use. The ultimate protection against the misuse 
of Article 356 lies in the hands of political actors. The 
provision therefore, is necessary, despite all the controversy, 
to be used as the last resort and should be used sparingly to 
meet grave constitutional crises. 
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Preface 
The study seeks to make an analysis of Article 356 of the 
Constitution of India, the very inception of the Constitution. 
The provision is largely a replica of section 93 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935. Section 93 and 45 of the Act 
deal with the breakdown of Constitutional machinery at the 
provincial and federal levels respectively. While the 
Government of India Act, 1935 empowered both the Governor 
General (at the federal level and the Governor at the 
provincial level) to deal with the failure of Constitutional 
machinery, interestingly the present Constitution does not say 
any thing about the failure of Constitutional machinery at the 
Union level. Further Article 356 empowers only the president 
of India to issue Proclamation. Article 356, which has become 
one of the most hotly debated topic of the Constitution of 
India. More so in the recent years no part of the Constitution 
has attracted so much controversy as the provision dealing 
with the Proclamation of the Presidential Rule in the States on 
the basis of Governor's report or even without it. Mere 
satisfaction on the part of President that a situation exists in a 
state, which calls for the Proclamation, is sufficient. What is 
surprising is that this satisfaction is non-justifiable. The 
concept of Unitary State was rejected by the Union 
Constitutions Committee of the Constituent Assembly as well 
as the Union Power's Committee in their reports. The 
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Constituent Assembly opted for a federation without 
mentioning the word as such with a strong Centre, totally 
efficient from the conventional type of federation. This 
explains the inclusions of the words. Union of States in the 
Article 1 of the Constitution. It is in this background the 
present study seeks to attempt the whole issue in proper 
perspective. An analysis of the Constituent Assembly Debates 
and the background, in which the Article was included in the 
Constitution to dismiss a duly elected government, in an 
imperative. It tries to examine the concept of federalism in 
depth. During the discussion in the Constituent Assembly, it 
was pointed out that the provisions of the Article 356 are very 
sweeping and autocratic. Arming the Union with overriding 
powers against the units is a rare federal phenomenon. The 
fears and apprehensions raised in the Constituent Assembly 
and the counter arguments by Ambedkar and others have been 
discussed in the first chapter. The reasons and circumstances 
which led to the adoption of Article 356have been discussed. 
The second chapter is an attempt to highlight the use, misuse 
and abuse of Article 356. An attempt is also made to highlight 
the cases where this power has been misused for political and 
electoral gains by the party at the Centre. All political parties 
stand guilty of using Article 356to its advantage. No other 
provision received such grievous and repeated outraging of 
constitutional modesty as Article 356 at the hands political 
parties, without any exception whatsoever. Its indiscriminate 
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use has posed a baffling problem for the federal polity. The 
need to strike a balance between the state autonomy and 
imperatives of national unity and political dynamics of 
governance, never received the consideration, it deserved, 
resulting in Union state tension. The frequent use of Article 
356 far from promoting cooperative federalism, which is so 
essential for the development of the country, has led to 
confrontation between the Union and units. 
The third chapter deals exclusively with the Nehru era. 
Nehru, the undisputed leader of the congress part and the 
nation, who had a record of opposing all that is undemocratic, 
unlawful, and dictatorial also did not refrain from invoking 
Article 356 for reasons other than those mentioned in the 
Constitution. As a matter of fact, there was no need for him to 
resort to this extra ordinary measure, when he or his party did 
not even think of a defeat not only at the Centre but also in the 
majority of the states. 
The fourth chapter throws light on the role of the 
Governor in India. It is of crucial importance not only for the 
proper function of the federation but also for the success of 
Parliamentary democracy. Consequently the institution of the 
Governor Constitutionally designed to be non-partisan has 
steadily become politicized. Governors are viewed as agents of 
the ruling party in state of independent Constitutional heads of 
states. The Governors have a pivotal role to play in easing the 
tension between the Union and the states. It then becomes 
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necessary for the Governors to have cordial relations with the 
Chief Minister as well as the Union Government. As head of 
the state he is not expected to act in a partisan manner. But the 
way, the Governors have helped the party at the Centre, in 
foisting Presidential Rule, have totally disturbed the fragile 
balance between the Union and states. 
The subsequent chapter highlights the role of judiciary 
V/.S- a vis Article 356 of the Constitution. In the initial year of 
the Indian Republic, the courts refrained from pronouncing its 
verdict on Article 356. The Kerala High Court come refused to 
intervene in the Proclamation of emergency and subsequent 
imposition of President's Rule. But over the years, the 
judiciary has underwent a change along with a change in the 
political scenario in the country. It recalled its activist role on 
the case of Bommai, where the apex court declared the 
dismissal of the Chief Minister and the dissolution of the 
Assembly in Karnataka as ultra vires of the Constitution. It 
made it clear that the courts have a role to play even in 
political matters, and judiciary can interfere if powers under 
Article 356are misused or used with issued malafide 
intentions. Slowly but steadily the scope of judicial review 
was widened. The fifth chapter aims at providing an insight 
into the judicial mind on this vital Constitutional issue. 
Finally the conclusion of the thesis in totality and 
suggests ways and means to end the impasse. Despite much 
recommendation by the various committees or commissions. 
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the use rather misuse of the provisions under Article 356 still 
continued with impunity. There was a demand for its deletion 
from several quarters. But that, perhaps, is more political 
demand because if it is deleted Article 365 would lose its 
relevance and use of Article 355 in the absence of Article 356 
might bring a drastic change in the federal system, which may 
be worse from the point of view of both the States and the 
Union. The need is to evolve a balance between the Union and 
the States by evolving healthy conventions and judicious 
interpretation of the Constitution ensuring the emergence of 
cooperative federalism. 
^AaAt&t-<i 
ADOPTION OF ARTICLE 356 IN THE 
CONSTITUTION 
An understanding of Article 356^ of the Constitution of 
India necessitates an understanding of the origin and 
implications, very often conflicting, of federation in the 
context of India. Federalism is originated in the experiences 
gathered from political experiments not merely for defense but 
also for a number of other subjects, such as control of foreign 
affairs, inter-state and foreign commerce, export and import 
and the like, which are matters of national concern to be dealt 
with by a national government while other matters such as 
public order, public health, fire, water and electricity, and 
other such local issues are left to local governments or state 
governments for management and administration. Historically, 
the earliest form of political organization is not federal but 
unitary. But it is the pressure of socio-economic and political 
circumstances which impelled unitary states to enter into 
alliance with others states for meeting common problems 
which initially, related to defence and later engulfed other 
areas too. It was with the adoption of the Constitution of the 
U.S.A. in 1789 that the concept of a federal state emerged in a 
definite shape. Subsequently the adoption of federal form in 
Canada, Switzerland and Australia gave a great impetus to 
federalism and a number of federal constitutions have cropped 
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Up since two wars notable amongst which are the former 
USSR, West Germany, India, Malaysia and Nigeria. 
A federation is a compromise between regional autonomy and 
national integration. But as we shall presently see, it takes one step 
ahead of other loose forms of alliances between independent states 
in that it creates a national government apart from the state 
governments. Both the national and state governments owe their 
existence and drive their powers from the federal constitution and 
both are separate legal entities. As K.C. Wheare puts it, "there is a 
single authority for the whole area in respect of some matters and 
there are independent regional authorities for other matters".^ 
There is a difficulty in defining federalism as it lacks 
unanimity among political scientists and jurists. More over it has 
become habitual with orthodox scholars on the subject to start with 
the model of the U.S.A, the oldest (1787) of all federal 
constitutions in the world and to exclude any system that does not 
conform to that model from the category of 'federation'.'' But a 
number of countries have adopted the federal structure , not exactly 
following the US model. 
A more liberal view was however, expressed as early as 1863 
by the historian, Freeman, when after an examination of the 
existing governments he observes,"* "the name federal government 
may be applied to any Union of component members where the 
degree of Union between the members surpasses that of mere 
alliance, however intimate, and where the degree of independence 
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possessed by each member surpasses any thing which can fairly 
come under the head of mere municipal freedom". The American 
scholars on federalism, categorically asserted that the questioin 
whether a state is federal or unitary is one of degree and the answer 
will depend upon the federal features that a Constitution possesses. 
And another view is that a federation is more functional than an 
institutional concept and that any theory which asserts that there 
were certain inflexible characteristics without which a political 
system can not be federal ignores the fact "that institutions are not 
the same thing in different social and cultural environments". Those 
institution are not the same in different social and cultural 
environments". This explains the transformation that has 
undergone over the years in the traditional federal structure and 
pattern. In the U.S.A. itself the process of centralization, aided by 
the Supreme Court by way of liberal interpretation of the federal 
power of inter state commerce^ and general welfare or the 
supremacy clause in Art VI(2) or defence [Art.l S.8(l)] as well as 
by inventing the judicial doctrine of 'implied powers^ of the federal 
legislature, national pre-emption and judicial recognition of co-
operative federalism^, affected the conventional balance between 
Union and states. 
The Australian Constitution Act of 1900 was formed on the 
American model. It provided judicial review to maintain and 
regulate the distribution of powers. And the judicial interpretation 
of the Australian federation up to 1920, held the balance in favour 
of the reserved rights of states^ * .^ Since 1920, however, the trend 
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has been definitely towards expansion of federal powers by judicial 
interpretation (as in the U.S.A.). And in due course of time, the 
federal government has emerged more and more powerful VLS' a vis 
the states. For instance, the postal power and power relating to 
inter-state and foreign trade and commerce, by applying the 
principle of progressive interpretation, has strengthened the federal 
government. The doctrine of inconsistency in sec. 109 was 
interpreted more to the advantage of the federal government by 
putting an end to the doctrine of reserved powers of the states by 
holding that the federal legislature could exclude state jurisdiction 
by its own act. The High Court^ ^ has itself explained that this 
liberal interpretation of commonwealth powers at the cost of 
reserved powers of the states is due to the vast changes in the 
national and international set up and scenario that call for greater 
national powers to foster unity and stability. The colonies became 
components of a federation, a commonwealth of Australia 
culminating into a nation. Its statehood was further consolidated by 
economic and commercial integration. In the same vein, it ought to 
be pointed that federalism in Canada also could not remain 
unaffected by this new trend towards a strong federal government 
and the powers of the state were confined to matters enumerated in 
sec. 92 and residuary powers were vested in the Union under Sec. 
91. Judicial interpretation, however, did expand the powers of 
provincial Legislatures, mainly by liberal interpretation of Sec. 
92(13)^\ but the various amendments to the Constitution have 
circumscribed the powers of the provincial legislatures'\ specially 
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in concurrent legislation, where in case of conflict the federal law 
would prevail over the laws enacted by the provincial legislatures^"*. 
Seen in this perspective, the Constituent Assembly in India also 
could not deviate from the prevailing practice. Besides, the 
confusion and turmoil generated by partition of the sub continent, 
the rise of communal violence and a poor economic structure 
prompted the framers of the Constitution to opt for Union of States 
in lieu of the conventional federation. The word federation was 
deliberately avoided by the Constituent Assembly to strengthen the 
Union Government vis a vis the States. It is this peculiar nature of 
the Indian federation which led K.C. Whereare to classify the 
Indian Constitution as quasi-federal'^ a federation with features of a 
unitary state. The Constitution itself has prescribed the limits and 
the parametes restricting the powers of the states to few matters. 
Even the Constitution of the United States of America under Article 
IV sec. 4 stipulates that the U.S.A. will guarantee'^ to every state in 
this Union a republican form of Government and shall protect each 
of them against invasion and on application of legislature or of the 
Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened) against 
domestic violence. This provision provides for both guarantee 
clause and protection clause. The impact of the above is quite 
visible on the Constituent Assembly in India. The draft Article 277-
A (now Article 355) also provide an implicit guarantee for the 
protection of parliamentary system of government in states. It was 
also influenced by section 93 of the Government of India Act 
1935, which provided that if a Governor of a province is satisfied 
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that the situation has arisen in which the government of a province 
can not be carried out in accordance with the provision of the said 
Act, he could by proclamation assume to himself, all or any of the 
powers vested in or exercisable by a provincial body or authority 
including the ministry and the legislature and to discharge those 
functions in his discretion. The only exception was that under this 
section, the Governor could not encroach upon the powers of the 
High Court^^. Section 45 conferred a similar power on the Governor 
General with respect to the Central Government. The Act of 1935 
contemplated for the first time, delegation of certain limited powers 
of government to the Ministries formed by the Indian Political 
parties. The British Government assigned limited powers to the 
Ministries and the Governor - General's special responsibilities 
remained in tact. The Indian leaders entered the legislature within 
view to break the government from within. The said section, 
therefore, provided that if any time, the Governor or the Governor 
General felt that the ministry in the province or at the Centre was 
not acting in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, he 
could resume these power and exercise the same in his discretion. 
The Article 356 was discussed threadbare by the Constituent 
Assembly and was finally adopted. Basically this provision and 
India's federal system have their roots in the Government of India 
Act of 1935. However, certain deviations were introduced to meet 
the compulsion of a newly independent state. The Constitution 
provided for a Union of States. It adopted a federation without 
mentioning it in explicit terms. The structure is heavily borrowed 
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from Canada where the unitary elements are clearly visible. The 
Constitution of India bestowed more powers on the Union 
Government, even to intervene in the conduct of the affairs of state 
governments, which cuts across the conventional federal 
principles'^. However, India's federalism fulfils the pluralistic 
requirements and the desire to carve unity out of diversity. Laski 
holds that since society is federal in nature, the state and its 
authority must be so organized that the diversities have a place 
therein. But without denying element of truth contained in these 
arguments we must add that if the diversities are not grouped 
territorially it is better not to use the term federalism because in 
that case, what is really meant is functional pluralism'^. 
In the American constitution, the federal state first assumed a 
definite political status. Bryce enunciated the difference between 
the federal states and the confederation as depending upon the 
extent of the federal government controlling every citizen of the 
Constituent State directly or through a governmental organ which 
could restrain the component units within allotted sphere. The 
indestructibility of the Union created by a rigid Constitution and 
self governing local government with power of initiative where the 
live characteristics of the federation, the distribution of powers 
being effected positively by conferring certain powers on the 
national government and negatively by imposing certain restriction 
on the states^°. Willoughby assumes that to the federal states 
national sovereignty should be conceded. The federal unit must be 
sovereign and have the right of nullification, which is the true test 
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in the distinction in between confederation and federation . The 
Indian federation is different from this classical model. 
The test of federation, according to Dicey, is supremacy of 
the Constitution, distribution of powers between the federation 
and federating units and the power of the interpretation of the 
Constitution to be based on contract which must be necessarily 
rigid. Dicey mentions two conditions as necessary^^, first of all 
there must some units with a desire for Union. The desire for 
Union is the resultant of a variety of forces. Here also there is no 
fixed rules but different factors operate in different federations. But 
there are some factors which are almost invariably present, such as 
sense of military insecurity and a desire for military strength and 
expectations of economic advantages, have largely contributed to 
the growth of federations. The menace of powerful neighbours 
endangering the existence of small states has often been the basis of 
federation. That a federation secures peace and tranquillity more 
than small detached states, has been ably discussed by Jay in "The 
Federalist," "who says, that one good national government vastly 
affords more security against danger of external aggression^"\ The 
economic factors are no less important. The thirteen federating 
colonies of America in 1787 were not only anxious to stabilize their 
hard won independence but also to enhance their economy by 
meaningful cooperation with each other. In the Federalist, 
Hamilton has pointed out these advantages of the Union. He writes, 
an unrestrained intercourse between the states themselves will 
advance the trade of each by an inter-change of their respective 
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production not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but 
for exportation to foreign market . 
Similarly of social and political institutions also create a 
desire for Union, but this does not mean that there should be a 
similarity on all fronts. Some amount of divergence is compatible 
with the desire to unite. The same is true of ethnological factors 
also, racial and cultural ties, language, race, religion, nationality, 
and caste. But it is possible nonetheless, that people differing in 
these respects may feel a strong desire for Union if other 
considerations are present. 
The federal idea attracted various thinkers in India from early 
times. As early as 1904 in his Presidential address to the 20"' 
session of the Indian National Congress, Henry Cotton, touched 
upon the federal idea^^ "The ideal of an Patriot", said Henry 
Cotton, "is the establishment of a federation of free and separate 
states, the United States of India, placed on a fraternal footing with 
the self governing colonies, each with its local autonomy cemented 
together under the aegis of Great Britain"'^^. Henry cotton admitted 
that this was a forecast and did not elucidate this ideal further. 
However, no serious consideration was given to the idea of an 
Indian federation, but the necessity of decentralization was felt 
both in the official and non-official circles to meet the 
compulsions of efficient administration in a country of India's size 
and magnitude. In 1915, O.K. Gokhele in his Political Testament 
did raise this issue of provincial autonomy^^ implying thereby both 
freedom of Provincial Governments from Central control as well as 
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responsible governments in the Provinces . That Indian should 
have the same constitutional status in the comity of nations the 
represented by the British empire as the Dominion of Canada, the 
Common Wealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the 
Union of South Africa and the Irish Free States. The need of a 
Parliament with powers to make laws for good governance and an 
executive responsible to the Parliament to be termed as the 
Commonwealth of India^^, was also felt 
But even with larger representation than the states were 
entitled to enjoy on strict population basis and preferential 
treatment regarding the surrendering of powers to the federal 
government, the enthusiasm of the Princes soon began to evaporate. 
The second Round Table conference lacked the flavour which 
marked the First and the Third. In the First Round Table 
Conference, the Princes made their declaration in support of an All 
India Federation, The British Government adopted the ideal of an 
All India federation and on the basis of agreements arrived at 
during the Round Table Conferences, a parliamentary white paper 
was prepared. This was subjected to a searching enquiry by a Joint 
Parliamentary Committee appointed for the purpose. After the 
submission of the report of Joint Parliamentary Committee, a bill 
was introduced in the British Parliament, culminating in the 
Government of India Act 1935 which for the first time provided for 
an All-India Federation. 
The proximate origin of the emergency powers can be traced 
back to the Government of India Act 1935. Section 93 of the Act 
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provided that if the Governor of the Province was satisfied that a 
situation has arisen in which the government of the Province can 
not be carried out in accordance with the Provisions of this Act^ \^ 
he may by proclamation assume to himself all or any of the powers 
vested in or exercisable by the provincial body or authority, 
including Ministry and the legislature and to discharge functions 
thus assumed in his discretion. The only exception was that he 
could not encroach upon the powers of the High Courts. 
The framers of the Constitution were deeply concerned with 
the need for ensuring peace and tranquillity throughout the country. 
External aggression in Jammu and Kashmir, emergence of 
disruptive forces and wide spread violent disturbances in the wake 
of partition, prompted the Constituent Assembly to incorporate 
special provisions for dealing swiftly with grave situations of law 
and order. The need for conferring special powers on the Union 
Government was accepted. It was agreed that the President would 
be given the powers of suspending the state Legislature and 
Government. Initially it was envisaged that the Governor could 
issue^' a proclamation if a state fails to maintain peace and 
tranquillity making it difficult for a state to carry out the 
administration in accordance with the Constitution. 
An important issue for consideration before the framers was, 
whether the President and the Governor or either of them should be 
vested with special responsibilities to be discharged by them in the 
exercise of their discretion, for purposes of maintaining peace and 
tranquillity. It was decided''^ at a very early stage of Constitution 
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framing that the President should have no such special power and 
that he would exercise all his functions on the advice of council of 
Ministers. However, the question of testing the Governors with 
discretionary powers remained under prolonged consideration, the 
details of which are given in the chapter on Governor'. It will be 
sufficient to say here that the Constituent Assembly decided''^ to 
have a nominated Governor, with a duty of furnishing reports to 
the President on the circumstances prelimining in his state""*. 
Thus, finally the Constituent Assembly decided that the 
responsibility of intervention in the administration of the state, 
when it was faced with a threatened or actual break down of the 
Constitutional arrangements, would be exclusively that of the 
President in effect of the Union Government and the Governor 
would have no authority in such a situation to assume in his 
discretion, the powers of the state Government even for a short 
period^^. The Provisions so finalized, was considered to be in 
accord with the basic principle of parliamentary democracy, the 
Union Government being accountable for all its action to 
Parliament. 
Explaining the Underlying principle and purpose of 
introducing Article 355 (277 A of the Draft Constitution), the 
Chairman of the Constituent Assembly"*^ stressed that "our 
Constitution, not with standing that many of its provision bestowed 
over riding powers on the Centre, nonetheless gives, on a federal 
principle. Plenary authority to the provinces to make laws and 
administer the same in the field assigned to them. That being so, if 
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the Centre is to interfere in the administration of Provincial affairs, 
it must be under some obligation which the Constitution imposes 
upon the Centre". It was emphasised that "the 'invasion' by the 
Centre in the Provincial field must not be an invasion which is 
wanton, arbitrary, and unauthorised by law. It was precisely for this 
that a duty was cast on the Union to protect the state against 
external aggression and internal disturbances, and to ensure that the 
government of every state is carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution^^" Replying to the criticism that such 
provisions were not found in other Constitutions, it was pointed 
out, that they were based on the Principle Underlying Article IV, 
section 4 of the United States Constitution which provides, "the 
United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government and shall protect each of them 
against invasion and on an application of the Legislature or the 
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic violence". The first part of this provision is known as the 
guarantee clause^^. It was explained in the Constituent Assembly 
that in Principle the Guarantee Clause conform to the latter part f 
the Draft Article 277 A (Now Article 355) of the Constitution 
which is designed to maintain in every state Parliamentary 
Government as contemplated by the Constitution. The Protection 
Clause of Article IV (4) Corresponds to the first part of Article 355, 
with the difference that instead of expression 'invasion' and 
domestic violence, the framers of the Constitution preferred to use 
the term "external aggression" and "internal disturbance" 
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respectively which are of relatively wider amplitude. Article 355 is 
definitely an improvement over Article IV (4) of the US 
Constitution in the sense that the latter does not prescribe the 
manner in which the guarantee as to the republican form of 
government may be enforced against a state. It has no provision 
analogous to Article 356 and 357, authorizing Union Government 
or the President to suspend or to supersede the Constitutional 
machinery in a state. 
It was strangely felt that Article 355 and 356 were necessary 
to met exceptional situations like the break-down of the 
constitutional machinery in states. At the same time, it is hoped that 
healthy conventions will grow and help in ensuring that these 
extraordinary powers are used most sparingly, in extreme cases, for 
the legitimate purposes for which they are intended. An important 
point made^^ in the Constituent Assembly during the debate was, 
that mere maladministration in a state is not a good ground to 
invoke the Article as that provides sufficient opportunity for its 
misuse. Emphasizing its application, Ambedkar observed that, "it 
is not altogether to deny that there is a possibility of this Article 
being abused, or employed for Political purposes. But the objection 
applies to every part of the Constitution which gives power to 
override the provinces. That such articles will never be called into 
operation and that they would remain a dead letter. If at all they are 
brought into operation, the President who is endowed with these 
powers will take proper precautions before actually suspending the 
administration of the provinces. The first thing he would issue a 
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warning to a province that erred, that things are not happening the 
in which way they are intended to happen by the Constitution. If the 
warning fails, the second thing for him to do is to order for 
elections allowing the people of the province to settle matters by 
themselves. It is only when these two remedies fail that he would 
resort to this Article"''^. 
It is difficult to define precisely the concept of internal 
disturbance. Similar provisions, however, occur in other 
Constitution too. Article 16 of the Federal Constitution of 
Switzerland uses the expression of internal disorder. The 
Constitution of the United States of America and Australia use 
"domestic violence"'. The Constitution of India provides "internal 
disturbance which is for more wider than the expression "domestic 
violence". The Constitution of Australia under section 119 provides 
that the Commonwealth shall protect every state against any 
invasion and on an application from the government of the state 
against domestic violence. And where violence is directed against 
the Commonwealth institutions or affect matters falling within the 
Commonwealth jurisdiction, the Commonwealth can directly 
intervene without any request from the state in which the violence 
occurs or there is threat of violence"*^ Article 16 of the Constitution 
of Switzerland gives unlimited powers to the Federal Council to 
intervene on its own in case of internal disorder where the 
Government of the threatened canton is not in a position to summon 
assistance from cantons or if the disorder endangers the safety of 
Switzerland. In the same way. Article 91 of the Constitution of 
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West Germany provides for federal assistance in order to avert an 
imminent danger to the very existence of the democratic order of a 
state, if the state government makes such a request. Even if the 
State Governments do not make such requests for federal 
assistance, the Federal Government may on its own take under its 
control the Police of that State and the Police forces of other States 
also, and, in addition can deploy units of Federal Border Guard, if 
the danger extends to more than one State. After a detailed analysis 
of various Federal Constitutions of the world, the framers of the 
Constitution of India considered it fit to adopt such measures 
without however, affecting the basic federal structure. 
The framers of the Constitution did not initially want to 
emulate the example of the Government of India Act. 1935 and 
incorporate its provisions in totality. They started off with the 
fundamental proposition that law and order situation in India was 
such that some kind of emergency powers would be required to deal 
with them. As a matter of fact, the preliminary discussions on 
emergency provisions arose out of very genuine concerns for law 
and order. It was only subsequently that the Provincial Constitution 
Committee began to spell out the true implications of these 
provisions in terms of their effect on state politics. 
B.N. Rau, the Constitutional Advisor in his draft 
memorandum on the Union Constitution considered the matter of 
emergency. At the Union level, Rau suggested, the President had a 
special responsibility, which he was to fulfil in his discretion, to 
prevent grave menace to the peace and tranquility of the Union and 
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to safeguard its financial stability and credit. Similarly the 
Governors were to have discretionary power to prevent grave 
menace to the peace and tranquility in their states. But it is of 
interest to note that B.N.Rau presented no detailed picture of how 
the President, and Governor were to fulfil these special 
constitutional responsibilities."^^ 
The Union and provincial Constitutional committees jointly 
and separately considered Rau's suggestions. The former did not 
elaborate on the recommendations of the first Union Powers 
Committee and confined itself to providing that the President could 
extend a session of Parliament during an emergency for a year 
beyond its four-year term. Turning to the provinces, a joint session 
of the Union and Provincial Constitution Committees, on the 
suggestion of Sardar Patel, decided that a Governor should be 
limited to reporting a grave menace to the peace of the province to 
the President, who would take action under his own powers.'*'* On 
June 11, 1947, the Committees approved the Governor's taking 
such action in his discretion without consulting his ministers.''^ 
When the Provincial Constitution Committee's report was 
presented to the Assembly, however, the extent and reach of 
Union's authority had been lessened and the authority of Governors 
further increased. The Governor was to act in his discretion and 
that he has to report the situation to the President, and on receiving 
such a report from the Governor, the President would take 
appropriate action under his own emergency powers.""^ 
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These provisions were debated by the Constituent Assembly 
in 1947."*^  the discussions mainly centered around two issues. The 
first was an amendment moved by K.M. Munshi suggesting that 
these powers of the Governor should be extended to cover situation 
where "it is not possible to carry on the Government of the 
Province with the advice of his Minsiters." The second issue was 
whether such enormous powers should be given to the Governor at 
all or vested in the President (though at that point of time Governor 
was assumed to be an elected one) acting on the report of the 
Governor. 
The Assembly debates on the Provincial Constitution 
Committee report revealed sharp differences of opinion about 
Governor's power and his relation with his ministers and the Union 
Government. H.N. Kunzru and G.B. Pant vehemently opposed to 
the vesting of such a wide discretion in the Governor, which was 
refuted by Maitra'*^ and Prakasan"*^ Who expressed the hope that 
Indian Governors would act differently from British Governors. 
Pant argued contrary to the committee's report that Governor 
should act on the advice of his ministers while issuing and acting 
under a proclamation for emergency, but that he could report or 
refrain from reporting the state of emergency to the President in his 
discretion - thus making the Union's entry into the provincial 
affairs dependent on the discretionary power of the Governors. 
Others held that the Governor could in emergencies act in his 
discretion so far as his own ministers are concerned, but that he was 
bound to communicate the proclamation of emergency to the 
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President, who could then take what action he deemed necessary. 
K.M. Munshi moved an agreed amendment to this effect. Pant, did 
not oppose the official position. But although he accepted the party 
decision yet he believed that his amendment was sound because in 
his opinion Governors did not become what he called 'all-wise' 
simply because they were elected.^° Kunzru, ignored the whip- by 
which he was not bound, not being a congressman. He attacked the 
Governor's power to issue proclamation in his discretion, pointing 
out that even under the Governor of India Act. 1935^', Governors 
must have the Governor-General's 'concurrence' before issuing 
emergency proclamation." K.M.Munshi's amendment was carried 
and in essence did appear later as Article 188 of the Draft 
Constitution. 
The Constituent Assembly, thus, in the end accepted that the 
powers to declare an emergency should not just be extended to 
sustaining the peace but also where the government of the province 
can not be carried on with the advice of the council of ministers. 
The Governor could himself declare the emergency and inform the 
President later.^ ^ The President was given an option either to 
revoke the Governor's emergency within the two weeks or take 
more drastic action under his own wider emergency powers. 
The Assembly debate on the emergency powers continued. At 
first, under a Draft of May 1947, the President was simply going to 
have the powers to preserve peace and tranquillity and prevent any 
grave menace to the whole of it, safeguard the country's financial 
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stability and safeguard the interest of minorities. The note of May 
30, 1947^ "* prepared by B.N. Rau thus proposed. 
(1) In the exercise of his functions, the President shall have the 
following special responsibilities, that is to say: 
The prevention of any grave menace to the peace and 
tranquility of the Union or any part thereof: 
(a) the safeguarding of the financial stability and credit of the 
Union Government; 
A number of suggestions were made at this stage but then a 
serious anomaly was discovered that the Draft Union Constitution 
did not include provisions to authorize the President to act on such 
a reference. In October 1947 another draft proposal on the issue 
was prepared by Rau.^ ^ This draft was put in the shape in which it 
was finally presented in the Draft Constitution of February, 1948. 
The re-numbered article 188.^ ^ read as follows: 
(i) if at any time the Governor of a state is satisfied that 
a grave emergency has arisen which threatens the 
peace and tranquility of that state and that it is not 
possible to carry on the Government of the state in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, 
he may by proclamation declare that his functions 
shall to such extent as may be specified in the 
proclamation, be exercised by him in his discretion, 
and any such proclamation may contain such 
incidental and consequential provisions as may 
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appear to him necessary or desire for giving effect to 
the objects of the proclamation including provisions 
for suspending in whole or in part the operation of 
any provisions of this Constitution relating to any 
body or authority in the state: 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorises the 
Governor to suspend, either in whole or in part, the operation of 
any provision of this Constitution relating to High Courts. 
The Constituent Assembly debate on the draft emergency 
provisions and its modifications took place principally in August 
1949. Opposition to Governors proclaiming emergencies in their 
discretion had been steadily growing. Pant and Kunzru continued 
their resistance and were joined by many others who believed that a 
Governor should not be permitted to take action in emergencies 
without the President's concurrence or the advice of his ministers. 
As a result of strong resistance a new provision, Article 277 A " was 
incorporated ensuring that government in the provinces was carried 
in accordance with the Constitution. Thus, the Central Government 
was given a constitutional responsibility for the good governance in 
the states. Article 188 remained unaltered. It came up for 
discussions again, along with 277A, during the July 1949 meeting 
between the Drafting Committee and the provincial Prime 
Minsiters. Pant again reiterated recreated his objections to the 
discretionary power of the Goverrneor to impose emergencies, and 
Ambedkar reiterated his opinion that the Centre must have a clear 
constitutional responsibility to intervene in a province.^*^ Thus 
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Article 277A was approved and it was decided to omit Article 188 
from the Constitution. It was redrafted as Article 278 under which 
the President either on the receipt of a report form provincial 
Executive, or on his own can issues a proclamation if the 
administration in the province could not be carried on in 
accordance with the Costitution.^^ Ayyar claimed that it would be 
administratively impossible for Parliament to assume the functions 
of a state legislature. N.G. Ayyar, however, believed that this was a 
logical corollary of the Centre's emergency powers. 
On August 2, 1949, the Constitutional Assembly took up 
these and remaining articles of the Emergency Provisions. First 
Ambedkar's amendment to Article 275 was adopted, reducing the 
life A span of an emergency proclamation from six months to two, 
unless approved by Parliament. The Constituent Assembly then 
empowered the Union Executive to give direction to State 
Executive concerning the exercise of their functions. 
The provision, entitling the President during emergencies to 
suspend any or all of the provisions concerning the distribution of 
revenue, sustained several strong attacks. Kunzru believed that 
Article 277 was 'practically subversive of the financial rights of the 
states' reducing them, by removing autonomy, to the status of 
municipal and district boards.^° A.K. Aiyar replied that the states 
lost little by the provision because the collection and distribution of 
revenue was in any case controlled by Parliament. The Union 
Finance Minister naturally supported the provision because the 
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Union would bear the brunt of the cost of an emergency and must 
therefore have the necessary funds.^' The article was thus approved. 
Introducing Article 277 A, Ambedkar argued that India had a 
federal system, which meant that the states were in certain way 
sovereign and had plenary authority to make any law for peace, 
order and good government of the province. For the Union to 
intervene in a province would, therefore, be a 'wanton invasion' of 
provincial affairs. Hence Article 277 A was needed to impose on 
the Union an 'obligation' to protect the units and to maintain the 
Constitution.^^ He continued that some people might think that 
Article 277A, is merely a pious declaration, that ought not to be 
there, but we are of a different view because a similar clause 
appears even in the American Constitution as well. It is also there 
in the Australian Constitution, where the Constitution provides that 
it shall be the duty of the Central Government to protect the units 
or states from external aggression or internal Commotion. All that 
we propose to do, Ambedkar argued, is to add one more clause to 
the principle enunciated in the American and Australian 
Constitutions, namely, that it shall also be the duty of the Union to 
maintain the Constitution in the provinces as enacted by this law. 
Some members.^^ did not agree with Ambedkar and it was argued 
that Article 277 A consisted of only a pious wish rather than a 
constructive provision. One member even went to extent of saying. 
This Article 277 A is of the vaguest 
description and I submit there is a want 
of clarity or probably deliberate 
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avoidance of clarity in order to get an 
excuse for interference provincial or 
64 
State matters. 
Under the draft Article 278 (I) it was laid down, that if the 
President on receipt of a report from the Governor or Ruler of a 
State or otherwise, satisfied that the Government of the State 
cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution, the President may by Proclamation: 
(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the 
Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested 
in or exercisable by the Governor or Ruler, as the case may 
be, or any body or authority in the State other than the 
Legislature of the State: 
(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall 
be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament: 
(c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear 
to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect 
to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions of 
suspending in whole or in part the operation of any 
provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or 
authority in the State: 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise the 
President to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or 
exercisable by a High Court or to suspend in whole or in part the 
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operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to High 
Courts. 
1. Any such proclamation may be revoked or varied by a 
subsequent Proclamation. 
2. Every proclamation under this article shall be laid before 
each House of Parliament and shall except where it is a 
proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to 
operate at the expiration of two months unless before the 
expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions 
of both Houses of Parliament: 
Provided that if any such Proclamation is issued at a time 
when the House of the People is dissolved or if the dissolution of 
the House of the People takes place during the period of two 
months referred to in this clause and the Proclamation has not been 
approved by a resolution by the House of the People before the 
expiration of that period, the proclamation, shall cease to operate 
at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House 
of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the 
expiration of that period resolutions approving the Proclamation 
have been passed by both Houses of Parliament. 
A proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to 
operate on the expiration of a period of six months from the date of 
passing of the second of the resolutions approving the 
proclamation under clause (3) of this article. 
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Provided that and so often as a resolution approving the 
continuance in force of such a proclamation is passed by both 
Houses of Parliament the proclamation shall, unless revoked, 
continue in force for a further period of six months from the date 
on which under this clause, it would otherwise have ceased to 
operate, but no such proclamation shall in any case remain in force 
for more than three years: 
Provided further that if the dissolution of the House of the 
People takes place during any such period of six months and a 
resolution approving the continuance in force of such proclamation 
has not been passed by the House of the People during the said 
period, the proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of 
thirty days from the date on which the House of People first sits 
after its reconstitution unless unless before the expiration of that 
period resolutions approving the proclamation have been passed by 
both both Houses of Parliament. Article 278-A (I) Where by a 
proclamation issued under clause (I) of both Article 278 of this 
constitution it has been declared that the powers of the Legislature 
of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of 
Parliament, it shall be competent-
(a) for the Parliament to delegate the power to make laws 
for the State to the President or any other authority 
specified by him in that behalf; 
(b) for Parliament or for the President or other authority to 
whom the power to make laws is delegated under sub 
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clause (a) of this clause to make laws conferring 
powers and imposing duties or authorising the 
conferring of powers and the imposition of duties upon 
the Government of India or officers and authorities of 
the Government of India. 
(c) for the President to authorise when the House of the 
People is not in session expenditure from the 
Consolidated Fund of the State pending the sanction of 
such expenditure by Parliament; 
(d) for the President to promulgate Ordinances under 
Article 102 of this Constitution except when both 
Houses are in session; 
(2) any laws made by or under the authority of Parliament 
which Parliament or the President or the President or 
any other authority referred to in sub-clause (a) of 
clause (I) of this article would not, but for the issue of 
a proclamation under article 278 of this Constitution, 
have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the 
in competency, cease to have effect on the expiration 
of a period of one year after the proclamation has 
ceased to operate except as respect things done or 
omitted to be done before expiration of a period one 
year after the proclamation has ceased to operate 
except as respect things done or omitted to be done 
before the expiration of the said period unless the 
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provisions which shall so cease to have effect are 
sooner repealed or re-enacted with or without 
modification by an Act of the Legislature of the State. 
Let us consider the changes proposed in the new article 278. 
The first and most vital shift in strategy was that the Governor was 
stripped of his powers to declare a temporary two weeks 
emergency under the original draft article 118. Secondly, the 
President's power was enlarged by the insertion of crucial words' 
or otherwise' and he could now short circuits the Governor and 
proceeds to declare emergency even in the absence of any report 
from the Governor. Thirdly the formula for interference was quite 
vague in that the President could declare an emergency when the 
Government of the State could not be carried on in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution'. Fourthly, the new 
provisions reduced the time period for which an emergency could 
be declared by the President without the approval of Parliament 
from "six months" to "two months". Fifthly, Parliament's power to 
extend the emergency for six months at a time was affirmed. 
Finally, the new article 278A clarified the allocation of 
responsibilities between Parliament and the administration during 
the pendency of the emergency. 
H.V. Kamnath's analysis of the proposed provision deserves 
consideration, particularly his anxiety about the true import of 
term 'internal disturbance' in Article 211 A. He said that the 
crucial point is what is internal disturbance and what is not? will 
any petty not or a general melee or imbroglio in any state 
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necessitate the President's or the Union Government's intervention 
in the internal affairs of that State^^ asked Mr. Kamnath. He said 
that in entry of state list the responsibility for maintaining public 
order is that of state and thus within the jurisdiction of the state. 
Public order has been made expressly a responsibility of the State 
Government. Mr. Kamnath continued that "the state must maintain 
public order. But through a new article Article 277-A the Union 
Government shall protect state against internal disturbance. Let us 
be honest about what we are going to do. It is no use having 
mental reservation on this important point. If we are going to 
whittle down provincial autonomy, let us say so in the 
Constitution. Let us make no bones about it. It is dishonest on our 
part to say in one article that public order shall be the 
responsibility of the state and then in another to confer powers 
upon the Union Government to intervene in the internal affairs of 
the state on the lightest pretext of any internal disturbance.^'^ 
Commenting on Article 278, Kamnath observed that it seeks 
to confer more powers upon the President than were envisaged in 
Article 278 of the Draft Constitution. Firstly, the President is 
empowered to act under Article 278 not merely if he gets a report 
from the Governor or the Ruler of the state but also otherwise. 
What that "otherwise" is. God only knows. Reading all these 
articles since yesterday and the amendments moved today, is seem 
to me, that we are not going about the business in an honest 
fashion. He went on to say" 
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We here representatives of a democracy, just 
liberated from foreign slavery, sitting in 
solemnity and dignity to frame the 
Constitution of our motherland, we have 
already adopted. To my mind, this is not the 
way to go about business. It may be all right 
if we said that. "If the President receives a 
report from the Governor or the Ruler of a 
State", well and good. After all we have 
already decided that the Governor shall be 
the nominee of President If he can not have 
this trust and confidence in his own 
nominees, let us wind up this Assembly and 
go home^ .^ 
One may appreciate the logic of H.V. Kamnath but the future 
events particularly of 1997 and 1998 have proved him wrong. Both 
in U.P. in 1997 as well ass in Bihar in 1998 in spite of the 
Governor's report, the President, K.R. Narayanan, refused to 
invoke Article 356 since he did not have confidence in two 
Governors due to political motivations of their reports for the 
imposition of the President rule in the two States. 
Going back to the Constituent Assembly Debates, Shibban 
Lai Saksena who spoke immediately after Kamnath also pointed out 
the effect of Article 278 on state autonomy and also opposed word 
'otherwise'. He observed, that the powers given in Article 278 are 
far too sweeping. I am glad that the ultimate authority lies with the 
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Parliament, and therefore, we can not say that these Articles nullify 
the entire autonomy of the state. That of course, is a very important 
safeguard, because, after all has been done, ultimately the Indian 
Parliament remains a sovereign body and the final authority 
responsible for the administration of the province. The President 
also can not do anything without putting the matter before 
Parliament, although he has two months time in which he can have 
his own way I therefore, think that I can not condemn the article as 
strongly as my friend Mr. Kamnath has done. He went on to 
compare Article 278 with the section 93 of the Government of India 
Act, 1935 and concluded that Article 278 is almost a word to word 
reproduction of section 93; only for Parliament of England, Houses 
of Parliament in India and for the period of six months, two months 
have been substituted. The rest is all identical. He pointed out that 
what is more interesting is that in the Government of India, Act 
1935, as amended and which is now in force in the country, this 
particular article is omitted. So in a way the present Government of 
India Act under which we are being governed, is more progressive 
than the article which we are going to pass, because in the present 
Government of India Act, there is no section 93, and we are 
re-introducing it in our own Constitution, which is a retrograde 
step. P.S. Deshmukh also spoke at length and was of the view that 
the President should act only on the report of the governor and 
words 'otherwise' be deleted. He said to the assembly members that 
"if you wish to retain the least possible vestige of a federation, you 
must not deprive the head of the unit or the state of all authority in 
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such matters.^^ He also said that Ambedkar had quoted the 
American and Australian Constitutions in support of Article 278 
but fortunately or unfortunately, there is no mention of any 
emergency either in the Australian or the American Constitution. 
He warned that if this Constitution is to work, the Centre will have 
to respect the autonomy of the provinces whether we specifically 
say so or not. If the Centre does not respect the provisions of the 
70 
Constitution, how could any one else be expected to do so? 
Similarly Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru opposed these articles 
on a number of grounds. He argued that Article 275 and 276 give 
sufficient power to the central government. Article 275 says that, 
when the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists 
threatening the security of India or any part of India, then he may 
make a declaration to that effect. So long as the said Proclamation 
continues, under Article 276, the Central Government will be 
empowered to issue directions to the governments of any province 
as regards the manner in which its executive authority should be 
exercised and the Parliament will be empowered to make laws with 
regard to any matter even though it may not be included in the 
Union List. The effect of these two articles is to enable the Central 
Government to intervene when owing to external or internal causes 
the peace and tranquility of India or any part of it is threatened. 
Further, if mismanagement in a province creates so much 
dissatisfaction as to endanger the public peace, the Government of 
India will have sufficient power, under these article to deal with the 
situation.^' Nothing more is needed than this and it is not right to 
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go any further than this, argued Kunzru, Naziruddin Ahmad, too 
was critical of the provision which, in his opinion, has reduced 
provincial autonomy to a farce. He observed that there has been 
enough encroachment on Provincial rights. In fact in the provincial 
list a great deal of encroachment has already been made. He 
observed: 
"I think we are drifting, perhaps unconsciously, 
towards a dictatorship. Democracy will flourish 
only in a democratic atmosphere and under 
democratic condition".^^ 
He argued that by adopting these articles, we are accepting 
the British argument to have over-riding power. He warned that 
too much interference by the Centre will create unpleasant reaction 
in the States. If you abolish provincial autonomy altogether that 
would be logical. But to make them responsible while making 
them powerless would not be proper thing to do. He lamented that 
the drafting Committee has drifted from our original decisions, 
from the Draft Constitution and from our original amendments. It 
would perhaps be more fitting to call the Drafting Committee "the 
Drifting Committee".^'' 
Algu Rai Shastri also felt that Article 278 was restoration of 
Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. He observed; 
The British have, no doubt, left the country, 
but their mentality of distrust is still 
lingering here. Whatever, they gave us with 
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one hand, they have tried to snatch with the 
other. The British rulers used to run the 
Government from Delhi. Forced by the 
growing agitation and compelled by 
circumstances they gave some powers to the 
people with the sole object of appeasing 
them.^ ^ 
Contrary to observations made above, a number of members 
supported the provision whole-heartedly. AUadi Krishanswami 
Aiyar said that except on the sentimental objection that article 278 
is just a repetition of the old section 93, there is not much substance 
in the opposition to article 278. He said: 
We are in grave and difficult times. The 
units are of different dimension and 
responsible government has not been at 
work, in some of the units at any rate, for a 
long time, under those circumstances, in the 
interest of the sound and healthy functioning 
of the constitution itself, it is necessaary that 
there should be some check from the Centre 
so that people might realise their 
responsibility and responsible government 
work properly.^^ 
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Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar also defended the article. He was 
of the view that the article has not made provincial autonomy a 
farce. He declared, 
the primary thing concerning the nation and the 
Union Government 'is to maintain the 
Cosntitution'. If the import of that expression is 
fully realised, it will be noticed that there cannot 
by any intention to interfere with the provincial 
constitution, because the provincial constitution is 
a part of the Constitution of the Union, therefore, 
it is the duty of the Union Government to protect 
against external aggression, internal disturbance 
and domestic chaos and to see that the 
Constitution is worked in a proper manner both in 
the States and in the Union. If the Constitution is 
worked in a proper manner in the provinces or in 
the States, that is, if responsible government as 
contemplated by the Constitution functions 
properly, the Union will not and cannot interfere. 
The protagonists of provincial or State autonomy 
will realise that, apart from being an impediment 
to the growth of healthy provincial or State 
autonomy, this provision is a bulwark in favour of 
provincial or State autonomy, because the primary 
obligation is cast upon the Union to see that the 
Constitution is maintained. Such a provision is by 
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no means a novel provision. Even in the typical 
federal constitution of the United States where 
state sovereignty is recognized more than in any 
other federation, you will find a provision therein 
to the effect that it is the duty of Union or the 
Central Government to see that the State is 
protected both against domestic violence and 
external aggression. In putting that article, we are 
merely following the example of the classical or 
model federation of America.^^ 
Raj Bahadur countering Kamnath's argument Raj Bahadur 
clarified, 
I see no reason why we should distrust our President, who has 
not yet even come into being. After all who shall be the President? 
The President shall be our own country man. He shall be elected by 
us, he will be the keeper of our democratic conscience. He shall be 
the guardian angel of our liberty and freedom. He shall be the first 
citizen of the country. I fail to understand why Kamnath should be 
so much suspicious about him. The time has come when we should 
break through the cyst of our suspicious and superstitions. 
Obviously enough we are living in the pre-1947 era. We talk of 
revolutionary spirit and revolutionary ideas. But it appears that we 
have not yet reconciled ourselves to the change that has taken place 
in the country. Why should we forget that we are the masters of our 
own house now? The President is to be elected by us and we should 
not distrust him. Cannot we put our trust in him for a brief two 
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months in the case of an emergency? Without giving any reasons 
for the view held by him, my friend went o saying that this article 
is merely a "subterfuge to nullify the democratic freedom." I say it 
is just the opposite and the antithesis of what he has said. It is to 
protect and safeguard democracy and freedom that such a provision 
has been made to meet certain emergencies. 
In the same vein. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava defended the 
word 'otherwise'. He said; 
The first criticism that I wish to dispose is 
about the word 'otherwise'. There was a 
complaint to start with when theGovernor's 
post was declared to be non-elected and he 
must be appointed by the Centre. Then there 
was a complaint that this was a retrograde 
measure. Not those who oppose this article say 
that the report of the Governor is the sole thing 
which ought to be considered. If the Governor 
is not independent and is only an agent of the 
Central Government, what is the use of his 
report. When you confess that the Governor is 
an individual person and he does not represent 
the people of the province, how can you rely 
on his report? The words 'on report or 
otherwise' do denote a state of things in which 
the Governor may not be doing his duties, or 
may give a wrong report. Ministers, and the 
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Ministers and the Houses pass a resolution to 
the effect that the Centre should intervene, and 
there is conspiracy and the whole State is 
seething with strife and this state is not 
reported by the Governor, what would happen" 
Under these circumstances it is fair that the 
words 'or otherwise' should be there. They 
provide for such contingencies. After all, the 
Centre or the President has to save the 
situation and see that, in case of failure of 
Constitution, conditions do not deteriorate into 
chaos. If that premise is correct, in whatever 
manner the President may come to know or the 
Centre may come to know, it is the duty of the 
Centre to interfere. Therefore these words 'or 
otherwise' do not mean, as one of my friends 
suggested, that report of the C.I.D. would be 
enough. It is a more serious thing. 
The above discussion on the presidential power in proclaim 
emergency in states thus mainly centered around the issue of state 
autonomy and the necessity of central control in exigencies of 
emergency. The role of Governor was also debated at length. The 
fifty years of our independence and use of article 356 more than 
hundred times proved Ambedkar and associates wrong. History has 
nullified the optimism echoed in the Constituent Assembly as far as 
the present Article 356 is concerned. 
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USE AND ABUSE OF ARTICLE '356' 
The framers of the Constitution of India have 
deliberately and quite consciously adopted the system of 
federalism with strong central tendencies. They wanted a 
strong Centre to such an extent that the word Federation was 
deliberately avoided by the Constitution and instead provided 
for a Union of States. A number of provisions were 
incorporated in the Constitution to strengthen the Central 
Government v/'.s- a vis the state governments. Article 356 is one 
such provision. It lays down (1) If the President, on receipt of 
a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied 
that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the 
State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of 
this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation: 
(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of 
the Government of the State and all or any of the 
powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or 
any body or authority in the State other than the 
Legislature of the State; 
(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the 
State shall be exercisable by or under the authority 
of Parliament; 
(c) make such incidental and consequential 
provisions as appear to the President to be 
necessary or desirable for giving effect to the 
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objects of the Proclamation, including provisions 
for suspending in whole or in part the operation of 
any provisions of this Constitution relating to any 
body or authority in the State: 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise 
the President to assume to himself any of the 
powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or 
to suspend in whole or in part the operation of any 
provision of this Constitution relating to High 
Courts. 
(2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or 
varied by a subsequent Proclamation. 
(3) Every Proclamation under this article shall be 
laid before each House of Parliament and shall, 
except where it is a Proclamation revoking a 
previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the 
expiration of two months unless before the 
expiration of that period it has been approved by 
resolutions of both Houses of Parliament: 
Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being a 
Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is 
issued at a time when the House of the People is 
dissolved or the dissolution of the House of the 
People takes place during the period of two months 
referred to in this clause, and if a resolution 
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approving the Proclamation has been passed by the 
Council of States, but no resolution with respect to 
such Proclamation has been passed by the House of 
the People before the expiration of that period, the 
Proclamation shall cease to operate at the 
expiration of thirty days from the date on which the 
House of the People first sits after its reconstitution 
unless before the expiration of the said period of 
thirty days a resolution approving the Proclamation 
has been also passed by the House of the People. 
(4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless 
revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of a 
period of six months from the date of issue of the 
Proclamation: 
Provided that if and so often as a resolution 
approving the continuance in force of such a 
Proclamation is passed by both Houses of 
Parliament, the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, 
continue in force for a further period of [six 
months] from the date on which under this clause it 
would otherwise have ceased to operate, but no 
such Proclamation shall in any case remain in force 
for more than three years: 
Provided further that if the dissolution of the House 
of the People takes place during any such period of 
[six months] and a resolution approving the 
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continuance in force of such Proclamation has been 
passed by the Council of States, but no resolution 
with respect to the continuance in force of such 
Proclamation has been passed by the House of the 
People during the said period, the Proclamation 
shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty 
days from the date on which the House of the 
People first sits after its reconstitution unless 
before the expiration of the said period of thirty 
days a resolution approving the continuance in 
force of the Proclamation has been also passed by 
the House of the People: 
[Provided also that in the case of the Proclamation 
issued under clause (1) on the 11th day of May, 
1987 with respect to the State of Punjab, the 
reference in the first proviso to this clause to "three 
years" shall be construed as a reference to [five 
years].] 
[(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause 
(4), a resolution with respect to the continuance in 
force of a Proclamation approved under clause (3) 
for any period beyond the expiration of one year 
from the date of issue of such Proclamation shall 
not be passed by either House of Parliament unless-
(a) a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in 
the whole of India or, as the case may be, in the 
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whole or any part of the State, at the time of the 
passing of such resolution, and 
(b) the Election Commission certifies that the 
continuance in force of the Proclamation approved 
under clause (3) during the period specified in such 
resolution is necessary on account of difficulties in 
holding general elections to the Legislative 
Assembly of the State concerned:] 
[Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to 
the Proclamation issued under clause (1) on the 
11th day of May, 1987 with respect to the State of 
Punjab.] 
However, in most cases the provision was not used for 
purpose envisaged in the Constitution but often to meet 
political ends. It was also used as an interlude in the shift of 
power at the state level from one political party to another, 
and in some cases even utilised to change the leaderships at 
the state. For the first time. Article 356 was invoked to resolve 
factional fight within the Congress in 1951, in Punjab under 
Gopi Chand Bhargava^. 
The Constitution of India by providing for a 'Union of 
States'^ is more emphatic about the 'Union' rather than sthe 
states, yet it is classified as a federation. As emphasized by 
Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly," "the basic principle 
of federalism is that the Legislative and Executive authority 
Chapter Two: Use and Abuse of Article '356' 48 
is partitioned between the Centre and States not by any law to 
be made by the Centre but by the Constitution itself. He also 
added that the Centre and States are co-equal". Ambedkar not 
only described India as a federation but also admitted that the 
Constitution contained a "dual polity" the Centre and each 
state enjoying 'sovereign powers' to be exercised in the field 
assigned to them by the Constitution. The Constitution makers 
tried to devise a scheme of government which was to be 
federal but with a strong Centre. 
Article 356 has a serious implication for federalism.^ It 
has vital bearing on the democratic parliamentary form of 
government as well. It is a power, if not properly supervised 
by the courts can lead to a situation whereby a Union 
Government can seek to undermine the governments of the 
states particularly those formed by political parties other than 
that at the Union. 
Since the dawn of the Constitution on 26 Jan. 1950, 
Article 356 has been invoked 111 times^. According to the Lok 
Sabha Secretariat Study, on 13 occasions the analogous 
provisions namely section 51 of the Government of Union 
Territories Act 1963 was applied to Union Territories. In the 
remaining 98 instances the Article was invoked to teach the 
erring state a lesson, for the completion of the process of 
elections, to fill up the gap created by the lack of clear 
majority of any party. In the remaining 88 instances there 
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were prima facie circumstances to justify the use of Article 
356, like large scale defection from the ruling party thereby 
reducing it to a minority, withdrawal of support by one or 
more coalition partners, voluntary resignation by the 
government in view of widespread agitations, disruption of 
law and order due to militancy, judicial disqualification of 
same numbers of the ruling party resulting in the loss of 
majority in the House and absence of alternate party to form a 
Government. About 13 cases of possible misuse were such in 
which defections and dissensions were engineered by political 
maneuvering. The over all saga of proclamation of Presidential 
Rule is sordid.^ The wholesale use rather misuse of Article 
356 in 1977 and 1980 for political purposes has crossed all 
limits of Constitutionlism and Parliamentary democracy.^ The 
proclamation of President's Rule by the Janata Government on 
April 31, 1977 in several states and the repetition of the same 
in nine states on similar grounds by the Congress (I) 
Government in 1980, to say the least, have made a mockery of 
the Constitution. 
In the 1977 Election to the Lok Sabha, the ruling 
Congress(I) lost its majority in nine states, Punjab, Haryana, 
Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, 
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, securing only 153 seats as 
against 350 in 1977 Elections. The Janata party which has 
obtained an overwhelming majority formed the Government at 
the Union. On assuming office, the then Home Minister on 
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April 18,1977 addressed a letter^" to the Chief Ministers of 
the states ruled by the Congress Party stating that the most 
unprecedented political situation has emerged out of the 
virtual rejection in the recent Lok Sabha Elections of 
candidates belonging to the Congress party in various states, 
which is a matter of grave concern. Accordingly the Governors 
of the Congress ruled States were advised "to dissolve the 
state Assemblies in exercise of powers under Article 174 (2) 
(b)'^ and seek fresh mandate from the electorate". Therefore 
on April 22, 1977 in an interview'^ reported in the press, 
Union Minister of Law said that "a clean case has been made 
out of the dissolution of Assemblies in Congress ruled states 
and holding of fresh elections, since a "serious doubt has been 
cast on their enjoying peoples" confidence, their party having 
been rejected in the recent Lok Sabha elections". Six of these 
states filed suits'^ under the Article 131 of the Constitution in 
the Supreme Court praying for a declaration that the letter of 
Union Home Minister was illegal, and ultra vires of the 
Constitution and prayed for an interim injunction restraining 
the Union Government from resorting to Article 356 and for a 
permanent injunction restraining the Union Government from 
taking any step to dissolve their Assemblies before the expiry 
of their term. Three members of the Legislative Assembly of 
Punjab also field a writ Petition in the Supreme Court on the 
same ground. The Union raised three preliminary objections: 
(a) that the suit was not maintainable under Art. 131; 
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(b) that the questions which arise for guiding the existence 
of a situation calling for action under Article 356, are, 
either by their very nature, non-Justiciable and they are 
also expressly made non-justiciable by Clause(5) of the 
Article, and 
(c) that the Writ petition was premature as the process which 
was being challenged might or might not actually 
produce the apprehended result or action. 
The Supreme Court held that the question is non-
justiciable'"*, although the learned judges constituting the 
Bench gave separate reasons, but they were all agreed that the 
writ is not maintainable. Goswami, Fazal Ali and Untwalia, JJ, 
were of the view that the plaintiffs had no locus standi to 
maintain the suit. Beg CJ and Fazal Ali J. held that the suit 
was premature. There was general agreement among all the 
judges that the matter in question was beyond the range of 
judicial review, because of political nature regarding which 
the Presidents' subjective satisfaction was conclusive or was 
otherwise non-justiciable in view of the bar to the courts' 
jurisdiction in clause (5) of the Article 356. The Court 
however, made it clear that the Presidents' "satisfaction" 
would be open to judicial review only in those exceptional 
cases where on facts admitted or disclosed, it is manifest that 
it is mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant 
grounds. After an elaborate discussion, the court held that the 
case before it did not fall within this exception. Although all 
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the learned judges did not refer to clause (5) expressly or in 
detail, they were very much conscious of this formidable 
hurdle in their way. The said clause stipulates'^ "not 
withstanding anything in this Constitution the satisfaction of 
the President mentioned in Article 356 Clause(l) sub clause 
(a) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in 
any court on any ground". 
The Forty-Fourth Amendment Act has removed this 
impediment to the courts'jurisdiction. In ^.A'. Roy V. Union of 
India^^ a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court observed 
that the Presidential rule was open to review on grounds of 
illegality, irrationality, impropriety or mala fide or in short on 
the ground of abuse of power. It also observed that after the 
deletion of clause (5) by the 44'^ ^ Constitutional Amendment 
Act which was in existence when the State of Rajasthan filed 
the suit under Article 131 of the Constitution in the supreme 
Court praying for the declaration that the letter of the Home 
Minister was illegal, and ultra vires of the Constitution and 
prayed for interim injunction restraining the Union 
Government for resorting to Article 356 and for a permanent 
in Junction restraining the Union Government from taking any 
Step to dissolve its Assembly before the expiry of its term 
fixed by the Constitutions. The observations made in the 
Rajasthan case no longer hold good'^ after the amendment. 
The court guarded against the possibility of drawing from its 
judgement any such inference. The Court speaking through 
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Bhagwati J., observed: merely because the ruling party in a 
state suffers defeat in election to the Lok Sabha...by itself can 
be no ground for saying that the Government of the State can 
not be carried on in accordance with provisions of the 
Constitution. The Federal Structure under our Constitution 
clearly postulates that there may be one party in power in the 
State and another at the centre'^. At the State when the case 
was heard and decided, the matter was premature. No action 
under Article 356(1) had yet been taken. The court therefore 
observed "it would be hazardous in the extreme to proceed on 
the assumption that this would be the only ground before the 
Council of Ministers when it considers whether or not to take 
action under Article 356(1) and that "new grounds may 
emerge."^". An overwhelming majority including former 
Governors, Ministers, statesmen, Parliamentarians, Political 
Scientists were interviewed, and were unanimously expressed 
their view that the dismissal of 9 states Governments in 1977 
by Janata Government and the same number by the Congress 
Government when it came to power in 1980^' was clearly 
improper and illegal. The Rajasthan case highlighted the 
futility of Constitutional checks^^ as it has highlighted the 
inadequacy of the checks, explicitly or implicitly, provided for 
the use of this extra ordinary power. Firstly, it exposed the 
utter inefficiency of the control of the each House of 
Parliament as a safeguard provided in clause (S)^ "* of Article 
356. The court found that, for two months from its issue, a 
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proclamation under clause (1) of the Article 356 remains in 
full force and effect, irrespective of any approval or 
disapproval of the Parliament. If within these two months, on 
the basis of that Proclamation an irrevocable order, such as 
dissolution of the State Legislative Assembly is passed, either 
House of Parliament can not, when the proclamation is laid 
before them as enjoined by clause (3) of Article 356, undo the 
same. The Supreme Court held that a proclamation under 
356(1) had immediate force and effect and was not dependent 
on the disapproval of both Houses of Parliament. The Court 
also rejected the contention that the Proclamation can not be 
issued when either or both the Houses of Parliament are in 
session. It was further held that even if parliament disapprove 
the Proclamation within the said period of two months, the 
Proclamation continues to be valid for two months, and that 
even if both the Houses do not approve or disapprove the 
proclamation, the government which has been dismissed or the 
Assembly which may have been dissolved do not revive^"*. It is 
interesting to note that unlike the decision of High Courts, the 
Supreme Court was prepared to adjudicate on the validity of a 
proclamation which was not even available when the court 
heard the case. 
Another vital question which the court had to answer 
related to the doctrine of "political question". The issue had 
never been discussed fully by the Supreme Court. Hidayatullah 
J. had made some observations on the subject of in Golak 
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Nath V. State of Punjah^^ in which it was submitted that the 
"political question" restraint on courts was a thing of the past. 
In the Dissolution case, the Supreme Court observed that 
though courts can not enter into what was called a "Politically 
prohibited area" or "political thicket" they must adjudicate 
on all Constitutional questions even though they may have a 
political complexion to them. The Court held that it has power 
to review whether an executive action was mala fide or did the 
authority while issuing the order relied on extraneous or 
irrelevant consideration^^ or failed to take into account 
relevant considerations. The most important question which 
the case raised was what did the words "the Government of a 
state can not be carried on in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution" mean? Unfortunately the apex court did 
not answer this question in explicit terms. Some judges in fact 
saw merit in the move for the dismissal of the Congress 
Governments in nine States. Justice Fazal Aliobserved, even 
so, there can be no doubt that having regard to the 
circumstances in which the Congress was completely routed in 
the nine States during the Lok Sabha elections, the possibility 
of the State Government having lost the confidence of the 
people cannot be ruled out. If so, to continue in office even 
after this would be purely undemocratic in character. As our 
Constitution is wedded to the democratic pattern of 
Government, if a particular State Government ceases to be 
democratic or acts in an undemocratic fashion, it cannot be 
Aaiia ^s.id j rT^ 
• . - ' . 
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said that the Government of the State is carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. In these 
circumstances, therefore, on the facts and material placed 
before us, the second part mentioned in Art 356 appears to 
have been prime facie satisfied^^. 
Justice Bhagwati's approach, on the contrary, seems to 
have taken a wider view. He appears to have relied on not just 
the material placed before the court but also his own 
understanding of contemporary political events. His view 
seems to be that under normal circumstances, the imposition 
of this kind of President's rule would not be justified. But the 
circumstances of the present case involve extraordinary 
situation. He went on observe that never in the history of this 
country has the people given such a clear and unequivocal 
verdict, never a more massive vote of non-confidence in the 
ruling party. The crushing defeat suffered by the ruling party 
is symptomatic of complete alienation between the 
Government and the people and that no Government can 
function efficiently and effectively in accordance with the 
Constitution in a democratic set up unless it enjoys the good 
will and support of the people as observed by Justice 
Bhagwati. Where there is a wall of estrangement which 
divides the Government, it is not at all unlikely that it may 
lead to instability and even the administration may be 
paralyzed. The consent of the people is the basis of the 
democratic form of Government and when that is withdrawn so 
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entirely and equivocally so as to leave room for doubt about 
the intensity of public feeling against the ruling party, the 
moral authority of the Government would be seriously 
undermined and a situation may arise where the people may 
cease to give respect and obedience to Government authority 
and even conflict and confrontation may develop between the 
Government and the people leading to a collapse of 
administration. These are all consequences which cannot be 
said to be unlikely to arise from such an unusual state of 
affairs and they may make it impossible for the Government of 
State to be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution.^^ 
The Dissolution case, thus, made an extremely 
significant contribution to the issue of President's rule in the 
States. It made clear that courts have a role to play even in 
political matters and judiciary can interfere if power under 
Article 356 is used mala fide. After the decision in Rajasthan 
case, the question of judicial review of Presidential 
proclamation issued under Article 356 arose for consideration 
in the Gauhati and Karnataka High Courts 
The Presidential Rule proclaimed in Nagaland on 
7.8.1988 was challenged in the Gauhati High Court. There 
was a sharp difference of opinion between Chief Justice 
Raghuvir and Justice Hansaria^". The Presidential satisfaction 
set out in the proclamation imposing Presidential rule in 
Nagaland was based on the Governor's report and on "other 
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information." Chief Justice Raghuvir held that the Court could 
not call for material on the basis of which the President had 
formed his satisfaction under Article 74 of the Constitution. 
The learned Chief Justice further held that since the two 
Houses of the Parliament dissolved the Nagaland Assembly, 
no relief could be granted'^'. On the other hand justice 
Hansaria held that as the material which formed part of "other 
information" was not before the court and as the same did not 
form part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers 
under Article 74(1)^^, the Union of India should be given an 
opportunity to disclose the information to the Court. Justice 
Hansaria ruled that if the Union of India failed to give the 
"other information", the court would have no other alternative 
but to decide the matter on the basis of the material placed 
before it. 
The Proclamation of Presidential rule in Karnataka on 
21.4.1989 and the dissolution of Legislative Assembly was 
challenged before the Karnataka High Court. The Presidential 
satisfaction was based on the Governor's report and on "other 
information." The full bench held that the Proclamation was 
justiciable". The Court declined to decide the scope of Article 
74(2) with reference to the question whether the "other 
information" could be called on the ground that the court 
should base their decision on the disclosed material and 
probing at any greater depth would be to enter a field from 
which judges must scrupulously keep away. The court held 
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that the facts stated in the two reports of the Governor were 
relevant. The full Bench further ruled that recourse to floor 
test was neither compulsory nor obligatory on the part of 
Governor for reading the conclusion that the ruling ministry 
had lost the confidence of the House. 
After the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya 
Presidents rule was imposed in the State of Uttar Pradesh in 
wake of the resignation of Kalyan Singh, the then Chief 
Minister of Uttar Pradesh on 6th December 1992. It was also 
proclaimed in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal 
Pradesh where the ruling party was the BJP, on the 
recommendation of the Governor. The imposition of 
Presidential Rule was challenged in the High Court of Madhya 
Pradesh (Jabalpur), which held that the said proclamation was 
unconstitutional and there was no relevant material to justify 
the action. And in a landmark decision quashed the imposition 
of President's rule in the state"^ "*. This was the first major case 
of judicial assertiveness in respect of Article 356. The 
majority opinion comprising the Chief Justice, S.K. Jha and 
Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari held that the Presidential 
proclamation under Article 356 was open to judicial review 
following the 44th amendment to the Constitution. But Justice 
K.M. Agarwal in his dissenting judgement raised the issue of 
the extent or limit of the judicial scrutiny. The High Court 
judges relied upon the apex court's observations in A.K. Roy V. 
Union of India^^ in holding that a Presidential proclamation 
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was open to review on the grounds of illegality, irrationality, 
impropriety or mala fide or in short, on the ground of abuse of 
power. The learned judges were of the opinion that mere 
worsening of the law and order situation in a state due to a 
sudden outbreak of violence did not call for the extreme step 
of imposition of President's rule unless to the satisfaction of 
the President, the law and order situation in the state had made 
it or was likely to make the functioning of the government 
impossible in the state^^. Incapacity or helplessness of a state 
to meet a threat to public order is not a permissible ground 
unless it results in non-functioning of the government in the 
state. The decision of the Jabalpur High Court was challenged 
in the Supreme Court in Sundar Lai Patwa V. Union of India . 
The three Government ruled by the BJP were dismissed in the 
view of the ban on Organisations like the Bajrang Dal, RSS 
and the VHP. The court observed that these dismissals were 
Constitutional on the ground that these governments have 
violated the secular spirit affecting the basic structure of the 
Constitution. In view of the election manifesto of BJP, 
speeches of its leaders and the fact that some of the Chief 
Ministers and other Ministers belonged to RSS which was 
banned immediately after the demolition and the fact that 
several Ministers of these BJP Governments exhorted people 
to join Kar Seva in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992, public 
statement of one BJP MLA from Rajasthan that he had actually 
participated in the destruction of Mosque, the proclamation 
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was Upheld by the court and held that the President was right 
in concluding that the government of the these states can not 
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and hence the Presidential proclamation in these 
states is constitutional. Justice Sawant observed, religious 
tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups and 
protection of their lives and property and places of their 
worship are an essential part of secularism enshrined in our 
Constitution. We have accepted the said goal not only because 
it is our historical legacy and a need of our national unity and 
integrity but also as a creed of universal brotherhood and 
humanism. It is our cardinal faith. Any profession and action, 
which go counter to the aforesaid creed, are a prima facie 
proof of the misconduct in defiance of the provisions of our 
Constitution. If, therefore, the President had acted on the 
aforesaid "credentials" of Ministries in these States which had 
unforeseen and imponderable causing continuous 
consequences, it can hardly be argued that there was no 
material before him to come to the conclusion that the 
Governments in the three States could not be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The 
consequences of such professions and acts, which are 
evidently against the provisions of the Constitution, cannot be 
measured only by what happens in present case. A reasonable 
prognosis of events to come and of their multifarious effects 
to follow can always be made on the basis of the events 
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occurring, and if such prognosis had led to the conclusion that 
in the circumstances the governments of the States could not 
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, the inference could hardly be faulted. We are 
therefore of the view that the President had enough material in 
the form of the aforesaid professions and acts of the 
responsible section in the political set up of the three States 
including the Ministries to form his satisfaction that the 
Governments of the three States could not be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution^**. 
The Bommai case has, infact, set a new trend in Indian 
federalism. The Janata party being in majority in the state 
Assembly had formed a government under the leadership of 
S.R. Bommai on August 30, 1988, following the resignation of 
Chief Minister Ram Krishna Hegde on August 1, 1988 who 
headed the Ministry from March 1985 till his resignation. In 
September 1988, the Janata Party and Lok Dal (B) merged into 
a new party called the Janta Dal. The Ministry was expanded 
on April 15, 1989 with the addition of 13 members. Within 
two days therefrom, one K.R. Molakery, a legislator of Janata 
Dal defected from the party and presented a letter to the 
Governor withdrawing his support to the Ministry. The 
Governor reported to the President that the Government has 
lost its majority and consequently Presidential rule was 
imposed. The dismissal of the Government was challenged in 
the Supreme Court S.R. Bommai Vs Union of India^\ In its 
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historical virdict, the court has analysed the scope and width 
of Article 356 and its constitutional implications'*". A 
Constitutional bench of the Supreme Court upheld the 
dismissal of state Assemblies. The judges unanimously agreed 
on certain points'" validity of proclamation under Article 
356(1) are judicially reviewable. Whether it is used on the 
basis of any material at all or whether it was mala fide 
exercise of power, the burden of proof lies on the Union of 
India that the relevant material for recommending the 
proclamation did infact exists. The court held that Article 
74(2) incorporating the cabinet's advice to the President in 
relation to the imposition of President's Rule in a state is not a 
bar against the scrutiny of the material on the basis of which 
the President had arrived at his satisfaction. And that Article 
356(3) is intended to be a check on the powers of the 
President. Therefore, it will not be permissible for the 
President to exercise power under Article 356 (1) sub-clause 
(a), (b), & (c) to take "irreversible action till atleast both the 
Houses of Parliament have approved of the Proclamation". The 
President will not be justified in dissolving the Legislative 
Assembly by using powers of Governor under Article 174(2), 
(6) read with Article 356(1) (a) till atleast both the Houses of 
parliament approve of the Proclamation. 
While restoring an illegally dissolved Assembly, it will 
be open for the court to mould the relief suitably and declare 
as valid actions taken by the President when the Assembly was 
Chapter Two: Use and Abuse of Article '356' 64 
under suspended animation. It will be open for the Parliament 
and Legislature of the state to validate the action of the 
President. However, in a view of the fact that fresh elections 
have taken since then and new ministries constituted, no relief 
could be granted to petitioners. 
Justice J.S. Verma in his brief 11 Pages verdict noted 
that there was no dispute that a proclamation under Article 
356 was subject to judicial review'*^. But, the debate was 
confined to the scope of judicial review or the area of 
justifiability in that sphere. However, controversies over 
proclamation based on subjective judicial judgement could not 
be justiciable. These political decisions call for "judicial 
hands off envisaging correction only by a subsequent electoral 
verdict, unless corrected earlier in Parliament''\ 
The political significance of the verdict is that it will act 
as a bar on motivated and arbitrary dismissal of state 
governments by the Centre as had happened in a number of 
cases in the past. Soli J. Sorabjee said in a symposium'*'', "that 
the judgement had laid to rest the myth that the judiciary was 
a weakest branch of the government." He recalled the 
Keshavnanda Bharti case; in which even the power to amend 
the constitution was held to be subject to judicial review. He 
said the present judgement was equally significant in 
providing scope for relief against unjust dissolution of State 
Assemblies. But matter of consideration arises whether 
Legislative Assembly should also be dissolved or not. Article 
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356 does not explicitly provide for dissolution of the 
Assembly. One opinion is that if till expiry of two months 
from the presidential proclamation and on the approval 
received from both Houses of Parliament the Legislative 
Assembly is not dissolved, it would give rise to operation 
disharmony. However, the majority opinion in the Bommai 
judgement holds that rationale of clause (3) that every 
proclamation issued under 356 shall be laid before both the 
House of parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiry of 
two months unless before the expiration of that period it has 
been approved by a resolution, passed by both the Houses, is 
to provide a salutary check on the executive power 
entrenching parliamentary supremacy over the executive. 
Justice Sawant and Kuldip Singh have expressed broad 
agreement with the illustrative instances of misuse of power 
set out in para 6.5.01 of the Report of the Sarkaria 
Commission and have further endorsed recommendations of 
the Commission made in paras 6.8.01 to 6.8.04. One of the 
recommendations endorsed is about issue of a prior warning to 
State Government before imposing President's rule in a State 
unless the situation is urgent. Justice Jeevan Reddy and 
Agarwal have accorded great weight to these 
recommendations, which in their view "do merit serious 
consideration" but have not endorsed them. 
According to Justice Ramaswamy the recommendations 
of the Sarkaria Commission "though they bear weight, it is for 
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the consideration of the political parties or Governments, but 
judicially it would not be adopted as guidance as some of them 
would be beset with difficulties in implementation." We are 
not enlightened about the difficulties visualized by Justice 
Ramaswamy. 
In view of Justice Pandian's concurrence with the 
reasoning of Justices Jeevan Reddy and Agarwai it would 
appear that the recommendations of Sarkaria Commission, 
though entitled to great weight, are not legally binding. 
However, any departure from these recommendations would 
raise 2i prima facie presumption of illegality or impropriety of 
the action so taken. 
The other aspect which the Supreme Court took to decide 
in Bommai case, ''^  related to, 
(A) Interpretation of Article 356(1): According to justices 
Sawant and Kuldip Singh, situations contemplated by Article 
356 must be such that where the governance of state is not 
possible to be carried on in accordance with the provisions of 
the Constitution. The word cannot emphatically connotes a 
situation of impasse. Accordingly, situations which can be 
remedied or do not create an impasse or do note disable or 
interfere with the governance of the State according to the 
Constitution would not merit the issuance of the President 
proclamation under the Article"*^. 
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In reaching the above conclusion reference was made to 
the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Tariq Ahmad Rahim V. 
Federation of Pakistan^^ that the power conferred by Article 
58(2) of the Pakistan Constitution which is analogous to 356 
"is an extreme power to be exercised where there is actual or 
imminent break down of the Constitutional machinery, as 
distinguished from a failure to observe a particular provision 
of the Constitution". Reference was also made to Justice 
Rustam Sidhwa's observations in the same case that it will 
amount to an abuse of Power to dissolve the National 
Assembly because a particular provision of the Constitution 
was not complied with unless such violation was so grave that 
a court could come to no other conclusion but that it alone has 
directly led to the break down of the functional working of the 
Government''^ The reasoning and conclusion of Justices Reddy 
and Agarwal on this aspect are similar that, "—it is not each 
and every noncompliance with a particular provision that calls 
for the exercise of the power under Article 356(1). The 
noncompliance or violation of the Constitution should be such 
as to lead or give rise to a situation where the government of 
the state cannot be carried out on in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution'*^. It is noteworthy that the 
minority judgement does not express a contrary view in this 
respect. It is submitted that the majority view is sound and 
well founded. It gives effect to the intent of the Founding 
Fathers, take into account the experience of the actual 
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operation of Article 356 in our country, pays due regard to the 
principle of federalism and Union state relations and provides 
a salutary and much needed check on the deep potential for the 
misuse of Article 356. It was also led down that a Presidential 
proclamation issued under Article 356 of the Constitution is 
not completely beyond judicial review. And that mala fides 
provides a ground of judicial interference. The main zone of 
disagreement has been about the area and extent of judicial 
review and justiciability of the Presidential proclamation. 
Sawant, J. and Kuldip Singh, J held that the President's 
satisfaction has to be based on objective material and further 
that, the objective material available either from the 
Governor's report or from other information or both must 
indicate that the government of the State can not be carried on 
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Their 
reasoning and conclusion indicate that the court can examine 
the existence of the material and the grounds for the issue of 
the Presidential proclamation under Article 356. Suppose the 
ground given is that the Legislative Assembly of a state has 
not transacted any business at all for four months and its 
sessions have broken up by pandemonium and if the petition 
disputes the existence of these facts and make out a prima 
facie case supported by cogent and credible material then "the 
burden is on the Union Government to prove that the relevant 
material did infact exist^". The logical course would be for the 
court to go into the correctness and the truth or otherwise of 
Chapter Two: Use and Abuse of Article '356' 69 
these basic facts. These two Judges have also rejected the 
contention of the Union of India that there is a difference in 
the nature and scope of the power of judicial review in 
Administrative Law and Constitutional Law. They rightly held 
that "many of the parameters of judicial review developed in 
the field of administrative law introduced albeit tentatively, 
the principle of proportionality" as a possible ground for 
judicial review for adoption in future. Justices Jeevan Reddy 
and Agarwal emphatically, rejected the submission that the 
judicial review in Presidential proclamation is available only 
in a extremely narrow and limited area since it is a power 
committed expressly to the President by the Constitution and 
also the contention that the issue is not one amenable to 
judicial review because it can't be resolved by applying known 
judicially manageable standards. Their lordship held that "if a 
proclamation is found to be mala fide or is found to be based 
wholly on extraneous and/or irrelevant grounds, it is liable to 
be struck down^'. 
The true interpretation and effect of Article 74(2) was 
one of the vexed issues before the Court, particularly in view 
of certain observations made in the Rajasthan Case. The main 
argument centered upon the question whether the Union of 
India was obliged to disclose the grounds or reasons or 
material, which formed the basis of action under Article 356 
and the legal consequence of such non-disclosure. The 
contention of the union was that disclosure of reason, material 
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would amount to disclosure of advice, and Article 74(2) of the 
Constitution expressly barred that. Sawant, J and Kuldip 
Singh, J neatly summed up the legal position as, "the object of 
Article 74(2) was not to exclude any material or documents 
from the scrutiny of the courts but to provide that an order 
issued by or in the name of the President could not be 
questioned on the ground that it was either contrary to the 
advice tendered by the Ministers or was issued without 
obtaining any advice from the ministers. Its object was only to 
make the question whether the President had followed the 
advice or acted contrary thereto^^. The majority judgement 
does not reflect wide divergence on this point. In justice 
Ahmadi's view, since reason would form part of the advice, 
the court would be precluded from calling for their disclosure. 
However the learned judge agrees, "Article 74(2) is no bar to 
the production of all the material on which the material advice 
was based^^. Justices, Verma, Dayal and Ramaswamy are also 
of the view that "Article 74(2) is no bar to production of the 
materials on which the ministerial advice is based, all judges 
have stated that the production of material which is not barred 
by Article 74(2) may yet be subject to a claim for privilege 
under section 123 of the Evidence Act^ "*. 
a. 'Or otherwise' in Article 356: 
A frequent technique employed to disable courts from 
exercising effective judicial review was to state in Presidential 
proclamation that in addition to the Governor's report the 
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satisfaction was also based on 'other information' and then 
contended that the same could not be disclosed to the Court 
and therefore the court would have no basis for determining 
whether the material relied upon was irrelevant or irrational. It 
is observed that the Union of India does not indicate or state 
that any other information/material was available to the 
President or Union Council of Ministers other than the report 
of the Governor much less disclose it, "the Court must hold 
that there was no other information before the President 
except the report of the Governor and that the 'word and other 
information received by me' were put in the proclamation 
mechanically. This is a welcome development which would 
have deeply heartened our founding fathers, especially H.V. 
Kamnath who condemned the insertion of the expression 'or 
otherwise' in the Article as a diabolic word.^^ 
B. No, dissolution of assembly before Parliamentary 
approval. One of the important issues decided by the Court is 
that the state Legislative Assembly cannot be dissolved merely 
upon the issue of a Presidential proclamation unless it is 
approved by Parliament as required by Article 356(3). The 
impelling consideration for reading into the Article such a 
limitation to place restraints on the executive and also to 
ensure that grant of final relief does not become difficult if 
not infractuous. Historical realism prevailed over literalism. 
The majority further held that until parliament grants 
approval, the Legislative Assembly can be suspended by 
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'suspending the provisions of Clause (1)'. The criterion for 
determining strength of a Ministry, should be the floor test as 
recognised by the Supreme Court in Bommai. Subjective 
satisfaction of the Governor or the President cannot replace 
the prerogative of the Assembly to test the strength of a 
Ministry. Any other assessment is an anathema to the 
democratic principle, apart from bearing the odium of mala 
fide. The Governor in Karnataka held no floor test before 
dissolving the Legislative Assemblies and the Presidential 
proclamation was based on personal assessment of the 
Governor about the loss of confidence by the Ministry in the 
State and consequently the Supreme Court struck down the 
Presidential rule. The judgement had a salutary effect. It is 
rather unfortunate that the Governor has played a significant 
role in toppling duly elected Government setting aside the 
recommendations of the five members committee of 
Governors^^ and the recommendation of the Sarkaria 
Commission^^. There is a need to evolve proper guidelines for 
the of Presidential Rule. When the Supreme Court first took up 
the issue of Presidential Rule in 1977, it declares that the plea 
of political decision will not exclude judicial scrutiny. In 
Bommai, the Supreme Court should have turn around and say 
enough is enough, it is not going to intervene just in perverse 
cases, but it is going to interpret the Constitution to lay down 
what a break down is. The existing Supreme Court rulings -
State of Rajasthan in 1977 and Bommai in 1994 do not define 
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the adequately the principle of judicial review. The judicial 
review has been left wide. For example P.N. Bhagwati's 
justification in 1977 that the emergency is such a cataclysmic 
event that the loss of national mandate was a reason for 
Presidential rule. In other words, such an imposition for loss 
of mandate was not permissible in other circumstances. And 
certainly, looking back, the judgement is an unmitigated 
disaster because the scope of Article 356 is too wide and the 
scope of judicial review is mangled. The second aspect of that 
decision is that once a state legislature is dissolved, it is too 
late for further intervention. Both these aspects came under 
review in Bommai Case. Picking up a cue from the Pakistan's 
Courts, Bommai overturns the Rajasthan precedent on the 
second aspect. There is a declaratory courage in saying that 
we will reinstate Legislatures, but whether they will ever have 
the courage in the real life situation to do this is doubtful. The 
main reason is that it would require in most cases an interim 
order by the courts and they really do this. 
Secondly, in Bommai scope of judicial review has not 
been properly spelled out. To some judges, mala fide is always 
a ground for judicial review. While justice P.B. Sawant also 
included the test of reasonableness. Justice J.S. Verma and 
A.M. Ahmadi on the contrary limited the extent of judicial 
review. Justice B.P. Sawant held that if some sound ground 
exists for the proclamation, the court would not intervene. The 
court instead of providing strict guidelines or suggesting 
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amendments to Article 356 to avoid its misuse and abuse 
warned the Government for the proper use of Article 356. The 
Rajmannar Committee appointed by the State of Madras 
(1971) recommended for the deletion of Article 356 in the 
same vein the West Bengal Government's memorandum on 
Centre State Relations (1977), All India Forward Block CPM 
at Srinagar Conclave and several political parties such as 
D.M.K., A.I.A.D.M.K., Telugu Desum, Akalidal, C.P.I.(M), 
CPI, AASU also voiced the same feeling. However, it ought to 
be pointed out that even after the deletion of Article 356 and 
357, the phenomenon of Centre's intervention into the state 
affairs may not be prevented all together. At the same time, 
the absence of emergency provisions may provide a fillip to 
the secessionist elements in the country. India needs a strong 
Centre but at the same time must not geopardise state's 
autonomy. The need is to evolve a balance between Union and 
States by evolving healthy conventions and a judicious 
interpretation of the Constitution ensuring the emergence of a 
cooperative federalism. 
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ARTICLE 356: A STUDY OF NEHRU ERA, 1951-64 
The Proclamation of Presidential Rule under Article 356 is 
not a new phenomenon. The Nehru era is no exception. 
Breakdown of constitutional machinery was engineered, time 
and again, to invoke the provisions of Article 356. The broad 
consensus in the Constituent Assembly that this provision 
would be resorted to as the last remedy was never observed 
and practiced. Though the Congress party during the Nehru era 
did not face any serious electoral threat either at the Union or 
in the states, yet the provision was used to set up convenient 
governments at the states. 
Historically the incidence of the use of Article 356 can be 
divided into Nehru era (1951-64); Lai Bahadur Shastri's 
regime (1964-6), Indira Gandhi years (1966-77); Morarji 
Desai, Charan Singh and Janata Government Rule (1977-79), 
Indira Gandhi's second phase, Rajiv Gandhi era (1984-89); 
V.P.Singh (1989-90) and Chandra Shekhar's rule (1990-91); 
Narasimha Rao Government (1991-96); National Front's 
Government (1996-98); and the present regime of the National 
Democratic Alliance sincel998. To put things in the right 
perspective, it ought to be pointed out that the incidence of 
President's rule till 1964 was not as frequent as was the case 
in the latter years. During the fourteen years of Jawahar Lai 
Nehru, President's rule was imposed on six occasions, Punjab 
in 1951, PEPSU in 1953, Andhra in 1954, Travancore-Cochin 
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in 1956, Kerala in 1959 and Orissa in 1961. But the relatively 
low number of occasions on which the President's rule was 
imposed was warranted more by extra constitutional factors 
and each one of the Proclamation was controversial. The 
trends and patterns set during the Nehru era became the 
guidelines for posterity, as far as the use, rather misuse and 
abuse of the provision is concerned. As early as June 1951, 
Nehru', to remove the then Chief Minister, Gopichand 
Bhargava, brought the state under emergency and imposed 
President's Rule, despite the fact that the Chief Minister 
enjoyed the majority support in the Assembly. His only fault 
was that he did not toe to the line of the Prime Minister in 
constituting his Council of Ministers and that he did not 
oblige the Prime Minister in accommodating persons of his 
choice in the Council of Ministers. The manner in which the 
Chief Minister was removed had proved the fears and 
apprehensions raised in the Constituent Assembly by some 
members, were right. 
The case of PEPSU (1953), Andhra (1954), Travancore-
Cochin (1956) and Orissa (1961), can all be read together. 
Each one of these states had coalition Ministry, which 
subsequently fell. There were non-Congress coalition in 
PEPSU and Travancore-Cochin and Congress coalition in 
Andhra and Orissa. The PEPSU Coalition broke because of the 
defection over the issue of the Chief Minister Giani Singh 
Rarewala, and the invalidation of six MLAs by the Court. K.N. 
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Katju, the then Home Minister, expressed the fear that there 
was a political uncertainty leading to administrative chaos^-
No attempt was made to try and find political balance or to 
persuade the remaining legislators to create a stable ministry. 
The Andhra Ministry was a Congress coalition, which fell 
because of a non-confidence motion against it on its 
prohibition policy. It did not withdraw its prohibition 
programme even after the Ramamurthy Committee had 
declared the programme a failure and recommended for its 
discontinuance. As a result, the Ministry headed by T. 
Prakashan fell. Nagi Reddy, leader of the CPI who had 40 
members in a House of 137, being the largest opposition party, 
demanded the right to form a ministry. The Governor decided 
to recommend the imposition of President's Rule rather than 
explore the possibility of an alternative ministry^. It looked 
more as an attempt to keep the communist party out on the 
part of the Governor at the behest of the Union than any thing 
else. 
After the 1954 Elections, the Travancore-Cochin Ministry 
also fell because the Congress withdrew support to the PSP 
Ministry and formed a ministry of its own in 1955. The 
Congress formed Ministry under Govinda Menon , but he 
resigned from the party itself over his differences with the 
Party High Command over the Tamil districts which were 
transferred to the State of Madras. The PSP, with 15 members 
in the Legislature claimed to have a support of 57 members in 
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the Legislature of 118 members, were however, denied the 
right to form the ministry. Commenting on the Centre's 
attitude, A.K. Gopalan rightly observed, that in Travancore-
Cochin, PEPSU and Andhra where the situation helped the 
Congress, there was a ministry, but if the other party or group 
of parties come up to form a government, it was not allowed to 
do so, it was either the Congress ministry or no ministry at all 
which in effect means President's Rule.^ In case of Orissa, the 
Congress Ministry headed by Gantantra Parishad fell in 
February 1961 because of its differences with the coalition 
partner resulting in defections. The Governor tried to consult 
different political parties to find out a way but the 
intransigence of the coalition partners who were determined 
not even to pass a budget until the political wrangling was 
over, ultimately resulted in the Proclamation of Presidential 
Rule. Thus even during the Nehru era, non-Congress parties 
were not encouraged to form ministries. In PEPSU one of the 
reasons given was that the political imbroglio had created 
enormous administrative difficulties. In Kerala, it was claimed 
that there was a complete breakdown of law and order 
resulting in the loss of faith in the government. The fear of 
communism also haunted the Congress. One of the focal 
points of the controversy was the Namboodripad's attempt to 
control private educational institutions. The alleged 
emergence of the people's^ movements in the urban trade 
unions and agricultural cooperatives at the connivance of the 
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police had also upset the Union Government. Besides, the fact 
that the communists had created a viable Government, which 
was not only slowly finding its feet but actually managed to 
mobilize a fair bit of cross-sectional support also made the 
Congress panicky. 
PUNJAB 
The first decade of the working of the constitution has 
vindicated the wisdom of these provisions. During this period 
there have been six occasions where the President had to 
proclaim an emergency as a result of the breakdown of 
Constitutional machinery in some of the states. Punjab was 
the first victim in 1951, before the first General Election. The 
independence of India had brought the division of two of its 
provinces-Punjab and Bengal. The parts, which came to India, 
were called East Punjab and west Bengal. Punjab being the 
border state occupied a special position calling for an efficient 
administration. But unfortunately, since its formation in 1947, 
it did not have a stable Ministry for some years. The Sikhs 
who formed a dominant minority never co-operated either with 
the Congress High Command or with the local Congress 
leaders in maintaining a stable Government.^ The communal 
situation in the state had also affected the political atmosphere 
of the state. The factional rivalry in the ruling Congress party 
of the state also added to the instability of the state 
Government. The Bhargava- Sachar^ rivalry became so acute 
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that the Parliamentary Board had to intervene at the instance 
of Jawahar Lai Nehru. The Board directed the chief Minister 
to resign and forbade other congress members of the state 
Legislature from trying to form an alternative Government, 
with the result. President's Rule was imposed in Punjab on 
June 20, 1951^. It was surprising, that in the state 
legislature of 77 members. Congress had the majority of 70 
seats and the Chief Minister, Gopichand Bhargava, had the 
solid support of 40 members, with this strength a person like 
him could have been able to give the state a stable and 
efficient Government. But the Governor in his report to the 
President recommending imposition of President's Rule, 
charged the Bhargava Ministry with gross maladministration 
and lack of integrity. With the imposition of president's Rule 
in the state, administration of the state was taken over by the 
President, who in turn transferred it to the Governor of the 
state. The power of the state Legislature was transferred to the 
Parliament. The State Legislature and the Council of Ministers 
were dissolved and it was declared clause 2 of Article 151 
which related to laying of reports before the Legislature of 
State, Article 163 and 164 concerning the appointment and 
position of the council of Ministers of the State, Article 166, 
relating to the functions of Governor, Article 167 stipulating 
the duties of the Chief Minister as respect the furnishing of 
information to Governor, would remain suspended. 
Subsequently, the president ordered that the Government of 
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Punjab would be dissolved and all the powers vested in or 
exercisable by the Governor under the Constitution under any 
law in force by virtue of clause (a) of the said proclamation 
would, subject to superintendence direction and control of the 
President, be exercised by the Governor of the State.^ The 
Governor, being the agent of the Union, remained responsible 
to the President for the administration of the State. 
As per the proclamation, the Legislative functions of the 
State Government were transferred to the Parliament and after 
wards the power was delegated to the President, which was 
criticised in the Parliament^^. Such Acts (made by the 
President) must required to be placed before Parliament, which 
within the prescribed time, would either pass it, or direct any 
modification to be made in it, and such modification would 
have to be made by the President. ^^ However, the national 
dailies welcomed the change. Despite ministerial instability 
and widespread corruption in administration, the State had 
made remarkable progress and become an exporter of food. 
The period of Governor's Rule was also useful in the sense 
that it improved the tone of general administration, restored 
law and order in the State, made much more improvement in 
refugee rehabilitation programmes and expedited passage of 
tenancy legislation in a short period of nine months. The First 
General Election was held and the power was handed back to 
the elected representatives of the State. Thus the emergency 
ended on 17 April 1952. 
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PEPSU 
The second occasion for the proclamation of emergency 
arose in 1952 when after the General Elections the formation 
of a stable ministry was found impossible in the state of 
PEPSU. There was first a Congress Ministry in the State, 
which lost its majority in the Legislature. A Coalition 
Ministry, which followed it, was incapable of functioning 
smoothly on account of dissension within the coalition. As a 
result, emergency was proclaimed, the State Legislature was 
dissolved and the Union Government appointed a civil servant 
as an Advisor to the Rajpramukh to carry on the 
administration during emergency.'^-
The Congress Party was the largest party with 26 seats in 
the House of 60 and therefore, its leader Raghubir Singh 
formed the Government in March 1952. But very soon, 
defections started from the ranks of the Congress Party and a 
new party called the United Democratic Front under the 
leadership of Gyan Singh Rarewala was formed. Raghubir 
Singh had to tender his resignation and Rarewala formed the 
Ministry in April 20, 1952'\ The first non-Congress 
Government was formed, but it could not solve the problem, 
rather it aggravated the condition of instability and the game 
of defections and anti-defections gained further momentum. 
After the Budget session, the Assembly did not meet for more 
than seven days. It was summoned only in November 1952, 
when the statutory limit of six months was to expire. The 
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session was to be of 10 days but was cut short by four days. At 
the request of leader of the House, the Speaker adjourned the 
House on 25 November 1952. However, the leaders of the 
opposition managed to compel the speaker to re-summon the 
Legislature, without consulting the Leader. During the session, 
two active members of the opposition defected and were sworn 
in as Minister and Deputy Minister respectively. This saved 
the ministry from a no-confidence motion'^. Meanwhile 31 
election petitions were pending before the Election Tribunal. 
Nine members were unseated: four of them were ministers 
including the Chief Minister, one minister was disqualified for 
6 years and the Council was reduced to less than half. Kailash 
Nath Katju, the then Home Minister remarked in the Lok 
Sabha that, 'neither the Ministry nor the legislature was 
functioning properly. What is going to happen to the 
administrative staff? From the highest to the lowest level, the 
District Magistrate, the Patwaris- all these people do not know 
what is going to happen and please remember further that 
PEPSU is a place, which is not accustomed to democratic 
tradition. In the Government itself, opinion was widely 
divergent. Law and order situation was deteriorating'.^^ 
The Ministry itself had to face sharp criticism against the 
agrarian reforms. In view of the mounting criticism. Cyan 
Singh Rarewala had to submit his resignation to the 
Rajpramukh (Governor) which led to the Proclamation of 
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President' Rule in March 1953. The first non-Congress 
Government was successfully thrown out of office. 
As in the case of Punjab earlier in 1951 the State 
Legislature was dissolved but in PEPSU, the Legislative 
Powers of the Assembly were transferred to the Parliament, 
which in turn, delegated powers to the President. The 
executive powers of the State Cabinet were taken over by the 
President, and made an order that the administration of the 
State would be carried out "under the general supervision, 
direction and control of the President by the Rajpramukh with 
the advice of an advisor to be appointed by the President^^. 
The PEPSU, 'Union Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act, 
1953 imposed the following limitations: 
(a) The President would consult, except where it was not 
practicable to do so, a committee consisting of ten 
members of the Lok Sabha nominated by the Speaker and 
five of the Rajya Sabha nominated by the Chairman. 
(b) Every Act promulgated by the President under this 
authority would be laid before each House of the 
Parliament. 
(c) Either House of the Parliament might by resolution pass 
within 7 days (by the Forty-fourth Amendments 1978 
provided that the Proclamation shall cease to operate at 
the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the 
House of the People first sits after its reconstitution 
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unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty 
days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been 
also passed by the House of the People) from the date on 
which the Act had been laid before the Parliament, direct 
any modification to be made in the Act and if the 
modifications were agreed to by the other House of the 
Parliament during the session in which the Act had been 
so laid before it, such modifications would be given 
effect to by the Parliament by enacting an amending 
Act.18 
Although the United Front in PEPSU and G.S. Rarewala 
were demanding immediate revocation of Presidential Rule, 
the Union government proposed for the extension of 
President's Rule after six months and a resolution to this 
effect was moved in the parliament on 14 September, 1953. 
The president's Rule continued for about 11 months. The 
extension proved a blessing in disguise, it helped in the 
restoration of law and order fostering a sense of insecurity and 
creating confidence in the administration to deal with the 
situation firmly'^. 
Elections were held in PEPSU in March 1954. The 
Congress party returned with an absolute majority, it bagged 
37 out of 60 seats in the State Legislature, on March 9, 1954 
the Congress Government was sworn in and the Presidents' 
Rule ended in PEPSU. 
Chapter Three: Article 356: A Study of Nehru Ern, 1951-64 89 
STATE OF ANDHRA 
The third occasion arose in 1954 in the newly created 
Andhra State under rather unusual circumstances. The Telugu 
speaking areas of multilingual State of Madras were organized 
in a new State of Andhra. By this division, weakened the 
communist's hold on the Telangana area was weakened.^^ The 
representatives elected during the First General Election 
decided to form a coalition Government, rather than inviting 
the wrath of Presidential Rule . No Party secured an absolute 
majority but the Congress emerged as the single largest party. 
T. Prakashan the veteran leader, who had deserted the 
Congress in 1951 rejoined it and under his leadership, a 
coalition Government of the Congress, PSP, KLP, KMPP, 
Communists and a few independents was formed which had a 
strength of 90 in a House of HO^l. The Prakashan Ministry 
was sworn in on 1 October 1953.But soon after the formation 
of Ministry, it was plagued by defections and splits in 
different political parties. And within two months of its 
formation, the Ministry suffered a defeat in the State 
Assembly on 2nd December, 1953 in a "snap division on the 
salaries of the Ministers" and a 50 percent cut motion was 
passed.^2 But since two other Government Bills were passed; 
the Ministry did not resign. It continued for about a year. On 6 
November, 1954 a vote of no-confidence was passed with the 
help of the dissidents. It was moved by KLP member, G. 
Latchana and sought to 'censure the Government for its 
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failure to implement the Assembly resolution on the 
recommendation of Ram Murthy Committee on Prohibition. 
The opposition, including the Congress dissidents, joined 
hands to defeat the Ministry, but the opposition by itself could 
not form the government in view of differences among 
themselves. The Chief Minister, T. Prakashan tendered his 
resignation to the Governor, CM. Trivedi, advising him to 
dissolve the Assembly and had also declined to head a care 
taker Government.^^ The Presidential Rule was imposed on 
15 November, 1954. The opposition did try to form a 
Government, but the Governor did not allow them to do on the 
ground that it was not easy for such diverse elements to put up 
a joint show so as to form a Ministry.^4 Public opinion in the 
State itself was also in favour of fresh elections. The decision 
of the Governor seemed to be justified in not inviting the 
opposition to form the government because the Socialist Party 
would not have cooperated with the communists and without 
their cooperation, a stable Government would not have been 
possible. In these circumstances. Presidential Rule was the 
only way out. For the opposition, the Presidential Rule may 
have been a setback, but by and large the people were more 
in favour of a stable Ministry rather than an ad hoc 
arrangement. The Governor during this period made a series of 
changes in the administrative set up concerning the 
development programmes in the State. Not only this, N.G. 
Ranga who had formed a separate party, KLP in 1951, again 
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merged his party with the parent body (Congress) just after the 
State elections in 1955. In the elections, the United Congress 
Front (UCF) gained an absolute majority, it got 146 seats in a 
House of 196, and B.Gopala Reddy was sworn in as the Chief 
Minister on March 29, 1955 ending the President's Rule. 
TRIVANCORE-COCHIN 
The politics of Kerala centred round intra and inter caste 
alignments, and the two most important political forces among 
the Kerala Hindus are the Ezhavas and the Nairs, then there 
are Muslims and Christians. Caste and religion were not new 
to Kerala . The occasion which necessitated the proclamation 
of emergency arose in 1956 when the then Congress Ministry 
of the former state of Travancore-Cochin^^ resigned and no 
other party was in a position to form an alternative 
Ministry.This paved way for the Union to take over the State 
Administration. Till 1952, when the First General Election 
was held in the country, there were three Chief Ministers in 
three years. In the 1952 elections no party could secure a 
clear majority in the State Legislature. The Congress, with 
A.J. John as chief Minister, formed the Government with the 
support of the Travancore Tamilnad Congress, (TTNC) a 
political faction which stood for the merger of a few areas 
with the State of Madras on linguistics grounds. The 
Congress could secure a just working majority, with 46 
members and 9 TTNC members and five independents in a 
House of 109 members. The Tamilnad group decided to 
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withdraw its support after 19 months of the formation of the 
Government and the Ministry was defeated, but did not resign. 
The Ministry was dissolved on the advice of the Chief 
Minister, and the need for a fresh mandate was emphasized. 
The Ministry, however, continued as a caretaker Government. 
The elections were held in 1954 but no single party could 
secure a majority. Again a minority Government of Pottom 
Thanu Pillai, a PSP leader, with 19 seats in the House, formed 
the Government with the support of the Congress which had 
45 seats in a House of 118 members. But after nine months, 
the Pradesh Congress Party decided to withdraw its support 
and a vote of no- confidence was carried in the Assembly by 
60 votes to 30. Pillai, while resigning, advised the Raj 
pramukh to dissolve the Assembly and hold fresh elections.^6 
The Rajpramukh instead of dissolving the House invited the 
Pradesh Congress leader Panampalli Govinda Menon to form 
the Government. He formed the Ministry with the support of 
TTNC, Independents and two dissident members of the PSP 
having a total strength of 60 in a House of 118. But this 
Government also got into trouble just after a year. It was 
apprehended that the trouble would further aggravate after the 
reorganisation of the state and would reduce the Congress to a 
minority in the interim State Legislature and the PSP would 
again be placed in a crucial balancing position and in that case 
a coalition between the Congress and the PSP would be the 
only alternative to instability.27 The six Tamil Congress 
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members of the Assembly also withdrew their support and 
consequently Govinda Menon tendered his resignation on 
March 13, 1956 and requested the Rajpramurkh to explore the 
possibility of forming an alternative ministry. But the 
Presidents' Rule was imposed after 12 days and the Legislature 
was dissolved. All the powers were vested in the President and 
with other relevant Articles, Article 111 was also suspended in 
Travancore as this provision would have required that the 
wishes of the State Legislature should be ascertained before 
introducing the States Reorganization Bill in Parliament. The 
administration was taken over by the Rajpramukh with the 
help of an advisor in the name of the President. In view of the 
forth-coming election in February 1957, Presidents' Rule was 
extended for further six months in November. In pursuance 
with the State Reorganisation Commission Report, territorial 
readjustments was made. The Tamil area of Southern 
Travancore was given to Madras in exchange for the 
Malayalam region of Malabar and the new state was named 
Kerala. There was a wide spread belief that this double 
surgery deeply effected the communal balance in Kerala with 
grave consequences to the equation of Political Power.^^ In 
1957, elections were held. It was a historic event not only in 
Kerala and India but also in the world because the 
communists came to power through the ballot box under the 
leadership of EMS Namboodripad, they polled 39.9 percent 
votes bagging 60 seats in a House of 125 and secured the 
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support of five independents with whom they had electoral 
alliances. The congress could secure only 45 seats. Thus, 
Namboodiripad formed a communist Ministry on 5 April, 1957 
ending President's Rule. 
KERALA 
The fifth occasion necessitating the Proclamation of 
Presidential Rule arose under unusual circumstances once 
again in the State of Kerala. These circumstances developed 
after the assumption of power in that state in April 1957 by 
the Communists. The communist party of India took its victory 
as a mandate for socio economic change. Like committed 
crusaders, they introduced reforms in vital areas like land 
ownership and education. They tried to change the definition 
of 'backwardness' by equating it with economic incapacity as 
opposed to the traditional caste basis. This led to protests 
especially by Nairs, Christians and even Muslims.2" There 
was a combined "liberation struggle" under Mannath 
Padmanabhan who was a Nair, against the Communist rule. 
The Congress and other parties also joined the fray. The 
agitation soon engulfed the entire state resulting in 
lawlessness , closure of factories, mills, followed by arrests 
of thousands of people. The Prime Minister after the touring 
the state for " three days" advised the Chief Minister to hold 
mid term election but it was not acceptable to him. The 
situation further deteriorated so much so that even the 
communist leaders like Ajay Ghosh and A.K. Gopalan sought 
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central intervention.^^ The Governor of the State, B. Rama 
Krishna Rao, ultimately sent a report to the President for the 
proclamation of the Article 3 56 as that seemed to be the only 
alternative to bring the situation under control.^^Moving the 
resolution in the Lok Sabha for the Proclamation, the then 
Home Minister G.B. Pant, made abundantly clear the attitude 
and policy of the Central Government. He observed, "so far as 
this resolution is concerned, it gives me no pleasure to move 
it. I really regret that an occasion should have arisen which 
left us with no alternative but to advise the President to issue 
the proclamation. I know there are differences of opinion over 
this matter, but I would respectfully submit that the Union 
Government has no desire and has never been anxious to 
interfere with or even intervene in the affairs of the states. In 
fact, with every passing year, the cooperation between the 
states and the Union is growing." After detailing various steps 
the Union Government had taken to accommodate the Kerala 
Government, the Home Minister continued; the circumstances 
left us no alternative except the Presidential Rule^^ Thus 
Kerala, where a party, deferent from the one that held power 
at the Centre, formed the government was brought under 
Presidential Rule which was revoked on 31st July, 1959.^^ The 
communist rule in Kerala lasted for two years and three 
months. 
The real reasons for the Proclamation, is perhaps, to oust 
a non-Congress Government from the Congress dominated 
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Indian canvas. The charges levelled against the Communist 
regime in Kerala can be levelled against any party. Prima 
facie, there seems to be no truth in these allegations. The 
charges included, release of prisoners who were Communists 
or fellow travellers, insecurity of persons and property, 
political murders, attempts to indoctrination of students, party 
interference in administration resulting in demoralization of 
the services, discrimination in administration, use of 
cooperative societies for the consolidation of the party and 
deterioration of financial condition of the state. It was 
projected that the situation in Kerala has gone out of 
proportion that in the given situation the administration of the 
state cannot be carried out in accordance with the provision of 
the Constitution. The Governor's report stated, the crux of 
legal and constitutional question is whether the Kerala 
Government has lost the support of the overwhelming majority 
of the people? Whether the allegation made of mal 
administration and subversion of democracy are substantially 
true? While the securing of majority of seats in the legislature, 
however, meagres, is very relevant at the time of forming 
government, it can be pleaded as conferring a continuing right 
to claim the confidence of the majority ^4 
The mid-term elections were held in Kerala in 1960. A 
new coalition Government (Congress-PSS) under the PSP 
leader, Patton Thanu Pillai, was formed in March 1960. The 
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cooperation of the Muslim League was secured by offering it 
the post of the Speaker. 
The proclamation of Emergency in Kerala brought to the 
forefront the role of the Governor and the problems 
associated with the working of the system of Government. The 
problems and Union-State tensions are bound to be aggravated 
with change of political complexion in States and Union. This 
central intervention in Kerala was, largely, interpreted as a 
case of political prejudice. It was alleged that the Central 
Government (the Congress Party) had dismissed the 
Communist Government in Kerala on political grounds and the 
Governor acted as a political puppet in the hands of political 
party in power at the Centre^^. Coming to the report of the 
Governor, even if for the sake of argument the allegations 
made against the Communist Government are true, it raises the 
question of the Constitutional responsibility of Governor with 
regard to the administration of the state, what was the 
Governor doing when the Communist Ministry was 
Committing these actions? Was he a helpless spectator of this 
so-called mal-administration for over a period of two years? 
Was he waiting for the people and the parties to level these 
charges to put his 'seal of approval' on the charges latter on? 
He had taken the oath to 'preserve protect and defend the 
Constitution'. But here the defenders of Constitution were the 
people and the opposition parties. They took the initiative and 
protested against the alleged mal-administration. The 
Chapter Three: Article 356: A Study of Nehru Era, 1951-64 98 
conclusion that emerges is that if these allegations are true, 
the Governor was a party to it. If these mal-practices could 
happen over a period of two years, the Governor was guilty of 
not acting according to the oath of the office. His further 
observation that the Government has lost the support of the 
majority of the people was not borne out by voting percentage 
in the mid term elections in Kerala. The percentage of voting 
in favour of the communist party increased in mid term 
elections^". 
In a Parliamentary system, a party, which secures a 
majority of seats in the legislature, has a right to form the 
Government. It continues to hold office till it enjoys the 
confidence of the House. The communist party had the 
majority, and that it was not defeated on the floor of the 
House, and the Government, therefore, could not be made to 
resign. The argument that there has been a tremendous shift in 
the minds and the feeling of the people against the 
Communists rule, and therefore, the ministry should be 
dismissed, is hardly tenable. The theory and practice of 
parliamentary game does not confer this right on the 
Governor, nor the Constitution bestows this power on the 
Governor, as such a proposition would be fatal to the working 
of democracy. The pretext of shift of public opinion and 
'feelings' of the people has dangerous overtones and has the 
propensity to encourage lawlessness. It will also give a free 
hand to the opposition parties in the states to stir lawlessness 
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polluting the atmosphere and inviting Central intervention. 
Democracy, in the process, will be reduced to a mockery. If 
the political movements are the basis of judging of shift of 
pubic opinion and dismissing the Ministry then the Punjab 
Ministry should have been dismissed because there were mass 
movements against its language policy (Akali and Hindi 
Agitation). Why was the Punjab Ministry not dismissed, when 
these movements were going on in Punjab, it seemed that 
majority of the people were against the Government^'. There 
was a great communal tension in the state. The Hindus and 
Sikhs were at loggerheads with each other, posing a threat to 
peace and security, yet Presidential Rule was not proclaimed. 
These issues were bandied about to hoodwink the public from 
the real motives behind the dismissal of the Communist 
Ministry in Kerala. The Governor was a tool. Many states have 
witnessed similar situations but Article 356 was never 
invoked. It is these double standards dictated by party 
consideration^^ that has played havoc with the principle of 
federation in India. The problems of Kerala did not rest there, 
even after the mid term poll in 1960, when the Ministry under 
the leadership of R. Shankar was formed, there was no smooth 
sailing. In September 1964, some Congressmen rebelled 
against the leadership of R. Shankar and a vote of no-
confidence was passed against the Shankar Ministry and on 
10th September the Assembly was suspended and Presidential 
Rule was Proclaimed for the third time in Kerala. 
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ORISSA 
During the Nehru era, Orissa was the last State which 
was put under Presidential Rule in 1961, When the 
Constitutional machinery in Orissa broke down on account of 
cracks in the Coalition Ministry. Kerala was influenced by 
caste and community affiliations while the state politics of 
Orissa was influenced by territorial division. After 
independence old Princely states were merged with the new 
State of Orrisa. The merger effected Orissa in many ways, the 
ex-princess organized themselves into Gantantra Parishad, the 
Adivasis found expression in parties like Jharkhand and 
Adivasi Congress. The party supported by the ex-princess 
secured victory in the elections.^^ The coastal districts were 
dominated by the Congress and the rest of the state by the 
Gantantra Parishad. There are other All India parties in Orissa 
like the PSP, the SSP, the Swantantra Party and Communist 
Party of India. In the first General Elections no party could 
secure a majority, the Congress emerged as the single largest 
party, but in the Second General Election, the Gantantra 
Parishad emerged as a formidable opposition. Hare Krishna 
Mahatab formed a coalition Ministry comprising Jharkhand 
and Communist Parties. But the Ministry could not function 
smoothly. Mahatab who was once hailed as the maker of 
Greater Utkal^O, lost the goodwill of the provincial Congress 
Committee. The Jharkhand Party also created problems to the 
Gantantra Parishad. Very often Jaipal Singh, a Member of 
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Parliament of Gantantra Parishad had to fly to Orissa from 
Delhi to pacify his party members and it was popularly 
believed that the five Jharknad members were paid heavily 
from the Congress fund every time division took place in the 
Assembly^ \ There were defections too. Once the Government 
was defeated on a snap vote and Mahatab resigned but the 
Governor, after ascertaining that he had the majority support 
in the House, did not accept the resignation. Some of the 
powerful leaders from Congress like Biju Patnaik and Biren 
Mitra did not like this act and came out in open opposition. 
The Congress decided to fight the 1962 election all alone and 
therefore, on the direction of his party, Mahatab resigned, with 
the result that President's Rule was imposed on February 25, 
1961^^. The Presidential Rule remained for 14 months and 
then mid-term elections were held which gave an absolute 
majority to the Congress under the leadership of Biju Patnaik, 
who was sworn in as the new Chief Minister in April 1962 
thereby the ending of the Presidential Rule. 
The above instances established beyond doubt that the 
frequent Proclamation of Presidential Rule has put the 
working of the Parliamentary system of Government in serious 
jeopardy. In all the above cases no serious attempt was made 
to form an alternative ministry. It was completely overlooked 
that the Proclamation of emergency be resorted to only when 
the Ministry has lost the confidence of the House and when no 
alternative Ministry could be formed. And finally as soon as 
Chnpter Three: Article 356: A Study of Nehru Era, 1951-64 102 
the political situation in the State is normalized, efforts should 
be made to install responsible government and that 
continuation of Presidential Rule is no answer. 
Very often, formation of ministries puts Governors in 
dilemma. If the political situation in the state is stable and the 
party has a clear majority, the Governor's task is easy, non-
controversial and mechanical. But the task becomes difficult 
when the majority party refuses to form the government and 
other parties are in minority. Under these circumstances, the 
Governor has to assess the situation and act judiciously. The 
very first instance of the application of Article 356 falls under 
the category. It took place in Punjab in 1951, another in 
Andhra Pradesh in 1954,when the Prakashan Ministry was 
defeated and the opposition parties were not in a position to 
form a compact coalition group. Similarly in PEPSU in 1952 
and Travancore-Cochin in 1956, Article 356 had to be invoked 
because the respective Ministries lost their majority in the 
legislature and the opposition could not form an alternative 
ministry. Kerala witnessed the same situation in 1964, when 
President's Rule had to be clamped there. 
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ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR 
The Governors, who are appointed by the President 
during his pleasure, have often come into attack for their 
unseemly hurry in recommending Proclamation of Presidential 
rule. This assumes serious dimensions particularly in a 
politically conflicting context where, without exploring all 
possibilities of forming an alternative Government enjoying 
confidence of the House, Presidential Rule is recommended. 
Even while making such an exploration. Governors have relied 
excessively on their subjective satisfaction. The issue of 
determining the majority support of a political party on the 
floor of the Assembly has been lucidly discussed by the 
Rajamannar Committee, Sarkaria Commission and the 
Supreme Court in the Bommai Case. 
It is imperative to examine the precise import of Article 
356, which sanctions Presidential Rule in a Sate in the event 
of a break down of the Constitutional machinery. Article 356 
(1) stipulates that if the President, on receipt of the report 
from the Governor of the State or otherwise, satisfied that a 
situation has arisen in which the government of state can not 
be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, the President may proclaim emergency, 
(a) Assume to himself all or any of the functions of the 
Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in 
or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the 
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State other than the legislature of the state. 
(b) Declare that the power of the legislature of the state 
shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament. 
(c) Make such incidental and consequential provisions as 
appear to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the 
objects of the proclamation, including provisions for 
suspending in whole or in a part the operation of any 
provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or 
authority in the state provided that nothing in this clause shall 
authorize the President to assume to himself the powers vested 
in or exercisable by a high court or to suspend in whole or in 
part the operation of any provisions of this Constitution 
relating to high courts^ 
The salient features of this provision, in the words of 
Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyer, are that immediately after the 
Proclamation is made, the executive functions (of the state) 
are assumed by the President, which in practice means the 
Union Council of Ministers responsible to the Parliament. If 
responsible government in a State functioned properly, the 
Centre would not and could not interfere. The kind of 
political instability in some of the states that we have 
witnessed and the politics of defection which has so much 
tarnished the political life of this country were not perhaps 
envisaged in any measure at the time of the drafting of the 
Constitution by the Constituent Assembly. Perhaps no 
Governor would want the state to be brought under President's 
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rule except in circumstances which leave him with no 
alternative and unless he is so directed by the powers that be 
at the Centre, as the ultimate decision to issue a proclamation 
rests with the President that is to say the Union Government. 
The President can exercise this power on the receipt of a 
report from the Governor or even 'otherwise' if he is satisfied 
that the situation requires the issue of such a Proclamation. 
Some of the circumstances in which President's rule is 
imposed have already been discussed. What is important to 
remember is that recourse to Article 356 should be the last 
resort for a Governor to seek. A frequent criticism of the 
Governor in this connection is that he sometimes acts at the 
behest of the Union Government. This criticism emanates 
largely from lack of appreciation of the situations, which 
confront the Governors. The imposition of President's rule 
normally results in the President vesting the Governor with 
executive functions, which belong to the Council of Ministers. 
This is the responsibility, which no Governor would like to 
accept and invite unnecessary controversy. 
There are some controversies about the matters in which 
the Governor can act at his own discretion. The concept of 
Governor's office as it emerged from the deliberations of the 
Constituent Assembly^ was largely one of the Constitutional 
head and yet the role was not meant to be purely formal or 
passive. He is the creation of the Constitution. Articles 153 to 
162 lay down the manner of his appointment, tenure. 
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qualification, oath, powers etc. Articles 163 and 167 lay down 
his relationship with the Chief Minister and the Council of 
Ministers; and Article 213 lays down the power of the 
Governor to promulgate ordinances etc. But other areas of 
discretionary action requiring the exercise of judgements also 
exist. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly made a 
distinction between the functions of the Governor and his 
duties and observed that while the Governor has no functions 
he had two kinds of duties'*, one in the making and unmaking 
of the ministry and second "to advise the ministry, to warn the 
ministry, to suggest for an alternative and to ask for a 
reconsideration". All these duties require the exercise of 
judgement, there are however, other matters for which the 
Governor may, by implication, be called upon to exercise his 
own judgement. Thus both as Central agent (the term is wholly 
appropreate) and as a Constitutional head of the states 
apparatus, the Governor has duties to perform in the light of 
his own judgement although many more are non-discretionary. 
The Union Government has no other agency other than the 
Governor in states to keep it informed of the happenings there 
and whether the state government is being carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution 
The action of the President in invoking Article 356 not 
being justiciable, it is difficult to explain what constitutes a 
failure of the Constitutional machinery and what necessitates 
the use of Article 356. But some of the circumstances ( these 
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can not be claimed to be comprehensively listed) in which this 
power could be used are-
(a) Where there has been a 'Political breakdown', e.g., where 
a ministry has resigned and an alternative ministry can not be 
formed without holding fresh elections, or where the party in 
majority refuses to form a ministry and the coalition (if any) 
fails to command the majority in the legislature; 
(b) Where a ministry, although properly constituted, violates 
the provisions of the Constitution or seeks to use its 
constitutional powers for purposes not authorised by the 
Constitution and other correctives or warnings fail. 
(c) Where a state fails to comply with any direction given by 
the Union in the exercise of its executive power under any of 
the provisions of the Constitution. 
In all such cases the Governor's report has to be 
objective, on the basis of facts as he sees and interprets them 
and not as his ministry or the Centre interprets them^ 
The procedure of sending reports to the President by the 
Governor was not, however, discussed in the Constituent 
Assembly. But some of the members wanted him to act as an 
agent of the Central Government or a link between the Centre 
and the States. P.S. Deshmukh emphatically argued in the 
Constituent Assembly that: "the Governor is essentially a link 
between provinces and the President and the Government of 
India^. Mahavir Tyagi held the same opinion where he 
observed that "Governor being the agency of the Centre is the 
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only guarantee to integrate the various provinces or states 
B.R Ambedkar upheld this view by implication. Briefly, 
therefore in reporting to the President whether in routine or in 
unusual circumstances, warranting Presidential intervention, 
Q 
the Governor is expected to exercise his own judgement . 
Where Presidential rule is proclaimed, the Governor may 
be entrusted by the Centre with the task of actively carrying 
on the administration for which he then becomes directly 
responsible to the Central Government. As soon as the 
proclamation of Emergency is made, the legislative 
competence of the Union parliament is automatically widened 
and parliament is empowered to legislate for items falling in 
List II (State list) and to confer powers and impose duties on 
the Union executive relating to these items. 
The executive power of the state vested in the hands of 
Governor who is empowered to exercise it directly or 
indirectly. According to Article 164, the Ministers shall hold 
office during the pleasure of the Governor. This does not mean 
that the Governor can dismiss his ministers any time he likes. 
The expression 'during the pleasure' under a parliamentary 
form of Government means a confidence of the House. The 
Governor exercises his pleasure according to the advise of the 
Council of Ministers. This follows from the provision in 
Article 164(2) which makes the Council of Ministers 
collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the 
state. This means so long as the ministry enjoys the 
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confidence of the majority in the Lower House the Governor 
cannot dismiss it. However the Governors need not follow the 
advice of the ministry which has lost the majority in the 
House. 
In the post 1967 situation there has been frequent 
controversies especially in the appointment of the Chief 
Minister, prorogation or dissolution of Legislative Assembly. 
In West Bengal the Governor dismissed the Ajoy 
Mukherjee Ministry in 1967 on the basis of a representation by 
the opposition expressing lack of confidence in the Ministry'\ 
The Governor certified that the ministry had lost the majority. 
He was of the view that he could dismiss the Ministry on the 
basis of any material or information available to him even if 
such information or material might be extraneous to the 
proceedings in the Assembly. If on such extraneous 
information he was satisfied that the Council of Ministers had 
lost the majority of the House, he would be justified in 
exercising his discretionary powers and dismiss the Ministry. 
This view of the Governor was upheld by the Calcutta High 
Court in Mahair Prasad v. PrafuUa Chandra^^. The Court 
declared that Article 164(1) does not impose any restriction or 
condition upon the powers of the Governor to appoint a Chief 
Minister and to dismiss a ministry. This is a entirely in the 
discretion of the Governor to withdraw the pleasure, during 
which the ministers hold office, is absolute and unrestricted. 
While interpreting the provisions of the Indian Constitution, 
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the Court heavily relied upon a Nigerian precedent". Which 
was neither necessary not desirable. The provision in the 
Nigerian Constitution as well as circumstances prevailing in 
Nigeria are quite different and can not be compared with the 
provisions in the Indian Constitution and the circumstance 
prevailing in India. The Nigerian precedent can hardly help in 
the interpretation of the Constitution of India. 
The justification of the Governor does not carry weight. 
According to a well established convention, when a ministry 
enjoys the confidence of majority in the House, it cannot be 
dismissed without giving it a chance to prove its majority on 
the floor of the House. The support of a Ministry in the House 
cannot be judged elsewhere. The Governor should have waited 
till the Ministry had been voted out of the office by the House 
itself. In Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh (1968) the Governors 
have followed this practice and when doubts were raised about 
the majority of the ministry in these states, they did not take 
note of it and waited till Assembly itself passed a vote of no-
confidence against the ministry. In West Bengal, the Governor 
dismissed the Government on the ground that the Chief 
Minister was not ready to summon the Assembly at an earlier 
date as suggested by him. The Governor should given the 
Chief Minister a reasonable time to convene the Assembly. It 
is these double standards on the part of Governors that have 
brought disrepute the office. 
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The study of Uttar Pradesh is the another instance where 
the Assembly was not dissolved but kept in suspension even 
after the resignation of Charan Singh, who had recommended 
its dissolution'^ Once again, the Governor acted in a partisan 
manner. J.B. Kriplani dissented it as an example of horse 
trading. By keeping the House alive, the ruling party 
(Congress) wanted to give time to its counterpart in the state 
to lure members of the Legislative Assembly to their fold. But 
when no scope for the formation of a alternative Ministry was 
found the Assembly was dissolved after about a month' . 
Regarding the question whether the Chief Minister had lost the 
confidence of the House, the Governor defended that after the 
withdrawal of the support by the coalition partner, the 
congress, the Charan Singh Ministry was reduced to a 
minority. The best thing for the Governor, under these 
circumstances, was to ask the Chief Minister to convene the 
Assembly, within a reasonable time, and test his strength on 
the floor of the House. The action of the Governor, to say the 
least, is definitely malafide. If the Governor's argument is to 
be accepted, the Congress Government at the Union was 
admittedly a minority after the split in the Party but it 
continued to remain in power with the support of its allies like 
the CPI. The President did not dissolve the Lok Sabha. In 
Punjab when the coalition partner, the Jan Sangh withdrew 
support, the Badal Ministry was reduced to a minority but it 
continued in office with the support of Congress (R). In the 
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Uttar Pradesh also, soon after the congress with drew support, 
other parties extended their support to the Charan Singh 
Ministry'"* but the Governor was not prepared for obivious 
reasons. Unlike West Bengal, where the Chief Minister was 
not prepared to commence the Assembly at an early date, 
Charan Singh in Uttar Pradesh had already summoned the 
Assembly to meet on October 6, 1970'^ and was also ready, to 
further advance the date if the Governor so desired, but the 
Governor had other plans. 
After the Constitutional crisis in Uttar Pradesh, the 
President appointed a committee of Governors to study and 
formulate guidelines for the Governors to be followed. They 
include: '^  
1. The Governor has the right to dismiss a ministry if the 
Chief Minister shirks his primary responsibility, of 
facing the Assembly within a reasonable time to test the 
confidence of the House in him. 
2. The test of confidence in the Ministry should normally 
be left to the Assembly. A Chief Minister's refusal to 
test his strength on the floor of the Assembly can well be 
interpreted as a prima facie proof of his no longer 
enjoying the confidence of the House. 
3. If an alternative Ministry can be formed, which in the 
Governor's view can command majority support in the 
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Assembly, steps should be taken to install such a 
Ministry. 
4. If formation of such a Ministry is not possible, the 
Governor is be left with no alternative but to make a 
report to the President under Article 356 for the 
proclamation of emergency. 
5. The Chief Minister in a coalition, the committee feels, 
deprives his pre-eminence solely from the agreement 
among the partners. When the Chief Minister heads a 
single party Government, his pre-eminence is 
unquestioned. A Chief Minister is the key stone of the 
arch of the Cabinet but this can apply only when he 
heads a team which collectively has a majority support in 
the House. Thus the Chief Minister in a coalition can not 
claim the right of advising the Governor with matter of 
appointment or dismissal of Ministers in such a matter, 
as to break the arch yet claim the right to continue as 
Chief Minster. 
6. On Governors discretion, committee observed, that right 
from the commencement of the Constitution, it has been 
recognised that in the choice of the Chief Minister, the 
Governor's decision under Article 164(1) is final and is 
based entirely on his unfattered judgement. 
7. Regarding political defections the committee feels that 
though there is a demand for legislation banning defects 
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such legislation would offend the provisions of Articles 
19(l)(c), 102 and 191 of the Constitution and would 
interfere with the right of dissent.'^ 
Governors have generally used this power in a partisan 
manner to promote the interests of the ruling party at the 
Centre'^. After the elections in Haryana in May 1982 no party 
could secure a clear majority. The Governor G.D. Tapase 
formally asked Devi Lai of the Lok Dal on May 22 to bring his 
supporters to the Raj Bhawan on Monday, May 24. In the 
house of 90, the Congress I had 36 seats, Lok Dal 31 seats, 
BJP 6 seats, Congress (J) 3 seats, Janta 1 seat and 
Independents 12 seats. The BJP and the Congress (J) as well 
as four independents had pledge support to Devilal. Bhajan 
Lai even with the support of independents could claim a total 
strength of only 42. And yet on May 23, without even giving a 
chance to Devi Lai to present his supporters, the Governor 
invited Bhajan Lai to form the government.'^ 
In Assam, where for almost three years, the opposition 
was deliberately denied the right to form a Government though 
it commanded a majority in the House and despite the fact that 
the Congress (I)'s claim of majority was repeatedly proved 
false. President's Rule was to expire in Assam on December 
12, 1980. It was claimed earlier by the then Home Minister 
Zail Singh, that the Congress (I) had a majority in the House 
and would form a Government even though it had originally 
won only 8 seats in the 1978 elections. It could not even elect 
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a leader who was subsequently nominated by Indira Gandhi, 
the then Prime Minister. Anwar Taimur was sworn in as Chief 
Minister by the Governor L.P. Singh on December 6, 1980 
with Congress claiming a membership of 52 in the House of 
188 (Congress 45, Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PICA) 4 
and others 3.^ ° On June 28, 1981, Taimur resigned when the 
PTCA withdrew its support. Again the opposition was not 
given a chance to form the Government. The legislature was 
prorogued and president's Rule was imposed on June 30, 1981. 
It was revoked on January 13, 1982, when K.C. Gogoi of the 
Congress (I) was sworn in as Chief Minister by the Governor, 
Prakash Mehrotra thereby brushing aside the Opposition's 
claims to form the government under S.C. Sinha, who claimed 
the support of 65 members was denied the chance to form the 
Ministry. Even though the Governor gave Gogoi two months to 
consolidate his position, Gogoi resigned as Chief Minister a 
few minutes before the Legislature was due to meet on March 
18. Again Sinha was not invited to from the government, and 
the Governor recommended the imposition of President's Rule 
and the dissolution of the Assembly which was done on March 
19, 1982. On four occasions where rival claims of strength 
could have been tested, the Opposition was denied a chance. 
When the Congress (I) failed to run the Government, the State 
Administration was taken over by the Centre, rather than 
exhausting other avenues . 
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Again in Sikkim, former Congress I Chief Minister of 
Sikkim N.B. Bhandari alleged that the Governor Homi 
Talyarkhan appeared to be ambitious to rule the State under 
President's Rule!^^ "This mutual suspicion culminated in the 
dismissal of the Bhandari Ministry after he refused to resign 
on his own. Bhandari enjoyed the support of 21 of the 22 
members of the Assembly, but was replaced by B.B. Gurung a 
Cabinet colleague. Undoubtedly Article 371 F(G) bestows 
discretionary powers on the Sikkim Governor but it does not 
include the right to dismiss an elected Chief Minister unless 
there is evidence to show that his continuance was harmful to 
the State's interests. There was no such evidence. The removal 
of Bhandari, is quite contrary to that the Constitution 
postulates^^. However, within a fortnight of the dismissal of 
Bhandari, President's Rule was imposed and the Assembly was 
dissolved since the Gurung ministry could not face a trial of 
strength. The Governor's action was described as a 'fraud on 
the Constitution'. This was another example where the ruling 
party at the center has arranged to dismiss its own party 
Government^''. Other such instances include Andhra Pradesh in 
1973, U.P. in 1975 and Orissa in 1976^^ 
The toppling of the Farooq Abdullah led National 
Conference Ministry and the installation of G.M. Shah as 
Chief Minister in 1984 was another glaring example of the 
Governor's partisan attitude. The process of toppling began 
with the replacement of B.K. Nehru by Jagmohan as Governor 
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of the State in April, 1984.^^ The course of events reveal a 
well planned strategy in which a law and order situation was 
sought to be created. The Governor, by his overt and covert 
actions by encouraged defectors, kept a liaison between them 
and the Centre. The National Conference led by Farooq had 
own 46 out of the 75 seats in the House, while the Congress 
(I) had 26 seats. The rift between Farooq and G.M. Shah (his 
estranged brother-in-law) led to defection of 12 National 
Conference MLA's who called on the Governor on July 1. The 
next day, Jagmohan summoned Farooq and informed him that 
the he had lost his majority^^ in the State Assembly in view of 
the defections and that he should resign. The Chief Minister 
and requested the Governor to give him a chance to prove his 
strength on the floor of the House. The Governor did not agree 
and he invited G.M. Shah to form the Government on July 2, 
but he was given one month to prove his majority in the 
Assembly. Subsequently in a tumultuous session held on July 
31, 43 MLA;s voted their confidence in Shah as Chief 
Minister. 
Even more blatant was the removal of Telugu Desam 
leader, N.T. Rama Rao from the Office of Chief Minister by 
then Governor of Andhra Pradesh, Ram Lai. The situation in 
Andhra Pradesh was created by Bhasker Rao, a member of the 
Council of Ministers of NTR Government, by resigning from 
the government along with few of his supporters, thereby 
causing a split in the Telgu -Desam. He sent a representation to 
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the governor that because of the split. NTR has lost majority 
support in the Assembly and that he should be invited to form 
the government. The governor, instead of asking NTR to 
convene the Assembly and prove his strength, invited Bhasker 
Rao to form the government. The Telgu Desam led by Rama 
Rao had the support of 173 of 201 party MLA;s as also the 
support of 19 of the non-Congress opposition members in the 
295 member Assembly. Not only did Ram Lai refused to meet 
Rama Rao and his supporters but also refused to accept his 
request that the Assembly be summoned on August 18, Worse 
still, Rama Rao and 162 Telgu Desam MLA;s were arrested on 
August 16. Rama Rao and his supporters sought an 
appointment with the President and paraded his MLA's before 
him, without, however, any tangible results. ^^  Initially Ram 
Lai's action was defended by the then Home Minister 
Narasimha Rao as being the exercise of an 'unfettered right' to 
dismiss Rama Rao once he was 'convinced' that the latter had 
lost his majority. Narashimaha Rao even went on to stay that 
'the Governor could not have acted otherwise at the given 
moment." This pretentious view was diametrically contrary to 
the legal position and subsequent action of the Central 
Government which not only 'disassociated "itself by stating 
that at no stage did the Governor consult them in his decision 
to dismiss the Rama Rao Ministry, or to invite N. Bhaskara 
Rao to form the government. In all the above mentioned states 
Sikkim, Jammu and Kashmir and Andhara Pradesh the chief 
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ministers were not defeated and could not be defeated on the 
floor of the house. Yet the governors dismissed them^°. 
The general yardstick was that whenever a non-Congress 
Government fell, the Assembly was ordinarily suspended if the 
Congress party had a chance to form the Government. 
Examples include the suspension of Assembly in Manipur in 
1967, U.P. in Fabruary 1969, West Bengal in March 1970 and 
Gujarat in 1976 when L.T. Singh, Charan Singh, B.B. Sastri, 
Ajoy Mukherji and Jasbhai Patel respectively resigned. On the 
other hand, whenever Congress led or supported Governments 
fell or were about to fall, Assemblies were not suspended but 
were immediately dissolved either under Article 174 (2) (b) or 
under Aticle 356. This happened in Kerala in 1970, Bihar and 
West Bengal in 1971 West Bengal in 1968 and 1971 and 
Orissa in 1973, and of course the case of Assam, as has been 
cited earlier. In all these cases, the Opposition not only had a 
legitimate right to form the Government but was in fact ready 
to form the Government. Generally where the Congress party 
was keen on forming the Government, whenever a 
recommendation for dissolution under Article 174 (2) (b) or 
Article 356 was made by an outgoing non-Congress Chief 
Minister, it was rejected. These include the recommendations 
of Rao Birendra Singh in Haryana, Gurnam Singh in Punjab 
(1976), Charan Singh in UP (1968), R.N. Singh in Madhya 
Pradesh (1969), Hitendra Desai and Karpoori Thakur in Bihar 
(1971) for dissolution under Article 174 2(b) or under Article 
Chapter Four: Role of The Governor 123 
356. The Janta Government also followed the same policy. In 
March 1977, the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly was dissolved 
when it was realised that the Congress could form a Ministry. 
A few months later, the Assembly in Manipur was managing 
by securing defections during President's Rule and a Janta 
Ministry was installed"". 
In Uttar Pradesh, after the Assembly election held in 
October 1997, no party got majority in the Assembly. The BJP 
emerged as a single largest party with 176 seats, Samjwadi 
Party won 134 and BSP and its allies got 100^^ seats. The state 
was still under the President Rule the Governor did not invite 
the single largest party i.e. the BJP to form the government. 
Instead, he recommended to the Centre for imposing the 
President Rule, as according to him, no party was able to form 
the Governor. The Governor with at the convenience of the 
Centre ignored the electoral mandate ^ The Centre acted on 
his report and imposed Presidential Rule in the State. The 
validity of the Presidential Rule was Challenged in the 
Allahabad High Court. A Divisional Bench of Allahabad High 
Court held that the Proclamation for imposition of Presidential 
Rule under Article 356 was unconstitutional as it was based on 
irrelevant and extraneous grounds, and hence liable to be 
quashed.^"^ 
Similar role was played by the Governor of Gujarat, K.P. 
Singh and he was dismissed by the Vajpayee Government.^^ In 
1996 General Elections, the BJP had secured two third 
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majority and formed the Government under the leadership of 
Keshu Bhai Patel. But sooon after the formation of the 
government, a prominent BJP MLA Shankar Singh Vaghela 
revolted against the leadership and consequently he was 
expelled from the party. Vaghela, then, formed a separate 
party and inform the Governor that the Chief Minister has lost 
the majority.''^ The Governor summoned the House and asked 
the Chief Minister, to prove his majority. When the House 
met, to take up the confidence motion there was unprecedented 
disturbance in the House. Because of the pandemonium in 
the House, the Governor suspended the Assembly and later on 
the Assembly was revoked and Vaghela was invited to form 
the government, who formed the government with the 
Congress support. After one year, in October 1997, the 
Congress party withdrew its support to the Vaghela Ministry. 
The Governor gave him 13 days time to prove his majority in 
the House. But the congress party wanted a change in the 
leadership. Under this formula, Vaghela stepped down from 
the office. Subsequently, there was a split in the Vaghela's 
Gujarat Janata Party and Dilip Pareekh, who was made the 
Chief Minister after Vaghela's Q\ii, was reduced to a minority 
and consequently, the Chief Minister, Pareekh, advised the 
Governor to dissolve the state Assembly and order a fresh 
election. The Governor accepted the advise, although he was 
heading a minority government and dissolved the Assembly 
and asked him to continue as a caretaker Chief Minister. 
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The Report of the Committee of Governors (1971) was of 
the view that there is "no absolute right as leader of the largest 
single party or group to claim that he should be entrusted with 
the task of forming a government to the exclusion of all 
others. The relevant test is not the size of a party but its 
ability to command the support of the majority in the 
legislature, may not be able to obtain the support of other 
members. In contrast, a numerically smaller party may 
command a majority support with the help of other parties or 
groups. And that no Governor has any right to pre-empt the 
verdict of the House by giving his own. The Governor 
(Romesh Bhandari) and his mentors in New Delhi had ready 
made up to invoke Article 356 that was constitutionally not 
the only option. The Governor did not fulfil his constitutional 
obligation by inviting the single largest party in the House and 
has overlooked the recent verdict of the Supreme Court in 
Bommai case regarding the floor test.^^ 
The Supreme Court's ruling in the Bommai Case is clear 
justices P.B. Sawant and Kuldip Singh held that the 
assessment of the strength of the ministry is not a matter of 
private opinion of any individual be he the Governor or the 
president. It is capable of being demonstrated and ascertained 
publicly in the House.... Such private assessment is an 
anathema to the democratic principles. The basic principles, 
however, applies also to the initial decision to appoint a new 
Prime Minister or Chief Minister, subject to the verdict of the 
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House. For that the Governor must keep on exploring all 
possibilities. Even if this meant installing the government 
belonging to minority party, the governor was duty- bound to 
opt for it so long as the government enjoy the confidence of 
the House, which alone can pronounce on its strength.^^ 
Again, in UP in 1998, barring muted support from the 
partisans, informed opinion of independent observers have 
faulted the Governor for his hasty action in dismissing Kalyan 
Singh Ministry without floor test'*^. The Governor is bound by 
the law declared by the Supreme Court in the Bommai Case, to 
ask the Chief Minister to test his strength on the floor of the 
House. The Court, even went to extent of declaring that 
deliberate failure to follow the law declared by the Supreme 
Court with a view to bringing with disrepute the judicial 
institution, may constitute contempt of Court."*' The spectrum 
of response to the second week of February 98, to the 
constitutional episode concerning Uttar Pradesh is wide and 
varied. There is a universal feeling of relief that (thanks to the 
intervention of President K.R. Narayanan, difference of 
opinion within the ruling United Front and fear of judicial 
intervention) murder of a Constitutional Government in the 
state has been obviated. 'The role of the Governor has been 
deprecated and Romesh Bhandari has been termed as "Villian 
of Piece"*^". The political parties concerned. Congress, B.J.P, 
B.S.P, Samajwadi Party,and Bahujan Samaj party are busy 
managing their calculus of damage/advantage accruing from 
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the episode. The Union Home Minister who had a special 
responsibility for safeguarding constitutional government 
seems to be escaping blame because he is reported to have 
opposed dismissal of Kalyan Singh Government after it had 
won the vote of confidence in the Legislative Assembly. 
What has yet remained outside the ambit of debate are 
the implications of the President having been driven to taking 
the extreme step of returning the advice on 17 October, 1997 in 
the case of U.P to the Council of Ministers for 
reconsideration. That the President did so is a tribute to K.R. 
Narayanan's courage of conviction. The step has succeeded in 
saving the day for constitutional Government in India. 
Hopefully, it has also resulted in emphasizing the limits of 
President's scrutiny on whimsical action of the Council of 
Ministers. The success of the step, however, must not obscure 
from view the hazards inherent in it. The President's prestige 
came under threat. The Council of Ministers in our polity 
came close to being tested. The President-Council of Ministers 
balance is encapsulated in Article 74(1) of the Constitution 
which is in its amended form provides "there shall be a 
Council of Minister's with the Prime Minister at the head to 
aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his 
functions act in accordance with such advice"*^." Provided that 
the President may require Council of Minister to reconsider 
such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President 
shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such 
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reconsideration. That the President shall in exercise of his 
functions, act in accordance with the advice of the Council of 
Ministers was made explicit by the 42"*^  Amendment Act in 
1976 during the period of Emergency when the focus was on 
strengthening the pre-eminent power of Council of Ministers. 
Its effects were to confirm the doubts expressed in a 1974 
judicial pronouncement, the President's power to refer back to 
the Council of Ministers for reconsideration or even to seek 
explanation. The introduction of the post emergency phase. 
"By the 44th Amendment Act, of 1978, one standpoint, the 
proviso confirms the legitimacy of the President to ask the 
Council of Minister to reconsider the advice given by it. From 
the opposite standpoint, it limits the exercise of such 
prerogatives to just one. After reconsideration, should the 
Council of Ministers, for reasons (imperatives of the coalition, 
whims, ego. or whatever) that is not obliged to spell out, 
reiterate the advice, the President is bound to act in 
accordance with it. 
To sum up, the Governor has a difficult role to play, he 
has to strike a balance between his constitutional obligations 
and the directives of the Union Government at the same time 
keep the Chief Minister in good humour. His role assumes 
great importance in case of conflict between the state and the 
Union Government. The general impression is that the 
Governors are reduced to instruments of central intervention 
(or party intervention) in the state administration. Under these 
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circumstances, the Governor has a duty to act above party 
politics. Only then, will he be able to inspire confidence in 
people and perform his constitutional responsibilities in 
relation to state administration. It is necessary on the part of 
the Central Government to make radical changes in its 
"attitude" in appointing Governors and persuade the states to 
accept "the watchdog status of Governors"'*''. In fact, what is 
significant is the type of person appointed rather than the 
method by which the appointment is made. As the 
Administrative Reform Commission has rightly suggested, "if 
the Governors are to fulfil their obligation properly, nothing is 
as important as the need to ensure that only the right persons 
are appointed Governors". The Governor must be a person who 
by his own ability, character and behaviour inspire respect... 
He must have knowledge and preferably experience, of the 
affairs of the government and administration."^ 
An unhealthy and unfortunate convention has 
developed that the Governor should come from another state in 
order to maintain a non-partisan attitude. But it has resulted in 
distrust on the part of the Ministrys. It is, therefore, better if 
the Governor is appointed from the same state so as to 
promote cordiality between him and the Chief Minister, which 
is essential for the smooth functioning of the state 
administration. 
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^AaJii&i~5 
ARTICLE 356: JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
The Proclamation of Presidential Rule in states is, as has 
been observed in the previous chapters, is accentuated more by 
Political considerations rather than constitutional reasons. The 
Constitution implicitly envisages that Presidential Rule should 
be declared by the President, on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers' and approved by Parliament. The pertinent question 
that is bound to arise whether Courts have any role to play in 
determining the Constitutionality of the Proclamation of 
Presidential Rule? But before we go into that question, it is 
worth noting that courts in the common law countries have 
always been reluctant to question the sagacity or expediency 
of political actions made by those entitled to make these 
actions under the theory of Parliamentary democracy that was 
evolved in England, and followed in India. It is Parliament, 
not the courts which must control the exercise of ministerial 
or, for that matter, any other kind of power . The collective 
responsibility in a parliamentary setup is recognized by the 
English Courts^ and that the courts are reluctant to interfere in 
the exercise of discretion by a minister who is responsible to 
Parliament. In Kruse v. Johnson^, this theory was taken further 
and Lord Russel expressed the view that Courts would 
scrutinise the delegated legislation of non-representative 
bodies where the person who enacts such legislation is not 
particularly accountable for exercise of this power. But over 
the years, the role of Parliament has declined and some sort of 
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Cabinet dictatorship has emerged. The continuing increase of 
state activities have strengthened the executive v/\s- a vis the 
Parliament. In such a scenario, judicial review or some sort of 
judicial scrutiny becomes indispensable to keep the executive 
within its confines. Realising the change, the House of Lords 
in Padfield V. Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries^ 
reinforced the view that even Cabinet Ministers can be asked 
by the courts to exercise their powers when courts think that 
they should exercise their powers. This does not mean that 
courts would rush to take charge of political decisions which 
politicians themselves would make after considerable 
deliberation. It merely means that if a statute (or a 
Constitution) confers power upon executive, it must exercise 
or refuse to exercise that power in a manner consistent with 
the purpose for which it has been conferred. Needless to say, 
this would not happen in all cases. There are certain cases 
where courts have to tread'' even in those areas where angels 
fear to tread upon. Earlier, the Courts in USA and England, 
have refused to interfere in matters which fell in the exclusive 
domain of executive and legislature. In England, for example, 
the Court refused to interfere with the reasons of the Attorney 
General whether people can be prosecuted while an industrial 
dispute was raging . The Supreme Court of USA, too, at first 
refused to be drawn into political questions like the 
demarcation of constituencies for an election*. Later, it agreed 
to consider political questions brought to it, provided that 
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these questions were dealt with by it, not as political question, 
but in the discharge of the court's constitutional functions, 
duties, and responsibilities. Apart from political questions, the 
court has always been wary of interfering in the exercise of 
the executive's emergency powers. Thus, courts have not, by 
and large, enquired into whether a particular emergency was 
justified or not. The Privy Council in the United Kingdom 
refused to interfere with the subjective satisfaction of the 
Secretary of State, when the latter preventively detained 
someone because he thought it was in the Public interest to do 
so^. These decisions have been questioned and followed as 
well'°. But, at the end of the day, courts will have to consider 
whether they should question the proclamation of an 
emergency by an authority entitled to declare it. The approach 
of Privy Council, hearing appeals from India, was to leave all 
these matters in the hands of the executive'^ 
Basically, there are three approaches that courts can 
adopt. First, they can argue that they have no role to play. As 
soon as an emergency is declared, the jurisdiction of court is 
ousted. The courts can neither question the desirability of 
emergency nor can pronounce a judgement on the validity of 
acts committed during an emergency'^. This can be termed as 
"Total Ouster" approach. Second, the courts can inquire as to 
whether the authority which had the power to declare an 
emergency did, infact, declare the emergency after having 
followed the procedure that was laid down, if any, in the 
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Constitution. Thus, if the Constitution provides that the 
President alone can declare an emergency, it can not be 
declared by some one else. The court can go into jurisdictional 
issues. According to this jurisdictional approach, courts would 
be entitled to ask whether there was a power to declare an 
emergency and was it justified? Such a proposition would 
surely draw the courts to political questions. Under the 
Constitution of India, for example, an emergency can be 
declared when there is a breakdown of constitutional 
machinery in the state, it is doubtful whether the courts can 
enquire whether a breakdown in law and order is, infact, a 
breakdown of the constitutional machinery. Or must the courts 
declare that, it is the executive that must decide whether a 
breakdown of law and order amounts to a breakdown of the 
constitutional machinery of the states. The third approach, 
perhaps, would be to leave to the courts themselves to 
consider whether a breakdown of law and order really amounts 
to a breakdown of constitutional machinery. This would 
amount to the interpretation of the Constitution rather than 
deciding political issues. Obviously, "a breakdown of 
constitutional machinery" can not cover each and every thing 
that the executive wants it to cover. It is for the courts to 
decide, on the basis of the facts of each case, what exactly 
does the breakdown of constitutional machinery constitutes. 
Here the court has to address substantial issues, hence it can 
be called 'Substantial Review' approach. 
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Coming to the ground realities, Indian politics was 
dominated by the Congress Party, for more almost than four 
decades. Inspite of the hegemony. Presidential Rule was 
frequently resorted to buUdose the dissension in the party and 
establish dominance of the Party High Command throughout 
the country. Not surprisingly, the Janata Party, the United 
Front, the National Democratic Alliance also used this 
formidable power to get political mileage out of it. It was this 
situation that prompted people to move the courts, which for 
long was considered forbidden. Initially, the courts were 
reluctant to entertain petition challenging the proclamation of 
Presidential Rule (the refusal by the Kerala High Court in 
1965 to go into the legalities of the Proclamation) but with the 
passage of time, the courts no longer remained silent 
spectators This change in the attitude in the judiciary can be 
attributed to the dawn of an era of judicial activism and the 
increasing encroachment by the Legislature and Executive, in 
the arena of rights be it the rights of states or citizen. 
The validity of the proclamation Article 356 was 
challenged on several occasions till date,in the Kerala High 
Court in 1965, before the Punjab High Courts in 1968, Andhra 
Pradesh and Orissa High Court in 1974, Patna High Court in 
1997 and in the Allahabad High Court in 1996 and before the 
Supreme Court in 1977 for the first time. Each Court followed 
its own distinct approaches and it would not be out of place to 
analyse the approach of each court separately before 
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considering the general role of the judiciary in dealing with 
Presidential Rule in the states. 
The state of Kerala was placed under Presidential Rule in 
1965, when the Governor discovered that no party had a 
majority to form the Government. K.K. Aboo, himself a 
Member of the Legislative Assembly, challenged the 
Presidential rule in the Kerala High court, in K.K. Aboo V. 
Union of India'\ The contention of the petitioner was, first, 
the Governor could not recommend the imposition of 
Presidential Rule when the state was already under the 
Presidential Rule, secondly, the Assembly could not be 
dissolved before it was summoned, which alone could have 
determined the possibilities of the formation a government or 
lack of it. It was also submitted that the convening of the 
assembly was a prerequisite to the imposition of Presidential 
Rule. That, the Governor should have called the Assembly 
instead of entering into negotiations with the party leaders to 
explore the formation of a government. That the Governor had 
acted mala fide. ^'^ And the constitutionality of the President's 
action should be tested by the Courts not by Parliament. 
The Court observed that Article 356 of the Constitution 
requires the approval of Parliament to be operative beyond a 
period of two months of its issue. When the matter comes up 
before it, it is open to Parliament to withhold approval. If the 
Parliament, in its wisdom is not impressed with the 
constitutionality, legality or even the propriety of the 
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Proclamation, it will not give its approval to it. It requires no 
exposition by this Court for such action on the part of 
Parliament. The necessity for urgent relief from this Court 
urged by the counsel on behalf of the petitioner is fanciful 
only.'^ 
Undoubtedly, it is the Parliament which approves or 
disapproves a Proclamation, but it can not decide whether a 
particular action purported to be made under the Constitution 
is valid, which constitutes the domain of the courts. This does 
not mean that Courts should upset every Presidential 
Proclamation, it merely means that Courts must consider the 
Constitutionality of a proclamation. The Court not justified 
with the contention of the petitioner dismissed the case.'^ 
Madhavan Nair J. observed, that the Governor had made 
efforts for the formation of a government before he submitted 
his report to the President for invoking Article356. That the 
action of the Governor attempting to ascertain the possibility 
of the formation of a government does not in any way attract 
or violate Articles 163 or 164. The attempt was not to setup a 
Constitutional Government but only to assess the possibility of 
one such Government being setup by the Legislature 
constituted by the general election. Therefore, there is no 
illegality, unconstitutionality and even impropriety on the part 
of the Governor.'^ The court further, observed that the 
constitutional crisis was not created because of the 
continuation of Presidential Rule but by a hung Assembly 
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•an 
resulting from the general election held in February 1965. 
None of the parties was able to secure a working majority of 
seats in the Legislative Assembly Even the parties which 
expressed willingness to form a coalition Government had not 
a collective majority in the Legislature. The argument that 
such a situation was brought about by the President's 
Proclamation of 1964 has no merit. That the Governor had 
not acted malafide even if some political leaders had been 
preventively detained. He argued that the President, when he 
issued a Proclamation, did not act as the agent of the Union 
Government but in his own right. A pertinent question in this 
regard is whether Presidential Rule can be imposed when a 
newly elected legislature was available to take over the 
government, and as long as there is a Legislative Assembly 
capable of functioning, there was no failure of constitutional 
machinery in the state. Justice Madhavan did not go into this 
argument. He observed that, Article 356 of the Constitution 
does not prescribe any condition for the exercise of powers 
thereunder by the Parliament, except the "satisfaction of the 
President". And that the facts and circumstances in this case 
clearly establish that the President had ample material for such 
satisfaction before he promulgated the Proclamation^^. The 
role of the state legislature, in the process, was sidelined, 
because it is the House that should resolve political crisis 
before a failure of constitutional machinery of the state is 
declared. Justice Madhavan sought to keep the court away 
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from all these questions having a political overtone. He 
firmly believed that Article 356 confers wide powers on the 
President and the judicial interference is uncalled for. The 
Court puts its seal of approval on what the Governor had done. 
The Court did not go into what constitutes a breakdown 
constitutional machinery. 
The next case in which a High Court examined the 
propriety of a Presidential proclamation arose in Rao Birendra 
Singh V Union of India^^ in Haryana. Here the President 
accepted the recommendation of the Governor that the 
Presidential Rule should be proclaimed. The petitioner who 
claimed to have a majority in the House, contended that 
Presidential Rule was improper. And it was an act of 
vengeance on the part of the Centre because in the past he did 
not accept arbitration on various thorny political issues^' and 
had opposed the election of the President^^ hence it is 
malafide. The Chief justice, Mehar Singh (for justice Narula 
and himself), found a rather novel and neat way of getting out 
of the arguments presented before him. It was held that the 
President's constitutional power was not amendable to the 
jurisdictional control of the High Court because the President 
did not act on behalf of the "executive" of the Union but in a 
Constitutional capacity, which is beyond judicial review. It 
may be pointed out that even if such acts are not of 
"executive" but of the President in his Constitutional capacity, 
there is nothing to prevent the courts from determining the 
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constitutional validity of such acts. The court further observed 
that the reconsideration of an emergency was vested in 
Parliament and there has "not been even a suggestion that 
Parliament has not acted beyond its constitutional powers . 
Equally, no case was made out that the President or the 
Governor had acted malafide. The Court, however, did not 
probe whether there were sufficient grounds for the Governor 
to report a failure of constitutional machinery in the state and 
for the President to act on the report of the Governor. The 
Court declared that it has no jurisdiction to enquire into these 
matters. At the same time, it went on to observe, that there is 
sufficient material in the report of the Governor to establish 
that the administration of the state had been paralyzed 
affecting its functioning^"*. In both the cases, the court simply 
refused to interfere in what they considered to be the exclusive 
domain of the President. By giving virtually carte blanche to 
the President, the Courts ignored the possibilities of political 
considerations in the satisfaction of the President, nor they try 
to lay down the conditions under which Proclamations could 
be issued. Their total faith in Article 356 and exercise of 
powers under it by the President, is hardly convincing. 
A change was writ large on the courts in 1974, when, the 
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa High Courts considered the scope 
of Article 356 in greater detail. In A. Sreeramalu.^^ Justice 
Chinnappa Reddy had to consider the validity of a 
Proclamation declaring Presidential Rule in Andhra Pradesh. 
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The Proclamation was imposed because of the resignation the 
chief minister at the behest of Congress High Command on the 
issue of the bifurcation of the State.^^ The Governor advised 
the President to impose Proclamation without exploring the 
formation of an alternative ministry.^^ Justice Chinnappa 
Reddy examined the general scheme of the emergency 
provision, held that the President had been given emergency 
powers which were kept in check by Parliament, and took the 
view that the President's Powers in this regard were of a 
special constitutional nature and not just an exercise of 
executive action, which is outside the scope of judicial 
review. And that the satisfaction of the President is a matter 
specially entrusted to him by the Constitution. The satisfaction 
of the President in a matter entrusted to him by the 
constitution can not be equated to the discretion conferred 
upon an administrative agency by some legislation or 
subordinate legislation. Indeed there is a great ocean of 
difference between the Head of the state expressing his 
satisfaction on a constitutional issue, aided and advised by the 
Council of Ministers, responsible to the Parliament, and the 
public officials exercising their discretion on administrative 
issues.^^ He cited American precedent to suggest that Courts 
should not indulge in political issues.''" But at the same time 
he made it clear that Article 356 is extremely wide. The 
petitioner seems to labour under the impression that his party 
has an undisputed majority in the Legislature to enable its 
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leader to form a Ministry, and therefore it can not be said that 
a situation has arisen where the Government of the state can 
not be carried out inaccordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. That is not correct. There may be many diverse 
and varied considerations. An outbreak of unprecedented 
violence which the Government is unable to curb may be a 
consideration. A great natural calamity like a severe 
earthquake or a flood creating a situation, which the 
Government of a state is unable to meet may be a 
consideration. A large epidemic leading to deaths may be 
another. In all these cases, there may be such a failure of the 
Government of the state as to amount to an abdication of its 
Governmental power.^' The learned judge refused to accept 
that just because "internal disturbance" was mentioned in 
Article 355 of the Constitution, that could not be the only 
basis for the President's action under Article 356 of the 
Constitution. The Court failed to pronounce whether there are 
any legal limits to the kind of action that can be taken under 
Article 356.The learned judge seems to suggest that the only 
limitation on the exercise of the power under Article 356 is 
political. 
What makes the confusion worse confounded is that the 
Constitution does not enumerate the situation for applying 
Article 356 nor is there any 'satisfactory criteria for judicial 
determination' of the considerations leading to Presidential 
Rule. The very absence of satisfactory criteria makes the 
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question intrinsically political and beyond the reach of the 
courts. The considerations which are relevant for the action 
under Article 356 are basically political. Again, any attempt to 
settle a controversy raised by a proclamation under Article 
356 will necessarily be followed by tremendous consequences 
and the Executive and Judiciary coming to loggerheads can not 
be ruled out. The Court, therefore, instead of invoking Judicial 
review, considered it more expedient to wide reposed 
confidence in politics, politicians and the people, because, and 
the ultimate analysis, it is the people of the country that 
should resist despotic tendencies on the part of the President 
or the majority party in Parliament it is scarcely a matter for 
the court.^^ 
There are two reasons why the learned judge took the 
view. The first was that, the application may have been made 
bonafide, it was made ten days short of two months after the 
Proclamation of Presidential Rule and that it was "belated" 
secondly, and more importantly, the judge observed, "I am 
entitled to take judicial notice of these events of contemporary 
history. The events narrated by me would show that there was 
a complete breakdown of law and order in a large area of the 
state and a strike by a great section of Government employees 
particularly paralyzing the Government. I have already 
explained earlier that those considerations are, without doubt, 
relevant consideration, which may be taken into account to 
conclude that a situation has arisen in which the Gol^ernment 
Chapter Five: Article 356: Judicial Response 145 
of the state can not be carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. There was, thus, sufficient 
justification for the President's proclamation, if proof of such 
justification was necessary''\ 
The moot question was whether courts would interfere if 
they had some doubts as to whether the action of the President 
was based on considerations that were not relevant to a failure 
of the constitutional machinery in a state. Justice Chinappa 
Reddy would presumably have preferred, courts not to go into 
these questions. But since he suggests that the considerations 
that guide the President's discretion must be relevant it is 
conceivable that the learned judge may have countenanced 
judicial intervention in an extreme situation. The better view, 
however, is that he would not have approved of judicial 
intervention in even the most extreme cases. The judgment 
adopted a twin strategy, on the one hand, it held that it was 
wrong for courts to look into these questions and on the other 
hand, it was prepared to take judicial notice of political events 
and declare its satisfaction with the propriety, presumably 
political and constitutional propriety, of what was done. 
In the Orissa case, justice O.K. Misra (for justice S.K. 
Ray and himself) adopted a slightly different view "^*. The 
Orissa situation arose because Nandini Satpathy resigned as 
chief Minister having discovered that it was impossible to 
administer the Government of the state and at the same time 
indulge in the politics of factionalism. The Governor, Jatti, 
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prorogued the Assembly, and sent two reports to the President, 
who invoked Article 356. 74 Members of the 140 Members of 
the Legislative Assembly asserting the right of the opposition 
leader, Biju Patnaik, to form a government in this case filed 
the writ. Misra CJ, felt that the Constitution clearly ousted the 
jurisdiction of the courts to inquire into the kind of advice the 
Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers, give to the 
President"*^ or the kind of advice that the Chief Minister, and 
his/her colleagues give to the Governor"^''. In any event, it was 
made clear that there are certain gubernatorial functions, 
including the power to summon, dissolve or prorogue the 
Legislative Assembly or submit a report to the President under 
Article 356, which were not amenable to judicial control". 
The Court felt that the President's action under Article 3 56 
also can not be challenged and that, proving that the President 
was acting malafide was very different and was not made out 
in the case"^ .^ 
But there were two points that were argued which merit 
attention. The first argument was that President's discretion 
may be subjective but at the same time, court could impose 
objective criteria to determine the failure of the constitutional 
machinery in the states^^ In addition, it was also argued that 
no exercise of power was immune from jurisdictional control 
of courts. The court did not accept these arguments. It pointed 
out that the Constitution clearly states that courts can not 
enquire into the advice given to the President by the Council 
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of Ministers. The Constitution further states that the President 
and Governors are not answerable to any court for the exercise 
and performance of the powers and duties of their offices or 
any act done or purporting to be done by them in the exercise 
and performance of those powers or duties'*". The Court 
probably did not take into account that these Articles are 
concerned with legal and constitutional acts of the President 
and Governors and their political acts are not protected by the 
Constitution. The Court, for example can not enquire whether 
an ordinance promulgated by the President is expedient, but it 
can consider whether the ordinance is within the ordinance 
making power of the President or whether it infringes the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in part III of the Constitution. 
Similarly, a court may not be concerned with the wisdom of a 
particular Presidential Proclamation under Article 356; but the 
Courts can certainly enquire whether or not there is a failure 
of the constitutional machinery in the states. As such, Misra, 
C.J.'s view that court's jurisdiction is ousted is, rather, 
unconvincing. 
These doubts are reinforced by the fact that 74 
legislators out of 140 were prepared to support the formation 
of a Government in the state. It was possible that the Governor 
had misjudged the situation and dissolved the Assembly when 
a viable and constitutional government was possible, Misra, 
C.J. sought to resolve this matter by considering whether the 
constitutional convention, that the leader of the opposition 
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should form a government, applied in this case. He found that 
there was such a constitutional convention and that the 
Supreme Court may have approved for such a convention"". 
But he resisted the argument on the basis that constitutional 
conventions could not be enforced in a court of law"*^ . This 
approach creates a lot of problems. Firstly, there is also a 
convention that the Prime Minister can appeal to the 
electorates over and above the claim of the leader of the 
opposition. This is what Ramsay Macdonald did in England in 
1924 and Nandini Satpathi wanted to do the same in this case. 
Secondly, and much more importantly, the learned judge 
seems to have, (impliedly), judicially accepted that the proper 
constitutional action would have been to permit the leader of 
opposition to form a government. Indeed, the learned judge 
also took the view that these matters should be "tested on the 
floor of the House whether it was in session or not"''\ The 
learned judge observed and even though he recognised that 
politics in Orissa was torn apart by political instability''\ This 
judgement was politically embarrassing because it suggests 
that the Governor and the President may have done something 
improper and the Courts are unable to invalidate these actions. 
This decision also has the legal effect of stating that the 
President's Powers are untrammelled because, inter alia, he 
acts on information from the Governor or even otherwise. 
Even though this judgement mildly censure the President and 
the Governors for the action they took, it has the effect of 
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saying that "the Government can not be carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution" in Article 
356 can mean anything the President and this council of 
Ministers want it to mean, subject to the control of Parliament. 
Despite its weaknesses, this judgement atleast has the 
effect of censuring the Government from doing things, which 
would not be regarded as Constitutionally proper. This is 
strikingly in contrast to the judgement of justice Basu in 
Mahabir v. Prafulla Chandra'^^v/heTQ he observed that the 
Governor can dismiss his own Chief Minister if the latter 
refuses to convene the Assembly when the Governor wants 
him to convene it, even through the Constitution does not 
prevent the Chief Minister from convening the assembly at a 
later date. The approach of High Court has been interesting. 
The Kerala and Punjab High Courts managed to follow what is 
called the "total ouster", approach while at the same time 
appearing to approve of the propriety of the action of the 
President and the Governor. The Orissa High Court accepted 
the 'total ouster' approach but expressed the opinion that the 
Governor may have acted in violation of settled constitutional 
conventions. Justice Chinnappa Reddy, followed the "total 
ouster" approach, but at the same explained the Courts' 
helplessness by taking stock of the realities of the power 
structure within which the Courts existed. He also touched the 
"substantive review" by taking note of the contemporary 
political events, and satisfied himself that a Presidential 
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Proclamation was necessarily proper. While it is true, that 
this argument was secondary, it contains within it the 
possibilities of an extremely wide power of review. From the 
above decisions, one gets the impression that there can be no 
legal check on how the President interprets the width of his 
power under Article 356. Many would regard this attitude of 
courts to be pragmatic. On the contrary, the Madras High 
Court, while reviewing the power of the Governor to prorogue 
the legislature, held that the Constitution "establishes 
supremacy of law and not of men, however, highly placed they 
may be. Seen in this perspective, the Courts have some role 
to play in determining whether a particular Presidential 
Proclamation fulfils the constitutional requirement in both 
letter and spirit. 
None of these questions were raised before the Supreme 
Court in the Dissolution case, relating to the Proclamation of 
the Presidential Rule in nine states which were ruled by the 
Congress party by newly elected Janata Party Government at 
the Centre. It was for the first time that the Article 356 was 
invoked on such a large scale. The Challenge before the 
Supreme Court came at a time when there was a change in the 
, political scenario in the country"*^ The emergency had just 
ended; the wounds that are inflicted by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the ADM Jabalpur V Shukla"*^ are yet to heel 
up. Again, it was during this period that the Supreme Court 
had also decided the Indira Gandhi election Case^'^. The entire 
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atmosphere was politically surcharged. It was in this 
background that the Rajasthan Case^^ was heard in the 
Supreme Court, Which is already discussed in the preceding 
chapter. The judges appear to have formed a united front in 
declaring that they would discuss political question to the 
extent to which such questions raised constitutional matters, 
which the court has jurisdiction to entertain. But the attitude 
of judicial restraints undoubtedly influenced the judges when 
it came to interpreting the exercise of powers under Article 
356. But it may also have been perpetuated because some 
rather imaginative arguments were placed before the Court. 
One such argument was that since the Constitution aims at 
establishing democracy, Presidential rule should only be 
imposed after Parliament has been able to consider whether 
Presidential Rule was justified under the circumstances. The 
Court rightly rejected this argument as straining the text of the 
Constitution and revising the sequential order in which the 
Constitution envisaged events should take place.^' It also 
rejected the view that the President could not dissolve the 
legislatures when a state or several states were under 
Presidential Rule on the ground that such a power of 
dissolution was clearly postulated by the Constitution. The 
real question was how the Supreme Court would approach the 
interpretation of Article 356. This was all the more important 
because the Forty-Second Amendment to the Constitution has 
added a new clause to Article 356 which provides that. 
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notwithstanding any thing in the Constitution, the satisfaction 
of the President mentioned in clause (1) shall be final and 
conclusive and shall not be questioned in any court on any 
ground. The judges chose to ignore this clause because, in 
many ways, the clause merely re-states what has already been 
said in a lot of Privy Council decisions and by the House of 
Lords". The import of these decisions was that the executive, 
and not the court, would determine whether or not particular 
emergency was justified or not. The court accepted the import 
of these rulings. But it does not mean that the judges totally 
abandoned the idea that the exercise of these powers could be 
subject to judicial review. The judges suggested that there is 
room for review, if the order was mala fide; the authority 
passing the order has taken into account extraneous or 
irrelevant considerations, and the order is used for a purpose 
which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Chief Justice Beg, explaining this additional ground, observed, 
that the court would interfere if the power under Article 356 
was exercised against the Council of Ministers in the States 
simply because the Council of Minister belonged to a 
particular caste or creed^^ 
The Supreme Court tried to further widen the scope of 
judicial power. But it was in the Bommai Case^"^ that the 
Supreme Court asserted its power and quashed a Presidential 
Proclamation and threatened to restore the Assembly even 
after its dissolution. It is pertinent here to discuss the 
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guidelines set by the Court in the Bommai Case .(The details 
of which have been discussed in the previous chapter.) 
1. The validity of the proclamation issued by the President 
under Article 356 (1) is judicially reviewable to the 
extent of examining whether it was issued on the basis of 
any material relevant or whether the proclamation was 
issued in the mala fide exercise of power. When a Prima 
facie case is made out against the proclamation, the 
burden of proof would be the Union Government to prove 
that the relevant material did in fact exist. 
2. Article 74 (2) is not a bar against the scrutiny of the 
material on the basis of which the President had arrived 
at his satisfaction. 
3. When the President issues Proclamation under Article 
356 (1) he, may exercise all or any of the powers under 
sub-clause (a), (b) and (c) thereof. It is for him to decide 
which of the said powers he will exercise, and at what 
stage, taking into consideration the exigencies of the 
situation. 
4. Since the provisions contained in clause (3) of Article 
356 are intended to be a check on the powers of the 
President under clause (1) thereof, it will not be 
permissible for the President to exercise powers under 
sub-clause (a),(b),(c) of clause (1) to take irreversible 
action till atleast both the Houses of Parliament have 
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approved the Proclamation. It is for this reason that the 
President will not be justified in dissolving legislative 
Assembly by using the power of the Governor under 
Article 356 (1) till both the Houses of Parliament 
approve of the Proclamation. 
5. If the Proclamation issued is held invalid then 
notwithstanding the fact that it is approved by both the 
Houses of Parliament, it will be open to the court to 
restore the status quo ante to the issuance of the 
Proclamation and hence to restore the legislative 
Assembly and the Ministry. 
6. In appropriate cases, the court will have power by an 
interim injunction to restrain the holding of fresh 
elections to the Legislative Assembly pending the final 
disposal of the challenge to the validity of the 
Proclamation to avoid the fail accompli and the remedy 
of judicial review being rendered fruitless. However, the 
court will not interdict the issuance of the Proclamation 
or the exercise of any other power under the 
Proclamation. 
7. While restoring the status quo ante, it will be open for 
the court to mould the relief suitably and declare as valid 
actions taken by the President till date. It will also be 
open for the Parliament and the legislature of the state to 
validate the said action of the President. 
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8. Secularism is a part of the basic structure Of the 
Constitution. The acts of the state Government which are 
calculated to subvert or sabotage secularism as enshrined 
the Constitution, can lawfully be deemed to give rise to a 
situation in which the Government of the state can not be 
carried on inaccordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution^^ 
Justice Ahmadi tried to answer the question which 
was left unanswered by the Supreme Court in State of 
Rajasthan V. Union of India^^ when he observed that the 
mere defeat of the ruling party at the Centre can not 
itself, without any thing more, entitle the newly elected 
party which comes to power at the Centre to advice the 
President to dissolve the Assemblies of those states 
where the party in power is other than the one in power 
at the Centre. Merely because a different political party 
elected to power at the Centre, even if with thumping 
majority, is no ground to hold that a situation has arisen 
in which the Government of the State can not be carried 
out in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. The observation of the learned judge is 
important in view of the rise of coalition polities in the 
country. Even in 1998 general election, the issue was 
raised in case of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh where 
Congress did not do well. Justice Ahmadi further 
observed, that people vote for different political parties 
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at the Centre and the states. And therefore, if a pcrlitical 
party with an ideology, different from the ideology of the 
political party in power in any state comes to power in 
the Centre, the Union Government would not be justified 
in exercising power under Article 356 (1) unless it is 
shown that the ideology of the political party in power in 
the state is inconsistent with the Constitutional 
philosophy^^. 
It is however, easy to criticize the court for not 
invalidating the Proclamation dissolving the legislature of 
nine duly elected Ministries which still had the right to 
continue for a little while. It is not unlikely that any other 
person called upon to decide the Rajasthan Case (Dissolution 
case) might have decided any other way^^. There is no doubt 
courts are meant to be independent. But the independence of 
Judiciary does not mean that the judiciary is a law unto itself. 
The judiciary, too, is governed by rules of interpretation and 
operates within a structure, which is not totally of its own 
making. Despite the severity of the law of contempt of Court, 
Judges are under the constant scrutiny of Parliament, 
academics, media, lawmen and laity The judges can not 
ignore the constitutional structure within which courts 
operate. The courts can not over reach themselves by assuming 
the responsibility of substituting their own views for the views 
of those that take administrative and political decisions. "If 
the courts begin to do things like that, the position and status 
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of judges would be radically altered"^^. Judicial appointments 
would begin to be made with political motives. The whole 
style and argumentation in courts would change. 
A foreign observer has made the comment that under the 
Indian Constitution the judiciary was supposed to be the arm 
of the social resolution^". A more accurate description was 
that of justice Krishna Iyer when he said in a judgement that 
Courts which within strict limits have to essay social 
engineering are not the sanctuary of age old but unwholesome 
(approaches) even if they are not the refuge of social reforms. 
In the inevitable chemistry of social change, courts are 
certainly not anti catalysts. 
One can not expect courts to bring about a social 
economic and political revolution single handed nor can it be 
expected that the courts will constantly revise governmental 
decisions. Twenty five judges in the Supreme Court can not be 
a substitute for the democratic process. Judges in the 
Commonwealth have invented an approach to guide the nature 
of judicial review in such matters. This approach is that courts 
will entertain limited questions in relation to jurisdiction. A 
jurisdictional question is one where courts do not consider the 
exercise of a power on merits. The courts merely consider 
whether the authority entitled to exercise the power in 
question did, in fact, exercise that power after following the 
procedure that was laid down. This jurisdictional approach is a 
safe approach. It has the effect of saying that courts would 
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prevent the executive from becoming a law unto itself. At the 
same time, the jurisdictional approach also implies that courts 
would not tread upon the executive's toes in substantive 
matters. There is no doubt that the approach can be seen as an 
exercise in the abdication of judicial powers. After all, people 
will argue: "If an independent judiciary can not stand up 
against the executive, then the common man is left without 
remedies". That the people may also argue that courts should 
enquire into such questions as whether a minister should have 
been put under preventive detention or not. There is, of 
course, always the chance that an independent judiciary which 
does not mind its own business may be made, in long run, to 
cease to be independent. Court's reticence in not going beyond 
jurisdictional power structure within which courts operate. A 
different kind of constitutional power structure might 
stimulate a different kind of judicial valour. 
Within the existing power structure postulated by the 
Constitution of India, judges can merely follow the 
jurisdictional approach and interpret this approach as 
imaginatively as possible. They can go further; but they do so 
at the risk of upsetting the political apple cart and possibly 
affecting fundamentally the nature, style and function of the 
judiciary itself. And so, judges have to be content with minor 
victories, which may with the passage of time be consolidated 
into major decisive campaigns. This gradualist approach has 
become inevitable as long as we follow the general scheme of 
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separation of powers, by and under which power and 
responsibilities are allocated in the Constitution of India. 
Bearing this in mind, let us consider the manner in which 
courts considered the Presidential Rule provisions. At first, 
the Kerala and Punjab High Courts took a very restricted view. 
While prepared to approve the Proclamations, these courts 
generally denied the power of courts to go into these 
questions at all. Justice Chinnappa Reddy in Andhra Pradesh 
High Court continued this stand, but with two significant 
additions. He explained his stand on the basis of political 
realities imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers. He 
also hazarded testing the alternative approach that the courts 
may consider the Proclamation of an emergency on merits on 
the basis of such knowledge of contemporary political events 
as the judges have personally. This was an extremely brave 
stand to take and it is not surprising that the learned judge 
took this stand as an alternative and secondary argument. 
Chief justice Misra of the Orissa High Court followed a 
narrow jurisdictional approach as well; but used court's 
judgement writing power to censure the government for not 
following political convention which ought to have followed. 
And then the issue came came up before the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court took a slightly wider view of the 
jurisdictional questions which the court could ask in respect of 
an emergency declared under Article 356. But this was in its 
theoretical approach to -the problem. In fact, justice 
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Chandrachud himself pointed out in the Supreme Court, the 
court could hardly interfere unless the government itself made 
a speaking order, the effect of which would be disclose an 
irregularity or illegality. It is possible that justice Bhagwati 
(for justice Gupta and himself) took a slightly wider view. In 
the end, the Supreme Court in a judgement in which many 
points were left ambiguous, a conventional jurisdictional 
approach to the problem. 
Judicial Activism & High Courts: post Bommai 
Phenomena: 
Two decisions of 1996 and 1997 that of Allahabad High 
Court which quashed a Presidential Proclamation and other a 
verbal observation of Patna High Court for the imposition of 
Presidential Rule in Bihar, are of paramount importance. The 
full bench of Allahabad High Court comprising justice 
B.M.Lai, Justice Markandey Katju and Justice Brajesh Kumar, 
quashed a Presidential Proclamation of October 17, 1996 
extending the Presidential Rule in the State beyond one year 
because none of the conditions stipulated in Article 356 (5) 
was present i.e. national emergency or a certificate from the 
Election Commission that fair and free elections could not be 
held under the circumstances. Though the court upheld 
Governor's decision of not inviting the single largest party, 
the BJP, to form the Government, since it did not have the 
confidence of the House under Article 164 of the Constitution, 
yet it observed that the Presidential Proclamation was "issued 
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in colourable exercise of power and based on wholly 
irrelevant and extraneous grounds" . 
The Court had also observed that the Governor had not 
exercised all the options available to him, among them, the 
option of asking the MLAs to elect its leader by sending a 
message to the Assembly. Such a provision would not have 
gone against any provision of the Constitution or any 
established practice or convention. An appeal was preferred 
against this order in the Supreme Court which stayed 
operation of High Court's order. The Supreme Court refused 
to stay the High Court's order. Instead, it ordered that a 
composite trial of strength be held in the House. And further 
director that if an attempt was made to form a Ministry in the 
State, it would have no objection.^'^ 
The other case in which judicial activism was 
clearly evident relate to verbal observations of Patna High 
Court on August 13,1997.The divisional Bench of Patna High 
Court disapproved of functioning of the State Government and 
observed that it was a fit case for imposition of Presidential 
Rule. The Bench comprising chief justice B.M. Lai and justice 
S.K. Singh observed that the recommendation of the Governor 
was not conclusive regarding invocation of Article 356 and the 
Court could also report to President on the situation in the 
State. The Court made observation in the light of the report 
submitted by the Comptroller and Auditor General over the 
irregularities committed in various employment programmes 
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under Jawahar Rojgar Yojana. The Judges told the Advocate 
General, that any constitutional authority inducing the Court, 
was competent to bring to the notice of the President the 
sordid state of affairs obtaining in the state.^^ 
The decision of the High Court is a clear case of over 
stepping and was criticized by many. We can not blame courts 
for not being too radical. But there is danger in allowing the 
executive to interpret the provisions of Article 356 exactly as 
they please. The Courts might have to consider the broad 
permissible width under which Article 356 has to be exercised. 
But that as it may be, the Courts did what they could do under 
the circumstances. From the above discussion, it can be 
concluded that the Kerala and Punjab High Courts have 
adopted an extremely narrow view and denied the powers of 
the courts to go into the Political implications involved in 
Article 356 and have gone in for total ouster approach. The 
Andhra and Orissa High Court slightly broadened this 
approach. The Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan V. 
Union of India tried to further widened the scope of judicial 
power. But it was in the Bommai Case, that the Supreme Court 
has come out with a radical judgement of far reaching 
Constitutional significance. It dawned a new era of not only 
judicial activism but also Presidential activism in respect of 
Article 356. 
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CONCLUSION 
India adopted the West minister model but at the same 
time provided in the Constitution implicitly the American 
concept of judicial review. Although no real power was given 
to the President, yet he is not a mere figurehead like that of 
the President of the Fourth French Republic. The observation 
of Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly, that the 'President 
occupied the same position as the king under the British 
Constitution', has under gone tremendous change over the 
years. On the other hand, the President is bound by the advice 
of the Council of Ministers, and on the other hand, the 
President has the responsibility to protect, safeguard and 
uphold the Constitution. His position becomes more 
significance in a fluid political situation, where he is expected 
to use his experience to exert influence on the Council of 
Ministers. In the initial years of independence, the then 
President, Rajendra Prasad, did raise the issue of the real 
powers of the President and set in motion an unwanted 
controversy. But these doubts and apprehensions were put to 
rest by the 42"^ ^ Amendment Act, which mandates the President 
to accept the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers. But 
even then, there is still room where the President can prevail 
upon the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers within the 
parameters of the Constitution, as was the case with the then 
President K. R. Narayanan, who successfully thwarted the 
attempts of the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, at 
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Proclamation of the Presidential Rule by dismissing the Rabri 
Devi Government in Bihar. 
A written Constitution obviously limits the powers of the 
government. The various provisions of the Constitution 
including Article 356 have to be understood and interpreted in 
a manner, which does not affect or alter or change the basic 
structure of the Constitution. But over past many years, the 
frequent use, rather misuse, of Article 356 has severely 
affected the federal fabric of the country and striking at the 
root of parliamentary system of government. Federalism in 
India is the basic of its nationalism as unity in diversity has 
been the ethos of Indian polity. The need is to remove the 
irritants between the Union and the states with a view to 
develop cooperative federalism. Article 356 is a stumbling 
block in the growth of development of healthy federal 
conventions. Nowhere in the world, one finds provisions 
analogous to Article 356. The conventional form of federalism 
that it is a weak and can not stand the stress and strains of war 
and emergencies, no longer holds validity as the war time 
experiences of the USA, Canada and Australia have shown that 
these apprehensions are not justified and that federation can 
very well stand the crisis. In the USA and Australia, the 
Courts by their liberal interpretations enlarged the jurisdiction 
of the Centre by giving it a greater area of operation than its 
peacetime ambit so as to all those things which are necessary 
for the safety of the country. The Constitution of India seeks 
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to achieve the same result in the area of federalism but in a 
different way. It confers wide powers on the executive to 
declare an emergency subject to its approval by the Parliament 
within a specified period and the courts have been kept out. A 
Council of Ministers enjoying majority support certainly takes 
the approval of the Parliament for granted and in effect 
Parliamentary control becomes meaningless. Under these 
circumstances it becomes necessary for the President to pursue 
the Council of Ministers to refrain from invoking Article 356 
at the slightest pretext. But, he cannot go too far; the 
President can only exert his influence and nothing more. 
Article 355 imposes a duty on the Union to protect every 
state against external aggression and internal disturbance and 
to ensure that the Government of every state is carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. A 
provision of this type is also found in other federal 
Constitutions like that of the USA, Canada and Australia as 
well. The US Constitution places a duty on the Federal 
Government to protect states against invasion and, on 
application of the state legislature, or of the Executive (when 
the legislature can not be convened), against domestic 
violence^ Section 119 of the Constitution of Australia 
provides in explicit terms, that the Centre shall protect every 
state against invasion, and, on application of the State 
Executive, against domestic violence. An important distinction 
between the Australian and American provisions on the one 
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hand, and the Indian provisions on the other hand, is that 
while in the former application by the state to the Centre is 
necessary for protection against domestic violence, no such 
condition is laid down in India. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
however, held that, if internal disturbance in any state, 
interfered with the operation of the Federal Government itself, 
or with the movement of Inter-state Commerce, the Centre can 
send force on its own without waiting for the application of 
the state authorities. In 1963, the Federal Government of USA 
did not hesitate to deploy the national militia in Little Rock to 
quell racial disturbances and to enforce its own decision on 
racial integration. This was done very much against the wishes 
of the state concerned. In India law and order is a state subject 
and, therefore. Central intervention under Article 355 would 
be justifiable only in case of aggravated form of disturbance, 
which a state finds beyond its means to control. Although not 
laid down in the Constitution of India, a convention has long 
since developed that ordinarily the Centre sends help to a state 
on request by the state Government. In view of the 
constitutional obligation placed on the Centre, it would be 
justifiable for the Centre to refuse help to a state when 
requested by it. It cannot, however, be asserted that the Centre 
shall never intervene in a state without its request though it 
may be a difficult question to decide when it would do so. The 
final decision appears to rest with the Centre. 
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Article 355 also imposes a duty on the Centre to ensure 
that the Government of every state is carried out in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution. It is in fulfillment of 
this obligation that the Centre takes over the Government of a 
state, under Article 356, in case of breakdown of the 
Constitutional machinery therein. A parallel to this is found in 
the American Constitution, which places the Centre under a 
duty to maintain the Republican form of the Government in 
each state. The provision in the Constitution of India 
stipulates, in essence, that the form of the government as 
prescribed in the Constitution must be maintained in the 
states. There is however, no specific provision in any of the 
three aforesaid federal Constitutions enabling the Centre to 
take over the Government of a state in case of breakdown of 
the Constitutional machinery. 
An interesting question arising out of the obligation of 
the Centre to ensure that a state Government is carried on in 
accordance with the Constitution is whether the Centre can 
take cognizance of complaints made from time to time 
regarding the deeds of omission and commission, bordering on 
corruption, against state Chief Ministers. It has been a 
common feature of the Indian political life that such 
complaints are usually made to the Union Government against 
state Chief Ministers. Whether the Union Government should 
take notice of these charges or leave the matter to the 
Governments concerned is a moot question. If the Centre does 
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not act on such complaints, the people may loose faith in the 
democratic form of Government and if the Centre intervenes, 
it may be accused of interfering too much in state matters and 
its bona fides may become suspect especially, if the parties 
controlling the state and the Centre happen to be of different 
political affiliations. 
Article 355 imposes an obligation upon the Centre to 
ensure that each state Government is carried out in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution, while Article 356 is 
designed to strengthen the hands of the Centre. In such an 
event, it is necessary to empower the President to exercise his 
discretion, particularly when the Centre desires to proclaim 
emergency in a state, without the report of the Governor. 
The actual position occupied by the state Governor in the 
Indian Constitutional system is much more than a 
"Post-office" between his Cabinet and the President^ K.P.Sen 
said in the Constituent Assembly that the Governor is not a 
figurehead but an important functionary expected to lubricate 
the machinery of the Government and to see that all the wheels 
are going well\ It is no doubt true that the functions of the 
Governor are largely formal and normally expected to be 
performed on the advice of the Council of Ministers. But the 
Constitution specifically and by implication, allows him some 
scope for the exercise of discretionary powers^ The 
Constitution also envisages eventualities in which the 
Governor of a state may act in his discretion i.e. without 
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seeking the advice of the Council of Ministers. If the 
Governor makes full use of his position and opportunities, he 
can make a powerful impact on his state. 
The Governor's discretion both in ministerial and 
legislative spheres is limited to his efforts in maintaining the 
principles and spirit of Parliamentary Government. The 
framers of the Indian Constitution did not initially want to 
emulate the example of the Government of India Act, 1935 and 
incorporate its provisions in totality. They started off with the 
fundamental proposition that law and order situation in India 
was such that some kind of emergency powers would be 
required to deal with them. As a matter of fact, the 
preliminary discussions on emergency provisions arose out of 
very genuine concerns for law and order. It was only 
subsequently that the Provincial Constitution Committee 
began to spell out the implications of these provisions in terms 
of their effect on the state politics. The Constituent Assembly, 
thus, accepted that the powers to declare an emergency should 
not just be extended to peace but also where the government of 
the province can be carried on with the advice of the Council 
of Ministers. The debate on Article 365 was most interesting. 
Strong views were expressed on both the sides. Ambedker 
defended the provision and advocated the insertion of word 
"otherwise" to make the Presidential power still wider. On the 
other hand, several members expressed the view that inclusion 
of Article 356 is nothing but drifting, perhaps unconsciously. 
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towards a dictatorships Ambedkar believed that the article 
would remain a dead letter. But more than fifty years of 
working of our Constitution and Article 356 have proved 
Amedkar wrong. His optimism stands shattered in the wake of 
the repeated use of Article 356. Though Article 356 requires 
the satisfaction of the President that a situation has arisen in 
which the government of the state cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, but the 
satisfaction of the President is the satisfaction of Council of 
Ministers. The successive governments at the Centre, both 
Congress as well as others, (including the present NDA 
government) have abused/tried to abuse the power under 
Article 356 with increasing frequency. 
During the Prime Ministership of Nehru, the incidence of 
the use of Article 356 was comparatively low as compared to 
its use latter. In each of the six cases in which Article 356 was 
invoked under Nehru, the Central Government entered the 
scene at the last moment after exhausting other remedies. In 
each case, the Article 356 was used when parliamentary 
government temporarily failed, when fresh election could not 
produce a majority or a coalition, making the task of 
formation of government impossibility. 
Unlike Nehru, during the first spell eleven years of Mrs. 
Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister, extensive use of Article 
356 was made President's rule was imposed on various states 
on as many as 27 occasions. A closer look at the 27 instances 
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of President's rule shows that it was quite frequently used 
during 1966-1969, the use was minimum in 1971 and it again 
went up in 1972. A number of factors contributed to this 
excessive use. The most important being the need to have a 
tighter control of central leadership on the state units. 
The first opposition government at the Centre i.e. Janata 
Party Government was no better and it dismissed nine 
Congress Governments in just one stroke. The Congress 
repeated the act in 1980.Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao also 
made use of Article 356 whenever it suited their interests. The 
dismissal of three state governments ruled by the BJP by the 
ruling party at the Centre in the wake of the demolition of the 
Babri Mosque even though there was no breakdown of 
constitutional machinery in the states, speak of the total 
partisan behaviour of the Union Government what was more 
strange was that the Supreme Court also upheld in dismissals. 
The United Front Government and the NDA also tried to 
misuse Article 356 in U.P. and Bihar but the then President, 
K.R. Narayanan, did not yield to the Prime Minister's 
pressures and Presidential Rule was averted. The satisfaction 
of the President has assumed an added significance in the 
recent years. The addition of word "otherwise" in Article 356 
at the insistence of Ambedkar has further strengthened the 
Union Council of Ministers vis a vis the States, for the 
satisfaction of the President is the satisfaction of the Council 
of Ministers. And Article 74 mandates the President to act on 
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the advice of the Council of Ministers. The expressions used 
in Article 356 are too wide which can be interpreted according 
to one's own convenience. By and large, the decision of 
imposing the President's Rule in a state is guided more by 
political considerations rather than genuine constitutional 
reasons. The judiciary, for a long time, remained a silent 
spectator to the use and misuse of Article 336. It was only in 
the recent past that it has realized the dangers of remaining 
silent and started asserting its powers. It dragged Article 356 
from the political arena to constitutional ground. The trend 
was set in Bommai case in 1994. The decision in the above 
case has almost settled the law on Article 356 and spelled out 
the guidelines to check its possible misuse. It has declared that 
Article 356 is judicially reviewable, that the Legislative 
Assembly can be kept in suspended animation till at least both 
Houses of the Parliament have approved of the Proclamation 
and the Assembly will not be dissolved prior to Parliamentary 
approval. The Court also held that if the Proclamation is held 
invalid, than it will be open to the Court to restore the status 
quo ante to the issuance of the Proclamation and hence to 
restore the Legislative Assembly and the ministry. 
The Sarkaria Commission^ has also discussed the issue 
threadbare and recommended for the minimum use of Article 
356. It, however, did not recommend its deletion on account of 
the conditions prevailing in the country. The growth of sub-
nationalism strengthening divisive forces, linguistic 
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chauvinism, regional angularities, communal frenzy have 
created a dent in the unity and integrity of the country. 
Therefore, it is not feasible to do away with Article 356 
completely. It has to retained as a constitutional weapon in the 
hands of the Centre to cope with extreme situations. 
There have been suggestions, time and again, to restrict 
the scope of Article 356. Some suggested that it should be 
confined to breakdown of law and order alone; others restrict 
its operation in case of failure to form a government, which 
can command a majority in the state Legislature, still others 
felt that this Article should invoked only in a situation where a 
state government fails to check activities of sabotage by anti 
rational elements to the detriment of national security. 
However it is not easy to define failure of constitutional 
machinery. A variety of factors can contribute to this failure. 
No hard and fast guidelines can be laid for all times to come. 
The only safeguard can be its minimum use. It has to be 
invoked only when other alternatives fail to restore 
Parliamentary democracy. All attempts should be made to 
resolve the crisis at State level before taking recourse to the 
provisions of Article 356. A number of safeguards have been 
suggested to prevent its misuse. There was a suggestion for 
the setting up of Inter State Council, which has not been done 
till date and consultation with it should be made mandatory 
before every Proclamation. There is another suggestion that in 
case the election can not be held within six months after 
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proclamation of President's rule, the Inter-State Council 
should be consulted again and its opinion be placed before 
Parliament. As has been noticed earlier that the power under 
Article 356 is drastic precisely because it is required to deal 
with an extraordinary situation. Although it is a power to be 
used as a last resort, yet, once it is invoked and the 
proclamation issued, the consequences follow immediately. 
The exigencies of a situation of constitutional break-down 
often require swift and effective action. Prior consultation 
with any other body or authority may hamper the speedy and 
smooth exercise of this power in such urgent situations. 
Further, this will dilute the responsibility of the Union 
executive for the actions taken under Article 356 to 
Parliament. 
It was also suggested that before State Government is 
dismissed and President's rule imposed, the Governor should 
consult the State Government and obtain its comments. Again, 
before issue of a proclamation, the President should convey 
the reasons for the action contemplated and take into 
consideration the opinion of the State Government before 
taking a final recourse to Article 356. Such a course ensures 
justice and fair play and minimises the resentment on the part 
of states. It is equally necessary to exhaust all possible 
alternative courses of action to resolve the crisis before 
resorting to the provisions of Article 356. It is necessary for 
the Governor, as the constitutional head of the State, and the 
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President, in fulfilment of the duties cast upon the Union 
Executive under Article 355, to try other avenues including 
consultation with the State Council of Ministers, where 
necessary, to prevent a situation of breakdown of the 
constitutional machinery in the State, before making ust of 
Article 356. A warning to the errant State before the 
proclamation will also go a long way in improving the 
situation. However, in grave situations, these exercises may 
not be possible for the Governor to undertake. 
Article 356 was amended by the Constitution 
(Forty-fourth amendment) Act. Clause (5) of Article 356 so 
amended, provides that a resolution with respect to the 
continuance in force of a proclamation for any period beyond 
one year from the date of issue of such proclamation shall not 
be passed by either House of Parliament unless two conditions 
are satisfied. Firstly, a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
operation in the whole of India or as the case may be in the 
whole or any part of the state, and secondly, the Election 
Commission certifies that the continuance in force of the 
proclamation during the extended period is necessary on 
account of difficulties in holding general elections to the 
Legislative Assembly of the State concerned. The provision is 
often criticize for the rigidity that it introduces. The State of 
Punjab posed a problem where to extend the proclamation 
beyond the period of one year, a constitutional amendment 
became necessary. But at the same time, it can also be said 
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keeping in view the alleged misuse of the provisions of Article 
356 in the past, there is need for severe restrictions in respect 
of any extension beyond one year. However, there is no 
unanimity among people over this. In some circles a demand 
for the restoration of the pre-Forty-Fourth Amendment 
position was enacted. 
It is noted in certain cases^ President's rule was 
continued beyond two months by issuing a fresh Proclamation 
on the expiry of the first oriQ. Approval of Parliament is 
necessary if the proclamation is to be continued beyond two 
months [clause (3)]. The provisions of Clause (3) are 
circumvented and the control of Parliament diluted if 
technically a 'fresh' proclamation is issued substantially on 
the same facts, on the expiry of the first one. This will not be 
a desirable practice. 
It is also necessary that every Proclamation should be 
placed before each House of Parliament at the earliest and in 
any case before the expiry of the period of two months from 
its issue. 
/ The experience over the last decades amply demonstrate 
that the Governors cannot play an independent and impartial 
role in Union-States Relations. It is imperative for the 
Governors to behave in a dignified manner in consonance with 
the provisions of the Constitution. They are not subordinate or 
subservient to the Government of India. The office of the 
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Governor is a Constitutional one, not a mere pleasure 
appointment and there is absolutely no justification on the part 
of Governors to behave in a partisan manner. However, to 
remove this lacunae, certain safeguards can be evolved to 
ensure their independence, both by Constitutional 
Amendments or otherwise. One safeguard would be that a 
person should not be appointed as a Governor for more than 
one term. Such a proposition would, perhaps, refrain the 
Governors from looking at the powers that be, for favours 
after the end of their term. A second suggestion would be to 
appoint non-political persons as Governors instead of the 
present practice of appointing discarded politicians, party 
workers and retired bureaucrats, as governors. A third 
safeguard would be to incorporate a provision of impeachment 
of governors by the State Assembly in the Constitution by 
suitably amending it. This will hang to Democle's sword over 
the head of Governors, and make them behave in a responsive 
and responsible manner. 
Recommendations: 
1. Article 365 should be used sparingly, as last resort when 
all other alternatives fail. It should not be the first 
remedy. All attempts should be made to resolve the 
crisis at the State level itself before taking recourse to 
the provisions of Article 356. The availability and 
choice of these alternatives will depend on the nature of 
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the constitutional crisis, its causes and exigencies of the 
situation. 
2. The state government should be warned before making a 
rush to the imposition of Presidential Rule. The 
viewpoint of the State Government should also be taken 
into account. 
3. When an 'external aggression' or 'internal rebellion' 
paralyses the state administration creating a situation 
drifting towards a potential breakdown of the 
constitutional machinery of the State, all alternative 
courses available to the Union for discharging its 
paramount responsibility under Article 356 should be 
exhausted to contain the situation. 
4. In a situation of political breakdown, the Governor 
should explore all possibilities of having a government 
enjoying majority support in the Assembly. If it is not 
possible for such a government to be installed and if 
fresh elections can be held without avoidable delay, he 
should ask the outgoing Ministry, if there is one, to 
continue as a caretaker government, provided the 
Ministry was defeated solely on a major policy issue, 
unconnected with any allegations of maladministration 
or corruption and is agreeable to continue. The 
Governor should then dissolve the Legislative 
Assembly, leaving the resolution of the constitutional 
crisis to the electorate. During the interim period, the 
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caretaker government should be allowed to function. As 
a matter of convention, the caretaker government should 
merely carry on the day-to-day government and desist 
from taking any major policy decision. 
5. If the important ingredients described above are absent, 
it would not be proper for the Governor to dissolve the 
assembly and install a caretaker government. The 
Governor should recommend proclamation of 
President's rule without dissolving the Assembly. 
6. Every proclamation should be placed before each House 
of Parliament at the earliest, as contemplated in of 
Article 356(3). 
7. The State Legislative Assembly should not be dissolved 
either by the Governor or the President before the 
Proclamation is issued under Article 356(1) and has 
been laid before Parliament and it has had an 
opportunity to consider it. Article 356 should be 
suitably amended to ensure this 
8. Safeguards corresponding in principle, to clauses (7) 
and (8) of Article 352^ should be incorporated in Article 
365 to enable Parliament to review continuance in 
force of a Proclamation. 
9. There is greater need of judicial review which should be 
enlarged to cover mala fides also. An amendment of the 
Constitution incorporating, notwithstanding anything in 
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clause (2) of Article 74 of the Constitution, the material 
facts and grounds on which Article 356 (1) is invoked 
should be made an integral part of the Proclamation. 
This will ensure Parliamentary control over the exercise 
of this power by the Union Executive, more effective. 
10. Normally, the President is pressed into action under 
Article 356 on the report of the Governor. The report of 
the Governor is placed before each House of Parliament. 
Such a report should be a "speaking document" 
containing a precise and clear statement of all material 
facts and grounds on the basis of which the President 
may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of 
the situation contemplated in Article 356. 
11. The Governor's report, on the basis of which a 
Proclamation under Article 356(1) is issued, should be 
given wide publicity in the media. 
12. President's Rule should be proclaimed on the basis of 
the Governor's report under Article 365 (1) as a general 
rule. 
13. The discretion of the Governor should be of general 
nature and its use should not depend upon the 
circumstances particular to the situation of the state, 
rather they should be guided by some guidelines. In fact 
the real difficulty is not that the Governors are misusing 
their discretionary powers but they have overlooked 
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their constitutional position. It is suggested that it 
would be appropriate if the words used in Article 163, 
"except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution" 
are replaced by the words, "except when he thinks that 
he should exercise his discretion in a given situation 
against the wishes and advice of the Council of 
Ministers." That may perhaps, put to rest the 
controversy over Governor's "situational discretion." 
The controversy over Article 356 is largely political. It 
is the political parties and the real politic that have made a 
mockery of Article 356, for immediate political gains. A 
political party, when in opposition, ask for the abolition, 
amendments or abrogation of Article 356 and when it comes to 
power at the Centre abuse the power for political ends. The 
Congress is the biggest beneficiary in this game. Other parties 
also did not lag behind. For example, the BJP in its manifesto 
of 1996 declared that it will explore the possibility of making 
it mandatory for the Union Government to seek Parliament's 
approval by two third majority for dismissal of state 
governments but nothing has been done till date. It is time for 
the parties to come to a broad agreement on the real intent of 
Article 356. 
Conclusion ^^^ 
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9. Article 352(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the 
foregoing clauses, the President shall revoke a 
Proclamation used under clause (1) or a Proclamation 
varying such Proclamation if the House of the People 
passes a resolution disapproving, or as the case may be, 
disapproving the continuance in force of such 
Proclamation. 
10. Article 365 Effect of failure to comply with, with or to 
give directions given by the Union- where any State has 
failed to comply with or, to give effect to, any direction 
given in the exercise of the executive power of the 
union under any of the provisions of the Constitution, it 
should be lawful for the President to hold that a situation 
has arisen in which the Government of the State can not 
be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution 
352(8) when a notice in writing signed by not less than 
one tenth of the total number of members of the House of 
the People has been given, of their intention to move a 
resolution for disapproving or, as the case may be, for 
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disapproving the continuance in force of a Proclamation 
issued under clause (1) or, a Proclamation varying such 
Proclamations: 
(a) to the Speaker, if the House is in session; or 
(b) to the President, if the House is not in session. 
Special sitting of the House shall be held 
within fourteen days from the date on which 
such notice is received by the Speaker, or as 
the case may be by the President, for the 
purpose of considering such resolution. 

The Constitution of India 
Proclamation of Emergency, Articles 352 
(1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists 
whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory 
thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or 
[armed rebellion], he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration 
to that effect in respect of the whole of India or of such part of 
the territory thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation]. 
Explanation:- A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the 
security of India or any part of the territory thereof is 
threatened by war or by external aggression or by armed 
rebellion may be made before the actual occurrence of war or of 
any such aggression or rebellion, if the President is satisfied 
that there is imminent danger thereof.] 
(2) A Proclamation issued under clause (1) may be varied or 
revoked by a subsequent Proclamation. 
(3) The President shall not issue a Proclamation under clause (1) or 
a Proclamation varying such Proclamation unless the decision 
of the Union Cabinet (that is to say, the Council consisting of 
the Prime Minister and other Ministers of Cabinet rank 
appointed under article 75) that such a Proclamation may be 
issued has been communicated to him in writing. 
(4) Every Proclamation issued under this article shall be laid before 
each House of Parliament and shall, except where it is a 
Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to 
operate at the expiration of one month unless before the 
expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of 
both Houses of Parliament: 
Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being a 
Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is issued at a 
time when the House of the People has been dissolved, or the 
dissolution of the House of the People takes place during the 
period of one month referred to in this clause, and if a 
resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the 
Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such 
Appendix 
Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People 
before the expiration of that period the Proclamation shall cease 
to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on 
which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution, 
unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a 
resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by 
the House of the People. 
(5) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to 
operate on the expiration of a period of six months from the 
date of the passing of the second of the resolutions approving 
the Proclamation under clause (4): 
Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the 
continuance in force of such a Proclamation is passed by both 
Houses of Parliament the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, 
continue in force for a further period of six months from the 
date on which it would otherwise have ceased to operate under 
this clause: 
Provided further that if the dissolution of the House of the 
People takes place during any such period of six months and a 
resolution approving the continuance in force of such 
Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States but no 
resolution with respect to the continuance in force of such 
Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People 
during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate 
at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the 
House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless 
before the expiration of the said period of thirty days, a 
resolution approving the continuance in force of the 
Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. 
(6) For the purposes of clauses (4) and (5), a resolution may be 
passed by either House of Parliament only by a majority of the 
total membership of that House and by a majority of not less 
than two-thirds of the Members of that House present and 
voting. 
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing clauses, 
the President shall revoke a Proclamation issued under clause 
(1) or a Proclamation varying such Proclamation if the House of 
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the People passes a resolution disapproving, or, as the case may 
be, disapproving the continuance in force of, such 
Proclamation. 
(8) Where a notice in writing signed by not less than one-tenth of 
the total number of members of the House of the People has 
been given, of their intention to move a resolution for 
disapproving, or, as the case may be, for disapproving the 
continuance in force of, a Proclamation issued under clause (1) 
or a Proclamation varying such Proclamation,-
(a) to the Speaker, if the House is in session; or 
(b) to the President, if the House is not in session, 
a special sitting of the House shall be held within fourteen days from 
the date on which such notice is received by the Speaker, or, as 
the case may be, by the President, for the purpose of 
considering such resolution.] 
(9) The power conferred on the President by this article shall 
include the power to issue different Proclamations on different 
grounds, being war or external aggression or [armed rebellion] 
or imminent danger of war or external aggression or [armed 
rebellion], whether or not there is a Proclamation already issued 
by the President under clause (1) and such Proclamation is in 
operation. 
Effect of Proclamation of Emergency, Article 353. 
While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, then-
(a) notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the executive 
power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions to 
any State as to the manner in which the executive power thereof 
is to be exercised; 
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws with respect to any 
matter shall include power to make laws conferring powers and 
imposing duties, or authorising the conferring of powers and the 
imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities 
of the Union as respects that matter, notwithstanding that it is 
one which is not enumerated in the Union List: 
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[Provided that where a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
operation only in any part of the territory of India,-
(i) the executive power of the Union to give directions under 
clause (a), and 
(ii) the power of Parliament to make laws under clause (b), 
shall also extend to any State other than a State in which or in 
any part of which the Proclamation of Emergency is in 
operation if and in so far as the security of India or any part of 
the territory thereof is threatened by activities in or in relation 
to the part of the territory of India in which the Proclamation of 
Emergency is in operation.] 
Application of provisions relating to distribution of revenues 
while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, Article 354. 
(1) The President may, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
operation, by order direct that all or any of the provisions of 
articles 268 to 279 shall for such period, not extending in any 
case beyond the expiration of the financial year in which such 
Proclamation ceases to operate, as may be specified in the 
order, have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as 
he thinks fit. 
(2) Every order made under clause (1) shall, as soon as may be 
after it is made, be laid before each House of Parliament. 
Duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression 
and internal disturbance, Article 355. 
It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against 
external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that 
the government of every State is carried on in accordance with 
the provisions of this Constitution. 
Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in 
States, Article 356. 
(1) If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a 
State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in 
which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in 
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accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the 
President may by Proclamation-
(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government 
of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable 
by the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than 
the Legislature of the State; 
(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be 
exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; 
(c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to 
the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to 
the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for 
suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions 
of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the 
State; 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise the President 
to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable 
by a High Court, or to suspend in whole or in part the operation 
of any provision of this Constitution relating to High Courts. 
(2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or varied by a 
subsequent Proclamation. 
(3) Every Proclamation under this article shall be laid before each 
House of Parliament and shall, except where it is a 
Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to 
operate at the expiration of two months unless before the 
expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of 
both Houses of Parliament: 
Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being a 
Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is issued at a 
time when the House of the People is dissolved or the 
dissolution of the House of the People takes place during the 
period of two months referred to in this clause, and if a 
resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the 
Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such 
Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People 
before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation shall 
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cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on 
which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution 
unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a 
resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by 
the House of the People. 
(4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to 
operate on the expiration of a period of [six months from the 
date of issue of the Proclamation]: 
Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the 
continuance in force of such a Proclamation is passed by both 
Houses of Parliament, the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, 
continue in force for a further period of [six months] from the 
date on which under this clause it would otherwise have ceased 
to operate, but no such Proclamation shall in any case remain in 
force for more than three years: 
Provided further that if the dissolution of the House of the 
People takes place during any such period of [six months] and a 
resolution approving the continuance in force of such 
Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no 
resolution with respect to the continuance in force of such 
Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People 
during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate 
at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the 
House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless 
before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a 
resolution approving the continuance in force of the 
Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People: 
[Provided also that in the case of the Proclamation issued under 
clause (1) on the 11th day of May, 1987 with respect to the 
State of Punjab, the reference in the first proviso to this clause 
to "three years" shall be construed as a reference to [five years], 
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (4), a resolution 
with respect to the continuance in force of a Proclamation 
approved under clause (3) for any period beyond the expiration 
of one year from the date of issue of such Proclamation shall 
not be passed by either House of Parliament unless-
Appendix VII 
(a) a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in the whole 
of India or, as the case may be, in the whole or any part of the 
State, at the time of the passing of such resolution, and 
(b) the Election Commission certifies that the continuance in 
force of the Proclamation approved under clause (3) during the 
period specified in such resolution is necessary on account of 
difficulties in holding general elections to the Legislative 
Assembly of the State concerned:] 
[Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to the 
Proclamation issued under clause (1) on the 11th day of May, 
1987 with respect to the State of Punjab.] 
Exercise of legislative powers under Proclamation issued under 
Article 356. 
(1) Where by a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356, 
it has been declared that the powers of the Legislature of the 
State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of 
Parliament, it shall be competent-
(a) for Parliament to confer on the President the power of the 
Legislature of the State to make laws, and to authorise the 
President to delegate, subject to such conditions as he may 
think fit to impose, the power so conferred to any other 
authority to be specified by him in that behalf; 
(b) for Parliament, or for the President or other authority in 
whom such power to make laws is vested under sub-clause (a), 
to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or 
authorising the conferring of powers and the imposition of 
duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities thereof; 
(c) for the President to authorise when the House of the People 
is not in session expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the 
State pending the sanction of such expenditure by Parliament. 
(2) [Any law made in exercise of the power of the Legislature of 
the State by Parliament or the President or other authority 
referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) which Parliament or 
the President or such other authority would not, but for the 
issue of a Proclamation under article 356, have been competent 
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to make shall, after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, 
continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a 
competent Legislature or other authority.] 
Suspension of provisions of article 19 during emergencies, 
Article 358. 
(1) [While a Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security 
of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war 
or by external aggression is in operation], nothing in article 19 
shall restrict the power of the State as defined in Part III to 
make any law or to take any executive action which the State 
would but for the provisions contained in that Part be competent 
to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of 
the incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the 
Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects things done 
or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect: 
[Provided that [where such Proclamation of Emergency] is in 
operation only in any part of the territory of India, any such law 
may be made, or any such executive action may be taken, under 
this article in relation to or in any State or Union territory in 
which or in any part of which the Proclamation of Emergency is 
not in operation, if and in so far as the security of India or any 
part of the territory thereof is threatened by activities in or in 
relation to the part of the territory of India in which the 
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation.] 
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply-
(a) to any law which does not contain a recital to the effect that 
such law is in relation to the Proclamation of Emergency in 
operation when it is made; or 
(b) to any executive action taken otherwise than under a law 
containing such a recital.] 
Provisions as to financial emergency. Article 360. 
(1) If the President is satisfied that a situation has arisen whereby 
the financial stability or credit of India or of any part of the 
territory thereof is threatened, he may by a Proclamation make 
a declaration to that effect. 
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(2) A Proclamation issued under clause (1)-
(a) may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Proclamation; 
(b) shall be laid before each House of Parliament; 
(c) shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months, unless 
before the expiration of that period it has been approved by 
resolutions of both Houses of Parliament: 
Provided that if any such Proclamation is issued at a time when 
the House of the People has been dissolved or the dissolution of 
the House of the People takes place during the period of two 
months referred to in sub-clause (c), and if a resolution 
approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of 
States, but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has 
been passed by the House of the People before the expiration of 
that period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the 
expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of 
the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the 
expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution 
approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House 
of the People.] 
(3) During the period any such Proclamation as is mentioned in 
clause (1) is in operation, the executive authority of the Union 
shall extend to the giving of directions to any State to observe 
such canons of financial propriety as may be specified in the 
directions, and to the giving of such other directions as the 
President may deem necessary and adequate for the purpose. 
(4) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution-
(a) any such direction may include-
(i) a provision requiring the reduction of salaries and 
allowances of all or any class of persons serving in connection 
with the affairs of a State; 
(ii) a provision requiring all Money Bills or other Bills to which 
the provisions of article 207 apply to be reserved for the 
consideration of the President after they are passed by the 
Legislature of the State; 
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(b) it shall be competent for the President during the period any 
Proclamation issued under this article is in operation to issue 
directions for the reduction of salaries and allowances of all or 
any class of persons serving in connection with the affairs of 
the Union including the Judges of the Supreme Court and the 
High Courts. 
Protection of President and Governors and Rajpramukhs, 
Article 361. 
(1) The President, or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, shall 
not be answerable to any court for the exercise and performance 
of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or 
purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance 
of those powers and duties: 
Provided that the conduct of the President may be brought 
under review by any court, tribunal or body appointed or 
designated by either House of Parliament for the investigation 
of a charge under article 61: 
Provided further that nothing in this clause shall be construed as 
restricting the right of any person to bring appropriate 
proceedings against the Government of India or the Government 
of a State. 
(2) No criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or 
continued against the President, or the Governor of a State, in 
any court during his term of office. 
(3 No process for the arrest or imprisonment of the President, or 
the Governor of a State, shall issue from any court during his 
term of office. 
(4) No civil proceedings in which relief is claimed against the 
President, or the Governor of a State, shall be instituted during 
his term of office in any court in respect of any act done or 
purporting to be done by him in his personal capacity, whether 
before or after he entered upon his office as President, or as 
Governor of such State, until the expiration of two months next 
after notice in writing has been delivered to the President or the 
Governor as the case may be, or left at his office stating the 
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nature of the proceedings, the cause of action therefor, the 
name, description and place of residence of the party by whom 
such proceedings are to be instituted and the relief which he 
claims. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Protection of publication of proceedings of Parliament and State 
Legislatures, Article 361 A. 
(1) No person shall be liable to any proceedings, civil or criminal, 
in any court in respect of the publication in a newspaper of a 
substantially true report of any proceedings of either House of 
Parliament or the Legislative Assembly, or, as the case may be, 
either House of the Legislature, of a State, unless the 
publication is proved to have been made with malice: 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to the 
publication of any report of the proceedings of a secret sitting 
of either House of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly, or, 
as the case may be, either House of the Legislature, of a State. 
(2) Clause (1) shall apply in relation to reports or matters broadcast 
by means of wireless telegraphy as part of any programme or 
service provided by means of a broadcasting station as it 
applies in relation to reports or matters published in a 
newspaper. 
Explanation.- In this article, "newspaper" includes a news 
agency report containing material for publication in a 
newspaper.] 
Effect of failure to comply with, or to give effect to, directions 
given by the Union, Article 365. 
Where any State has failed to comply with, or to give effect to, 
any directions given in the exercise of the executive power of 
the Union under any of the provisions of this Constitution, it 
shall be lawful for the President to hold that a situation has 
arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried 
on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
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